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ABSTRACT
The management accountant (MA) has traditionally been described as having two 
distinct roles. One role centres on control, the other on decision-making (DM) 
(Hopper, 1980). Developments in the business environment have altered the 
dynamics of these two roles suggesting that the contemporary MA is responsible for 
providing an increasingly wide range of information. The literature suggests that this 
can only be achieved if the MA becomes a hybrid accountant who assists managers 
in controlling the organisation in a modern context, while also occupying a ‘business 
partner’ role along side the management team (Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). A review 
of the literature identifies a need for a rigorous and up-to-date examination of the 
MA’s role and exposes a dearth of empirical research reporting managers’ 
perceptions of the MA’s role (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). In response, this dissertation 
reports the findings from an empirical study of managers’ perceptions of the role of 
MAs in the provision of information for control and DM.
Research questions were generated in the context of key control frameworks 
presented in the literature, as well as significant prior empirical research on the MA’s 
evolving role, user perceptions and the impact of change and contingent variables on 
the MA’s role. Semi structured interviews were carried out with eighteen managers 
regarding their information requirements, their expectations of the information 
provider, the perceived performance of their respective MAs relative to these 
expectations and perceived conflicts inherent in the MA’s role.
A mixture of quantitative and qualitative data were gathered. The quantitative results 
were subject to statistical analysis and the qualitative results were analysed through 
an iterative process of coding and analytical induction.
A framework of analysis was developed through which these findings could be 
interpreted in detail. Using this framework, the different types of MA evident from 
the findings were refined to four possible categories: the Reporter, the Guardian, the 
Interpreter and the Participator. Several factors were identified which may be 
associated with the role played by the MA. In addition, some further insights were 
gathered facilitating a deeper understanding of the complexities of the MA’s 
contemporary role.
The study highlights the diversity of management accounting roles among different 
organisations. It examines what managers are looking for in the context of support 
for control and DM, and provides an insight into the levels of satisfaction among 
managers as to the role played by their MA in this regard. The study broadens our 
understanding of the control frameworks presented in the literature and examines the 
concept of the hybrid accountant, presenting a more detailed definition of the hybrid 
accountant than has previously been presented in the literature. Finally, the study 
increases our understanding of the conflicts inherent in the MA’s role, as perceived 
by the managers.
By focusing on managers’ perceptions of the role of MAs, this study addresses a 
significant gap in the literature. It provides a deeper and more contemporary insight 
into the contingency-based research surrounding the MA’s role. It also contributes to 
the literature in the area of control, MA roles, the hybrid accountant and MA role 
conflict. The study concludes by suggesting possible directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
Background, 
objectives and 
overview of the 
study
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The management accounting literature has traditionally presented the management 
accountant (MA) as someone with two distinct roles. One role centres on monitoring, 
control and scorekeeping, the other involves supporting managerial decision-making 
(DM) and assisting in problem solving (Hopper, 1980). As the business environment 
has developed and transformed over the past two decades (Otley, 1994; Cooper, 
1995; Burns, Scapens and Turley, 1996), the dynamics o f these two roles have 
altered significantly (Granlund and Lukka, 1998). The literature suggests that 
contributing to control, in today’s environment, involves putting financial numbers in 
a strategic context and relating non financial results to strategic objectives (Burns, 
Ezzamel and Scapens, 1999). Contributing to DM requires the MA to be strategically 
aware with sufficient business knowledge to be able to advise management for the 
purposes o f DM (Bums and Yazdifar, 2001).
There is a dearth o f empirical research reporting managers’ perceptions of the MA’s 
role (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). The contemporary literature is not clear on the extent 
to which MAs have embraced the changes in the business environment, nor does it 
adequately reflect the opinions o f managers with regard to the M A’s role in light of 
such changes. In response, this dissertation reports the findings from an empirical 
study o f managers’ perceptions o f the role o f the MA.
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.2.1 The objectives of the management accountant
Simon, Guetzkow, Kozmetsky and Tyndall (1954) describe accounting in the context 
of three functions: scorekeeping, attention directing and problem solving. 
Scorekeeping data includes routine financial reports and accounts. Attention 
directing data includes data which compares actual performance with standard so that 
deviations may be highlighted. Problem solving data includes any type o f data which 
helps managers to make decisions. Hopper (1980) considers scorekeeping and 
attention directing to fall under the common umbrella of control, while Simon (1960) 
considers problem solving and DM to be inextricably linked. In this way, the
2
fundamental objective o f the MA, as traditionally presented in the literature, is the 
provision of information to support control and DM (Belkaoui, 1980; Emmanuel, 
Otley and Merchant, 1991; Drury, 2004).
1.2.2 The development of organisational control
Organisational control may be described as the way in which managers manage the 
organisation so that it achieves its chosen objectives (Otley and Berry, 1980). 
Anthony (1965) discusses organisational control in the context o f strategic planning, 
management control and operational control. Strategic planning involves deciding on 
the organisations objectives, as well as the resources and policies necessary to 
achieve those objectives. Management control describes the means by which 
managers ensure that these resources are obtained and used effectively and 
efficiently in achieving the objectives. Operational control involves ensuring that all 
of the organisation’s day-to-day tasks are carried out properly. Anthony focuses on 
management control and emphasises the use of accounting measurements as a key 
control tool but he ignores strategic planning and operational control which leads to 
an overly simplified control model which cannot cope with many of the complexities 
of the business environment (Otley, 1994).
Otley and Berry (1980) present a more holistic control model which embraces 
strategic planning and operational control, as well as management control, by 
recognising the significance o f the organisation’s relationship with its external 
environment and encouraging the organisation to adapt and learn as environmental 
changes occur.
Otley (1999), responding to changes in the business environment, presents a control 
framework which progresses from measuring organisational performance to 
managing organisational performance. He suggests that an organisation is 
performing well if  it is successfully achieving its objectives and he argues that the 
traditional frameworks presented by Anthony (1965) and Otley and Berry (1980) will 
not facilitate this type of control. Otley (1999) describes the necessity to motivate 
and incentivise employees to achieve organisational objectives and discusses the role 
of information as a key ingredient in this modern control framework.
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Essentially, these frameworks represent the progression o f thought in the literature 
with regard to control in response to changes and developments in the business 
environment. Simons (1995) developed a framework which, he claims, describes the 
fundamental elements o f an effective control system. Simons’ (1995) four levers of 
control encapsulate this progression of thought in the control literature. Simons’ 
(1995) diagnostic and boundary control systems are consistent with the hierarchical 
approach to control presented by Anthony (1965) and Otley and Berry (1980), while 
his belief and interactive control systems are consistent with Otley’s (1999) modem 
view of control. The contemporary view o f control recognises the growing voice of 
employees within the organisation and suggests that the traditional control tools of 
accountability and performance appraisal must be applied in a manner which 
motivates all employees towards achieving the organisation’s objectives.
1.2.3 The development of organisational decision-making
A key function o f the MA is to support managers in their DM (Emmanuel et al, 
1991). Anthony (1965) describes DM in the context o f operational, managerial and 
strategic decisions. Operational decisions involve specific tasks and generally span a 
short time-frame, e.g. inventory ordering. Managerial decisions require more 
subjective interpretation and judgement than operational decisions, e.g. budget 
preparation. Finally, strategic decisions are more future oriented, span a longer time 
frame and require the decision-maker to have a strong awareness of the relationship 
between the organisation and the external environment, e.g. new product planning 
(Belkaoui, 1980). Simon (1960) differentiates between structured decisions which 
are repetitive and routine, and unstructured decisions which are ad hoc and 
unpredictable. Like control, the nature of DM has evolved. As the business 
environment has become less predictable, the decisions facing managers have 
become more unstructured in nature (Otley, 1994). DM is becoming more dependant 
on critical analysis and interactive discussion than on mathematical modelling and 
linear programming. Also, the responsibility for organisational adaptability and 
flexibility no longer rests with just senior management and so the distinction between 
operational management, middle management and strategic management is blurring 
(Ezzamel, Lilley and Willmott, 1994).
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1.2.4 The management accountant's role in control and decision-making
Johnson and Kaplan (1987) initiated concerns in the text ‘Relevance Lost: The Rise 
and Fall of Management Accounting’ as to the continued relevance o f management 
accounting techniques in light of changes in the business environment. This was 
followed by a decade of criticisms of the management accounting profession coupled 
with suggestions for improvement (Cooper and Kaplan, 1987; 1988; 1991; Kato, 
1993; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994). Pierce and O ’Dea (1998), however, reported 
that traditional control techniques such as budgets, variance analysis and standard 
costing were as popular as ever and Bums and Yazdifar (2001) reported that modern 
DM tools such as Activity Based Costing (ABC) were enjoying only modest 
application. The literature suggests that the changes occurring in the management 
accounting profession were not necessarily in terms of the tools and techniques 
which the MAs were using for control and DM, but more in terms of who was 
performing these management accounting tasks and how they were being performed 
(Scapens, Turley, Burns, Joseph, Lewis and Southworth, 1996). According to the 
literature, the MA was expected to provide more non-financial information (Drury, 
Braund, Osborne and Tayles, 1993) and ‘softer’, more strategically relevant 
information (Roslender, 1996).
The 1990s witnessed vast improvements in field-based research methods, resulting in 
more management accounting studies being conducted, addressing issues not 
previously focused on in the management accounting literature (Scapens and 
Bromwich, 2001). Topics such as the M A’s role (Granlund and Lukka, 1998), the 
MA’s competencies (Brignall, Fitzgerald, Johnston and Markou, 1999), management 
accounting practices (Friedman and Lyne, 1997) and the impact of change on the 
MA (Burns et al, 1996) all became key areas for analysis. The Siegel and Kulesza 
(1994) and Siegel and Sorensen (1999) ‘practice analyses’ both represented key 
studies into the M A’s skills and competencies, management accounting tasks and the 
MA's role in general. Increasingly, the literature was presenting a MA who 
interpreted information so as to facilitate control in a contemporary business 
environment and contribute to DM in a more useful manner. The term ‘hybrid 
accountant’ (Bums et al, 1999) was coined to encapsulate this dual role of the
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modern MA. The literature suggested that this modem MA would address all of the 
challenges posed by the modem business environment in terms of control and DM. 
This suggests a change in the type o f information provided by the contemporary MA 
when compared with the traditional MA. It suggests a shift in the key traits and 
characteristics o f the modern MA and an alteration in managers’ expectations o f the 
MA.
1.3 NEED FOR RESEARCH ON THIS TOPIC
A significant amount o f research has been published predicting the demise of the 
traditional MA (Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Brignall et al, 1999) in favour of a 
modem hybrid style MA (Bums et al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). Bums et al 
(1999) predict that the future MA will work alongside and advise process managers, 
combining their financial knowledge with commercial awareness together with a 
broad-based understanding of the business. Burns and Yazdifar (2001) anticipate 
traditional management accounting tools being adopted in conjunction with strategy- 
led tools such as rolling forecasts and strategic management accounting. Siegel and 
Sorensen (1999) report that MAs now see themselves as business analysts actively 
involved in organisational DM. An up-to-date, rigorous examination of the MA’s 
role is now necessary in order to ascertain the extent to which there is evidence of 
these predictions and expectations being realised.
In addition, there is a dearth of empirical research reporting managers’ perceptions of 
the MA’s role. Enquiries o f MAs do little to establish if managers’ needs are actually 
being met (Pierce and O ’Dea, 2003). Therefore, an up-to-date, rigorous examination 
of managers’ perceptions o f the MA role is necessary.
Also, recent empirical research into the MA’s role appears to have been carried out 
in isolation from the underlying theoretical frameworks presented in the literature. It 
is difficult to relate the results o f the empirical reviews o f the last two decades (e.g. 
Siegel and Kulesza, 1994; Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; 
Bums et al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001) to the underlying theoretical 
frameworks preceding them (e.g. Simon et al, 1954; Otley and Berry, 1980; Simons,
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1995; Otley, 1999). It is necessary to bring these two bodies o f research closer 
together in order to gain a better understanding o f both.
Concern has been expressed in the literature as to the conflicts inherent in the M A’s 
role, whether it’s the modem hybrid accountant role (Granlund and Lukka, 1998) or 
the traditional MA role (Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 1978; Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982). 
Few studies have examined managers’ perceptions of these conflicts. It is important 
to understand if  these conflicts are perceived to exist in all MAs and what factors 
might be associated with increased or decreased conflicts in different circumstances.
Up-to-date research is needed in order to ascertain managers’ perceptions of the 
current status o f the M A’s role, specifically in the context o f control and DM, and to 
identify the key factors influencing this role. This area o f research addresses some 
gaps in the existing literature and has practical implications for the management 
accounting profession and for the future education o f MAs.
1.4 O BJECTIV ES OF TH E RESEARCH
The general research objective and specific research questions are set out in detail in 
chapter 4 and are summarised briefly below. The general objective o f this study is to 
examine managers’ perceptions of the role of the MA in providing information for 
control and DM, as well as the factors influencing this role (4.2.1). This objective 
will be achieved by posing specific research questions as introduced below.
The role o f information has been examined in detail in the literature (Belkaoui, 1980; 
Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Jonsson and Gronlund, 1988; Bruns and McKinnon, 
1993; Mia and Chenhall, 1994; Mondoza and Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003; 
Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002). A comprehensive list was derived from this 
literature of the characteristics most frequently referred to by managers when 
discussing their information requirements (2.6). The literature has not examined in 
detail the extent to which these characteristics may be considered as important for 
control as for DM and vice versa. The first research question therefore is to ascertain 
what characteristics o f information do managers perceive to be important for (i) 
control and (ii) DM (4.2.2)?
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Chapter 3 details the changes which have occurred in the business environment over 
the past two decades and the effects these changes have had on the role o f the MA. 
Chapter 3 also describes how the various skills, attributes and competencies (SACs) 
o f the MA have been reviewed in the literature (Siegel and Kulesza, 1994; Siegel and 
Sorensen, 1999; Bums et al, 1999; Pierce and O’Dea, 1998; Burns and Yazdifar, 
2001). A comprehensive list was derived from this literature o f the SACs often 
referred to by managers when discussing their information providers (3.8). Again, 
this literature has not focused on the extent to which these SACs may be considered 
as important for control as they are for DM, or vice versa. The second research 
question therefore is to ascertain what SACs managers perceive to be important in 
providers o f information for (i) control and (ii) DM (4.2.3)?
Chapter 2 explains how the MA role, as traditionally presented in the literature, may 
be divided into two contrasting roles. From one perspective, the MA is relied upon to 
support the organisation’s planning and control system; from another, to support 
organisational DM (2.2.4). The third research question therefore asks managers to 
what extent are MAs providing information for (i) control and (ii) DM (4.2.4)?
Prior empirical reviews focusing on information have examined managers’ 
perceptions o f the importance of specific information characteristics, or the MA’s 
performance in relation to specific information characteristics. Few have attempted 
both, which is why the fourth research question in this study asks how effective the 
MA is perceived to be at providing useful information (4.2.5)?
Similarly, prior empirical research has focused on the importance of SACs, or the 
M A’s performance in relation to SACs. Again, this study examines both. Examining 
the MAs’ SACs in this way will highlight gaps between the managers’ expectations 
and the MAs’ perceived capabilities. In addition, many o f these studies have focused 
on predicting future changes and anticipating future requirements. This study focuses 
on the actual experiences o f managers in comparison with the predictions made in 
prior studies. The fifth research question therefore asks to what extent MAs display 
the SACs associated with providers o f useful information (4.2.6)?
8
Chapter 2 describes the two distinct roles of the MA; one contributing to control, the 
other contributing to DM (2.2.4). Chapter 3 describes how these roles have become 
more conflicting as a result of all of the developments in the business environment 
and the resulting changes in the MA’s role (3.2-3.3). The literature questions whether 
both roles can be occupied by the same person (Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 1978; Hopper, 
1980, Sathe, 1982 Granlund and Lukka, 1998), but very few have examined this 
from a manager’s perspective. The sixth research question therefore asks to what 
extent do managers perceive a conflict to exist in the M A’s capacity to provide 
information for both control and DM (4.2.7)?
1.5 OVERVIEW  OF STUDY DESIGN
In order to address the research questions and the underlying research objective set 
out in section 1.4, data were collected by means o f eighteen semi-structured 
interviews with managers in eighteen different companies. A purposeful random 
sampling approach was used in sourcing these interviewees. This approach reduces 
bias but does prohibit statistical generalisation to a larger population.
Data were gathered from each manager during face-to-face interviews lasting 
approximately 60 minutes each. The quantitative and qualitative nature o f the study 
is described in detail in chapter 4 and may be summarised as follows: Specific 
quantitative information was requested with regard to RQ1 relating to the importance 
of various information characteristics, RQ2 relating to the importance of various 
SACs, RQ4 relating to the MA’s performance in terms of the information 
characteristics and RQ5 relating to the MAs performance in terms of the SACs. The 
managers were asked to choose their responses from a pre-determined scale and were 
then asked open-ended questions based on their quantitative answers. Open-ended 
questions only were asked in relation to RQ3 relating to the role played by their MA 
and RQ6 relating to perceived conflicts in the M A’s role. The interview findings are 
presented in chapter 5.
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After all of the interviews were completed, an extensive process of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis took place. The quantitative results were subjected to detailed 
non-parametric testing while the qualitative results were analysed using an iterative 
process o f coding and analytical induction (AI). The analysis and interpretation of 
these findings are presented in chapter 6.
Several measures were taken to maximise the reliability and validity of these 
findings. Random sampling meant that all interviewees were consulted without a pre­
conceived notion of the manager’s responses. All transcripts and notes were 
reviewed after each interview at which time post interview notes were prepared. 
Each transcript was confirmed with each interviewee. All quantitative and qualitative 
analysis procedures were applied rigorously and documented methodically. The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data gathering facilitated triangulation of 
results, and an iterative process of AI resulted in a detailed and lengthy study of the 
findings.
1.6 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
The findings were consistent with some areas o f the literature, they served to 
contradict other areas o f the literature and they addressed some areas not previously 
focused on in empirical studies. The contributions of this study are set out in detail in 
chapter 7 but a summary is set out below.
Firstly, the MA classification system developed from the findings of this study (6.2) 
is consistent with the progression of thought in the literature with regard to control. 
An analysis o f the MA classification system in the context of the key control 
frameworks broadens our understanding of these control frameworks. The findings 
suggest that specific styles of control, as encapsulated within the frameworks, will 
only be successfully executed in specific organisational circumstances. Specifically, 
the findings suggest that growing competitive pressures may be associated with 
Simons’ (1995) belief systems of control (6.4.2), increased financial security may be 
associated with Simons’ interactive control systems (6.4.3) and a strong corporate 
influence may encourage Simons’ diagnostic and boundary control system (6.4.4). In 
addition, the findings suggest that relationships and interactions between individuals
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will also influence the style of control executed in an organisation. For instance, 
there is evidence that higher levels of manager independence from the MA may be 
associated with a traditional control approach being executed in the organisation 
(6.5.4). More territorial managers may operate within diagnostic and boundary 
control systems (6.5.5) and a modem control approach may be associated with MAs 
who exhibit a strong business understanding (6.6.1) and strong communication skills 
(6 .6 .2).
Secondly, the study responds to gaps in the literature by providing a rigorous and up- 
to-date analysis o f managers’ perceptions of the role o f the MA in the context of 
control and DM. It presents a deeper understanding of what managers are looking for 
in terms of support for control and DM and raises awareness as to the levels of 
satisfaction among managers regarding their M As’ performance. It examines the 
concept of the hybrid accountant as presented in the literature and provides an up-to- 
date description o f this so-called hybrid accountant as interpreted from the findings.
Thirdly, the study provides a deeper and more contemporary insight into the 
contingency-based research surrounding the M A’s role. Chenhall (2003) suggested 
that future contingency-based research should focus on interactions between 
individuals and groups which might impact the M A’s role. The study responds to this 
suggestion by examining how interactions between the manager and the MA may be 
associated with the role played by the MA, Specifically, the study identified how the 
relationship between the manager and the MA (6.5.3), the extent of manager 
independence from the MA (6.5.4) and levels o f manager territorialism (6.5.5) affect 
the role played by the MA.
Finally, the study examines managers’ perceptions of the conflicts inherent in the 
MA’s role as a simultaneous ‘controller’ and ‘supporter’ o f managers and 
employees. It highlights some factors which may be associated with these conflicts 
and discusses why some managers appear to be better equipped than others to 
overcome these conflicts.
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Following the overview o f the research outlined in this chapter, the role o f the MA as 
traditionally presented in the literature is reviewed in chapter 2. Most o f this 
literature is theoretical in nature and presents some key frameworks which are 
revisited and referred to at various stages throughout the study. Chapter 3 examines 
the role of the MA as presented in the contemporary literature, most o f which is 
empirical in nature.
Based on the literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3, a research objective for the 
study was identified. This research objective is presented in chapter 4 together with 
six research questions to be addressed in pursuing this objective. The research 
design, data collection and data analyses procedures are also described in chapter 4.
The findings from the interviews, addressing each research question, are reported in 
chapter 5. Chapter 6 begins with a description of the MA classification system. This 
is the framework established in this study through which the study’s findings are 
interpreted. Chapter 6 goes on to discuss these findings in the context of this 
framework. Finally, in chapter 7 the implications of the findings are examined along 
with a summary o f the research, its conclusions, strengths, limitations, and 
suggestions for future research.
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION
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CHAPTER 2
The Traditional 
Role of the 
Management 
Accountant
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The relevance of management accounting in light of the changing business 
environment has been questioned at length in the literature (Kaplan, 1984, 1985, 
1988, 1990; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Drury and Tayles, 1995 and Drury, 2004). 
There appears to be a significant difference between the traditional MA as portrayed 
in the textbooks and actual management accounting practices (Drury and Tayles, 
1995). Traditional management accounting research output has been in the form of 
simplistic models o f the outside world, rather than studies o f ‘best practice’. As a 
consequence, this literature has been criticised for becoming somewhat impractical 
and divorced from reality (Roslender, 1996). More recent empirical literature 
suggests that changes are taking place (Scapens et al, 1996; Bums et al, 1999; Burns 
and Yazdifar, 2001). These changes are occurring in terms of what management 
accounting is being done, how it is being done and who is doing it (Ezzamel et al, 
1994). Chapter 2 will analyse the function of management accounting as traditionally 
presented in the well-established management accounting literature, most o f which is 
theoretical in nature, while chapter 3 will address the role of the MA as reported in 
the contemporary empirical literature.
Section 2.2 sets out Simon et al’s (1954) three functions of accounting data, 
ultimately concluding that traditionally the MA performed two key functions, 
providing information for control and providing information for DM. Section 2.3 
lays out the key management control frameworks in the literature, namely, Anthony 
(1965), Otley and Berry (1980) and Simons (1995). Section 2.4 discusses the 
theoretical frameworks underlying DM revisiting Anthony (1965) and introducing 
Simon (1960). Section 2.5 provides a discussion on the key management accounting 
techniques, both traditional and new, available to the MA in providing information 
for both of these purposes. Section 2.6 presents a list o f characteristics which may be 
used to assess the effectiveness o f this information. Section 2.7 provides a chapter 
summary and conclusion.
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2.2 SIMON ET ALS’ FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
Simon et al (1954) maintain that the function of accounting information was 
threefold. Firstly, accounting information fulfils a scorekeeping function, in this 
capacity, it is expected to indicate how an organisation, or a part of an organisation is 
performing. Secondly, accounting information contributes to attention directing by 
highlighting problems, concerns or areas worthy of further investigation. Finally, 
accounting information is used for problem solving, where it provides information on 
alternative courses of action and facilitates informed DM.
2.2.1 Scorekeeping
Hopper (1980) describes a bookkeeper as one who is involved in the implementation 
and administration of financial systems to enable management to monitor employee 
performance. Whether one refers to it as scorekeeping, bookkeeping, record-keeping 
or bean-counting, ultimately it encapsulates such activities as the generation of 
monthly accounts and the consistent production of routine financial reports with 
which managers can monitor and control the performance of various sub-units within 
the organisation, as well as the organisation as a whole.
2.2.2 Attention Directing
Traditional accounting-based control systems provide a means of establishing 
quantitative standards of performance, which, when compared with actual 
performance will indicate deviations, thereby fulfilling Simon et a l’s (1954) attention 
directing function (Otley and Berry, 1980). Budgeting, standard costing and variance 
analysis are among the most commonly cited traditional accounting-based control 
tools (Drury, 2004).
2.2.3 Problem Solving
Simon et al (1954) describe two ways in which managers may rely on accounting 
information when engaged in problem solving. They may turn to the regular 
accounting reports which are a product of the scorekeeping and attention directing
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functions discussed above. They may also require special studies for particular 
problems. Generally, each problem or issue faced by a manager will require the 
determination and investigation of potential courses of action out of which managers 
must decide on the best alternative. MAs are often relied upon, either through the 
elaboration of regular reports or through special analysis of core data, to provide 
information which identifies and/or expands upon these alternative courses of action 
and assists the manager in choosing the optimum one. This may include production 
cost comparisons, pricing decisions, inventory policies or capital investment 
decisions. Essentially, the MA has a responsibility to provide the requisite 
information to management in order to assist them in their decision making process.
2.2.4 The Traditional Management Accounting Dichotomy
Hopper (1980) identified the two contrasting roles of the traditional MA, that of the 
‘book-keeper’ and the ‘service aid’. The ‘book-keeper’ was concerned with 
maintaining a financial system to facilitate managerial measurement of performance, 
in other words, control. The ‘service aid’ delivered information to lower and middle 
management to assist them in their DM. Hopper (1980) and much of the literature of 
the 1980s was clear about the existence of both of these aspects of the MA’s role and 
many were conscious of the conflicts and inconsistencies between them (Sathe, 
1978; Perrow, 1970).
Hopper (1980) associated Simon et a l’s (1954) scorekeeping and attention direction 
functions of accounting data with the traditional control function of management 
accounting, while associating problem solving with DM. Simon et al pointed out 
that:
... no sharp line can be drawn between the scorekeeping and attention
directing use of accounting data (pp.24).
Scorekeeping refers to the overall appraisal of an operating unit and attention 
directing involves highlighting specific problems which need to be addressed. Both 
may be carried out using the same or similar information, both are concerned with 
the monitoring and review of actual day-to-day performance and both often involve 
the comparison of this actual performance with a pre-determined expectation or
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standard (Simon et al, 1954). Vickers (1967) described control in the context of 
regulation, i.e. a controller is concerned with identifying the difference between 
‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ and any difference perceived here drives a necessity 
for action. Scorekeeping and attention directing can together be associated with this 
interpretation of control. Planning is a critical aspect of control. Planning involves 
systematically looking at the future so that decisions can be made which will bring 
the company its desired results. Control, therefore, is the process of measuring and 
correcting actual performance to ensure that plans for implementing the chosen 
course of action are effectively carried out (Drury, 2004). Planning and control are 
each two sides of the same coin (Emmanuel et al, 1991) and in this study any 
reference to control is assumed to incorporate planning also.
Meanwhile, Simon et a l’s (1954) problem solving function was expanded upon 
further by Simon (1960), who perceived problem solving and DM to be inextricably 
linked. He analysed the role of management accounting in DM in the context of the 
specific problems that needed to be solved by making decisions. Gorry-Scott Morton 
(1971) expanded this analysis citing examples of problems that needed to be solved, 
categorising these in terms of the type of decisions they trigger.
In this way, Simon et a l’s (1954) three functions of accounting data provide the basis 
for the dichotomous role of management accounting as traditionally perceived in the 
literature; scorekeeping and attention directing may be associated with the 
contribution of control information while problem solving may be associated with 
the contribution of DM information.
Managers in general are perceived to be in the business of DM and a key function of 
management accounting information is to facilitate and support such DM (Emmanuel 
et al, 1991). Such DM will frequently take place within a planning and control 
system as described at 2.3 below. DM and control are not mutually exclusive 
(Emmanuel et al, 1991) but for the purposes of this study, support of such DM is 
considered in its own right as a key function of management accounting which is 
separately identifiable from its function in supporting control.
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2.3 AN ANALYSIS OF CONTROL
It has been historically difficult to develop a clear and unambiguous meaning of 
‘control’. Rathe (1960) presented ‘57 varieties’ of meaning, the majority of which 
fell into either of two main themes. Firstly the concept of control as domination and 
secondly the concept of control as regulation. The regulatory meaning of control, 
which has been referred to at 2.2.4 above, appears to be the most applicable in a 
business context. Emmanuel et al (1991) describe control as:
... the process by which a system adapts itself to its environment (pp. 7).
This is in keeping with Vickers (1967) regulatory concept of control which maintains 
that in a business context the specification of objectives, as well as the specification 
of the methods of achieving these objectives, form the first part of the control 
process. This view develops the concept of control into the concept of organisational 
control. Organisational control refers to the process through which managers manage 
and regulate their organisation’s affairs so that the organisation remains viable and 
achieves its chosen objectives (Otley and Berry, 1980). The following frameworks 
describe three alternative approaches to organisation control as presented in the 
literature.
2.3.1 Anthony’s Control Framework
Anthony (1965) differentiated between strategic planning, management control and
operational control. He described strategic planning as:
...the process of deciding on the objectives of the organisation, the resources 
used to obtain these objectives, and, the policies used to govern the use of 
these resources (pp. 16).
Essentially, strategic planning is concerned with setting the long-term objectives of 
the organisation as a whole and developing some guidelines as to how these 
objectives may be met.
Management control was described as:
... a process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used 
effectively and efficiently in accomplishing the organisation’s objectives 
(pp.17). '
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In its entirety management control should be referred to as ‘management planning 
and control’ and it is concerned with the ongoing administration of the enterprise. 
This process ensures that the day-to-day organisational tasks are performed in a 
controlled and co-ordinated way that will result in goal attainment. Management 
control is carried out by managers, i.e. people who work with subordinates to get 
things done. It takes place within the context of the goals and objectives set at the 
strategic planning stage and the ultimate benchmarks for management control, as 
identified by Anthony (1965) are effectiveness and efficiency.
Operational control was described as:
... the process of assuring that specific tasks are carried out effectively and 
efficiently (pp. 18).
This is the process of ensuring that the immediate day-to-day tasks are executed. 
Anthony (1965) clearly points out that the tasks to which operational control refers 
are specific, programmable tasks, about which little or no judgement is required.
2.3.2 Criticisms of Anthony’s Control Framework
Having distinguished between the three different aspects of control, Anthony went 
on to discuss management control at length and appeared to attach comparatively 
little weight to strategic planning and operational control.
Operational control was neglected by Anthony (1965). It was thought that different 
types of organisations would have different operational control practices which 
would be too numerous and cumbersome to capture within the control framework. 
Free from the complications of operational control, Anthony (1965) focused on the 
middle range process of management control and concentrated on the commonalities 
existing between multiple organisations. Such focus on commonalities led to a 
reliance on the common language of accounting (Otley, 1999) and resulted in 
Anthony’s (1965) interpretation of management control as a process of assuring the 
effective and efficient usage of resources in order to accomplish organisational 
objectives. Defining management control in this way drove Anthony’s study to focus
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primarily on accounting based organisational controls (Puxty, 1989). Anthony’s 
limited consideration of the properties of operational control also ensured that the 
importance of organisational processes and functional workflows were never really 
recognised and were ultimately eliminated from his study of management control 
(Otley, Broadbent and Berry, 1995).
Anthony (1965) noted the critical issues with regard to strategic planning, namely, its 
complex and unsystematic nature, its necessity for an innovative and imaginative 
approach and its utilisation of information which is often non financial and 
qualitative in nature. However, he neglected to give these issues any further 
consideration and deliberately developed a control system which was common to all 
strategies. This led to an emphasis on the use of accounting measurement while 
neglecting non-financial performance measurement, leading to an unfortunate trend 
in the literature of financial measures being used as a convenient measure of more 
complex organisational issues (Otley, 1999).
Management control was viewed by Anthony as a separately identifiable process, 
which made possible the achievement of planned objectives within the confines of 
the parameters imposed by the strategic planning process. While some linkage was 
established between strategic planning and management control, and again between 
management control and operational control, Anthony stopped short of investigating 
the complexities and difficulties of the strategic planning and operational control 
processes and virtually ignored how either of these processes might affect or be 
affected by the process of management control. Anthony’s framework for control, 
while initially groundbreaking, has been subsequently criticised in the literature for 
being excessively narrow in its view (Otley, 1994 and 1999; Otley et al, 1995). The 
reasons for this, as well as the effects of it, emerge in the analysis of subsequent 
frameworks for management control.
2.3.3 Otley and Berry’s ‘Cybernetic’ Control Framework
Cybernetics is the study of how systems regulate themselves, reproduce themselves, 
evolve and learn (Pask, 1961). The major contribution of cybernetics is in the study 
of complex systems which recognise the evolving nature of systems in terms of their
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feedback mechanisms and learning abilities (Ashby, 1956). Otley and Berry’s (1980) 
Framework for Organisational Control, illustrated in figure 1, is an application of 
Tochers (1970) control model and represents the first real attempt to apply cybernetic 
theory to organisational control (Otley et al, 1995).
Otley and Berry’s (1980) framework embraces the complexity of strategic planning 
and operational control, both of which were largely ignored by Anthony (1965) as 
described at 2.3.2 above. They introduce the idea of generating a predictive model 
which helps one to predict the consequences of certain control actions.
Figure I: Otley and Berry (1980) Framework for Organisational Control
Inputs Process Outputs
Measures Measures Measures
(1) Change 
inputs 
(first order control)
Predictive Model of process
Reality
judgement
(3) Amend model of process 
(internal learning)
Interrogation of model 
(reality judgements)
Mis match signal
Implementation 
o f chosen action
Generation and evaluation 
of alternative courses of Value
judgement
(4) Change process (systemic learning)
Objectives 
of process
(2) Amend objectives (second-order control)
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This framework centres on a simple model involving inputs, a process, and outputs. 
Initially, outputs are compared with objectives. However the requisite knowledge of 
outputs or ‘the true state o f  the real world' (Otley and Berry, 1980) is not always 
easy to ascertain and will often require what Vickers (1967) describes as ‘reality 
judgem ent’. When outputs are actually compared with objectives, a certain amount of 
what Vickers (1967) describes as ‘value judgem ent’ is required. Actual output is 
compared with objectives and a discrepancy or mis-match between the two is 
ascertained. Alternative courses of action are generated and evaluated. At this point it 
is necessary to predict or forecast the likely outcomes of the various alternatives. 
This requires continuous interrogation o f  the predictive model. Again, the knowledge 
of the true state of the real world may still be elusive at this point so reality 
judgement may be required. Finally an alternative course of action is selected and 
implemented. This will result in one or more of four actions. Firstly system inputs 
may be adjusted, referred to as first order control. Secondly system objectives may 
be altered, known as second order control. Thirdly the predictive model may be 
amended, referred to as internal learning, and/or finally the nature of the process 
itself may be altered, known as systematic learning.
This model can be applied anywhere, to any level of a system or sub system 
providing four conditions are met. Knowledge of outcomes must be available which 
requires feedback on actual performance. There must always be an objective and an 
effective predictive model, and finally a selected control action must be 
implemented.
Otley and Berry (1980) recognise the limitations of this framework;
1. Objectives are difficult to define and not easily reconciled between varying 
groups within the organisation;
2. Predictive models are often imprecise and inaccurate and there are usually 
several conflicting predictive models within a given control system;
3. Deciding upon an appropriate measure by which to compare actual results 
with desired objectives is complex and, again, organisationally conflicting. It 
will not always be appropriate for such measures to be financial in nature.
4. For a control system to be effective, individuals must be persuaded to 
implement the required actions. This raises the issue of appropriate
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communication of what needs to be done, the motivation of individuals to do 
the necessary job and the adequacy of resources to implement the chosen 
course of action.
Despite these limitations, there can be no doubt that Otley and Berry’s (1980) 
framework represents a significant step forward from the organisational control 
concepts of Anthony (1965). Otley and Berry embrace a holistic approach to 
organisational control, which relates strategic objectives to day-to-day operational 
processes and constantly revisits each stage of this process as events alter. They 
recognise the significance of the relationship of the organisation with its external 
environment and suggest developing a wider range of variables within the predictive 
model that may successfully influence the operation of the organisation. This brings 
with it requirements for additional ways of measuring and assessing these variables, 
which extend beyond Anthony’s initial scope of the MA in terms of assessing 
performance.
2.3.4 Simons (1995) Control Framework
Simons (1995) developed a framework which in his view describes the fundamental 
dimensions of an effective control function. Simons attempted to find the balance 
whereby effective control is exercised without sacrificing flexibility, innovation and 
creativity. He described the tools necessary to reconcile this potential conflict in 
today’s environment as being the four levers of control:
Lever 1- Diagnostics Control Systems
Diagnostic control systems allow managers to track the progress of individuals, 
departments or units by measuring their performance against pre-defined targets. 
Feedback of performance is compared with targets and the resulting fine-tuning of 
inputs is intended to produce outputs that are closer to the initial targets. Diagnostic 
control systems represent the narrowest lever of control, the main aim of which is to 
lesson the managers’ burden of constant monitoring. It is assumed that once people 
have targets, and their rewards are based on meeting those targets, people will work 
responsibly towards achieving them, managers need only periodically review results. 
Simons himself points out, however, that this lever of control does possess inherent
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weaknesses. Empowered employees, under pressure to meet targets, may manipulate 
processes and outputs so that managers are reviewing distorted feedback. Such 
control failures often result in adverse consequences for the organisation. This is why 
diagnostic control systems, in themselves, are not sufficient to effectively control an 
organisation.
Lever 2- B elief Systems
Belief systems are an expression of the values and direction that managers want 
employees to embrace. They instil in an employee the core aspiration of the 
organisation in terms of the value it aspires to create and the relationships it aspires 
to build. They encourage employees to move in the same strategic direction as the 
rest of the company. Belief systems should re-enforce diagnostic control systems by 
encouraging people to achieve organisational goals by proper and appropriate means. 
Belief systems encourage the empowerment of people within the organisation 
through the communication of a clear mission and the encouragement of creative 
contribution and effective input. However, Simons (1995) believes that this lever of 
control must be counter-acted by clear rules, boundaries and charters of behaviour. 
This introduces the notion of boundary systems.
Lever 3- Boundary Systems
This involves the setting of limits and rules which employees are discouraged from 
exceeding or breaking. Simons describes boundary systems as ‘organisational 
brakes’. Boundary systems are stated in negative terms or as minimum standards. 
This clear statement of ‘off limit activities’ is described by Simons as a necessary 
control of empowered employees who are ‘fuelled by inspiration and performance 
rewards’. Boundary systems act as ‘safety catch’ on diagnostic and belief systems. 
Simons describes belief systems and boundary systems as the yin and yang of 
organisational control. In his view, the warm, positive, inspirational beliefs are 
controlled by the dark, cold constraints of the boundary systems.
Lever 4- Interactive Control Systems
These are formal systems designed to share emerging information. These systems 
involve consistent monitoring by senior management of the DM and activities of 
subordinates. Interactive control systems focus on constantly changing information
24
that senior management have identified as potentially strategic. This information 
demands frequent and regular attention from all levels of management. The resulting 
data are best interpreted in face-to-face meetings between all parties concerned and 
such information should act as a catalyst for debate about underlying plans and 
assumptions.
2.3.5 A Comparison of the Control Frameworks
The control frameworks described above represent a progression of thought with 
regard to organisational control. Anthony’s (1965) views of control focus on what he 
refers to as management control which is described as the effective and efficient 
allocation of organisational resources. This analysis virtually ignores the processes of 
strategic planning and operational control. Otley and Berry (1980) present a more 
inclusive framework which embrace the complexities of strategic planning and day- 
to-day operational control. However, this framework is limited in its consideration of 
the difficulties inherent in reconciling the various groups within the organisation. It 
also fails to appreciate the challenges of motivating and communicating with various 
individuals to do the necessary job. Simons (1995) recognises the importance of the 
individuals operating within the organisational control systems. Belief systems re­
enforce diagnostic control systems by instilling the organisations aspirations and 
values into the individual while interactive control systems encourage managers to 
listen to employees and to learn from their experiences.
The three frameworks discussed certainly share common elements. All three 
ultimately revolve around goal attainment as well as a comparison of actual 
performance with some pre-determined target. Simons (1995) diagnostic control 
system is consistent with Otley and Berry (1980). Both involve measuring progress 
against a pre-defined target, using a predictive control model to anticipate the 
outcome of alternatives actions and then fine tuning the inputs and processes, all in 
the hope of producing outputs closer to original targets. Simons (1995) boundary 
systems is consistent with the hierarchical approach to control that both Anthony 
(1965) and Otley and Berry (1980) describe.
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However they each have a different interpretation of how management control 
systems actually contribute to organisational control. Simons (1995) encourages 
control in a much more enlightened way. He describes a more ‘enabling’ type of 
control in which employees are helped by the organisation to contribute to the 
control process. Simons (1995) interpretation of control is much more compatible 
with a business partner than with a traditional MA. This is discussed in greater detail 
in section 3.4.1.
2.4 AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION MAKING
Belkaoui (1980) notes that using different conceptual frameworks for examining 
decisions provides a basis for viewing the different types of decisions faced by 
managers, the different types of information required to support these decisions, and 
the role of the MA in providing these different types of information.
2.4.1 Anthony’s (1965) Framework
Although introduced by Anthony (1965) to describe different types of managerial 
activities and in turn different types of control activities, Anthony’s distinction 
between operational control, management control and strategic planning also 
represents a good basis on which to analyse DM. Operational control is associated 
with the process of getting specific tasks done. DM in this arena is mainly concerned 
with activities occurring within a short time frame. Potential outcomes can often be 
expressed in terms of a mathematical model. Management control is associated with 
effective and efficient resource allocation. DM in this arena is subject to greater 
subjective interpretation and personal interaction than operational DM, and is more 
difficult to encapsulate within the mathematical models used for operational DM. 
Strategic planning is the process of deciding on the objectives of the company and 
the best way of achieving these objectives. DM within this category requires an 
awareness of the relationship between the organisation and its external environment. 
The time frame associated with such decisions are also more long ranging and future 
oriented than either of the other two levels of DM.
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2.4.2 Simon’s (1960) Decision Making Framework
Simon (1960) distinguishes between structured and unstructured decisions. 
Structured decisions are those which are repetitive, routine and subject to a definite 
procedure each time the decision arises. They are generally solved by analytical 
techniques. Unstructured decisions are novel, unpredictable, consequential, and rely 
far more on human intuition and judgement. They are so individually complex or of 
such importance that a solution for them must be tailor made. Traditional 
Management Accounting Systems (MAS) are designed in such a way as to provide 
significant assistance in structured DM but their usefulness in terms of unstructured 
decision making is questionable, (Belkaoui, 1980).
2.4.3 Gorry-Scott M orton’s Decision Making Framework
Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) provided a useful combination of both Anthony’s 
and Simon’s typologies by developing a matrix which classified decisions from 
structured to unstructured and from operational to strategic. Belkaoui (1980) 
expanded this matrix to incorporate examples of types of DM falling within each 
category. This is illustrated in figure 2. This model illustrates managers’ differing 
information requirements, as well as the distinctive methods of data collection and 
maintenance which would be required, within each of the three dimensions. It also 
highlights the contrasting frequency of decisions, as well as the different relative 
magnitude of decisions in each case. Finally, it is clear that the decision-making 
process and the level of analytical sophistication will vary across the three categories 
(Belkaoui, 1980). Clearly, management accountants must recognise these differences 
and reflect them in their information provision, if they are to provide adequate 
decision support to managers within each category.
So far, chapter 2 has described the key theoretical frameworks underlying both the 
control and DM functions of management accounting. The role of the MA in the 
context of these frameworks is discussed in detail in chapter 3. The remaining parts 
of chapter 2 deal firstly with the tools and techniques available to the MA in carrying 
out this role. Finally, given that information is the key deliverable of the management
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accounting function, it goes on to introduce some of the properties of information 
which may affect the usefulness of information as perceived by the user.
Figure 2: Expanded Gorry-Scott Morton Framework, (Belkaoui, 1980)
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2.5 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING TECHNIQUES
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 introduced the theoretical frameworks underlying control and 
DM as presented in the literature. These theoretical frameworks may be applied 
using a range of management accounting tools and techniques. It was suggested in 
the literature of the 1980s that ‘traditional’ management accounting techniques had 
lost relevance in light of the changing business environment (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987). In response, several ‘new’ techniques were presented which were intended to 
restore the relevance of management accounting.
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Figure 3 lists a selection of the ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ techniques most prominently 
featured in the literature. This classification is based primarily on the descriptions of 
these techniques in Drury (2004). It is worth noting that not all techniques may be 
neatly classified within either ‘control’ or ‘decision-making’. For instance, the 
organisational consequences of ABC are not just used for DM purposes (Bhimani an 
Pigott, 1992) and the implementation of Strategic Management Accounting (SMA) 
certainly extends beyond the organisations planning and control system throughout 
the entire management accounting system, often incorporating ‘decision-making’ 
techniques such as ABC, lifecycle costing and customer profitability analysis (Drury, 
2004).
Figure 3: Management Accounting Techniques
Traditional Techniques New Techniques
For Control 
Purposes
■ Budgets
■ Standard costing
■ Variance analysis
■ Return on 
investment (ROI)
■ Strategic 
Management 
Accounting
■ Balanced scorecard
■ Benchmarking 
* Quality cost
analysis
■ Non financial 
performance 
measures
For DM 
Purposes
■ Volume based 
absorption
■ Marginal costing
■ Discounted cash­
flow (DCF)
■ Cost plus pricing
■ ABC
■ Target costing
■ Lifecycle costing
■ Customer 
profitability 
analysis
The ‘traditional’ techniques produce information which is largely financial in nature, 
is concerned with internal, operational activities and is generally historically focused. 
The ‘new’ techniques are intended to produce more qualitative, non-financial 
information which is externally focused, strategic in nature and future orientated 
(Drury, 2004).
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2.5.1 Control Techniques
Traditional Techniques
Budgeting, in its simplest form, shows plans for an organisation for a forthcoming 
period in financial terms and allows actual results to be compared against a pre­
determined standard (Drury, 2004).
Standard costing is appropriate in an organisation consisting of common or repetitive 
operations such as manufacturing organisations. Standard costs are pre-determined 
costs or target costs, which should be incurred under efficient operating conditions. 
Comparing total actual costs with total standard costs for an operation or a 
responsibility centre is the first step in budgetary control (Drury, 2004).
Variance analysis involves comparing actual costs with standard costs for a 
responsibility centre in order to ascertain the variance which can then be broken 
down in terms of price and quantity (Horngren, Foster and Datar, 2006).
Return on Investment (ROI) is used largely in divisionally structured organisations. 
ROI expresses divisional profits as a percentage of assets employed in the division. It 
essentially measures the rate of return which an organisation or division is earning. If 
a manager is to be considered successful in running his division, he must generate an 
ROI which exceeds the alternative market return for capital (Drury, 2004).
New Techniques
The new control techniques generate less financially driven information and are more 
externally focused than the traditional techniques.
SMA is an all-encompassing term which describes the provision of information to 
managers to assist in the formulation and implementation of the organisations 
strategy. SMA is difficult to define and may mean different things to different 
organisations but ultimately it involves an extension of the internal focus of 
traditional management accounting to include external, customer driven information;
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it focuses on gaining competitive advantage by decreasing costs and exploiting 
competitive advantage throughout the entire value chain, and it links the strategic 
positioning of the firm with it’s management accounting information system (Drury, 
2004).
The balanced scorecard recognises the relationship between financial information 
and non-financial information. It allows managers to examine a company’s 
performance based on four alternative perspectives of the organisations incorporating 
both financial and non-financial measures. These are the customer perspective, the 
internal perspective, the innovation and learning perspective and the financial 
perspective. It is designed to translate a company’s strategic objectives into a 
coherent set of performance measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1992).
Benchmarking requires companies to continually measure themselves against 
comparable best performing organisations in an effort to drive continuous 
improvement by constantly striving to beat superior competitors (Drury, 2004).
Quality cost analysis is the detailed analysis of costs associated with the prevention, 
identification, repair and rectification of poor quality in an organisation as well as the 
opportunity cost of lost production time and sales arising out of poor quality 
production (Blocher, Chen and Lin, 1999).
‘Non-financial performance measures’ is an all-encapsulating term to refer to the 
growing desire by management to use non-financial data for management purposes. 
Many of the issues now considered critical in modem firms such as quality, brand 
awareness and customer perceptions cannot be measured in monetary terms and 
many factors which affect traditional measures, such as ROI cannot be captured in 
monetary terms. This places a huge requirement on the MA to provide non-financial 
performance measures (Drury, 2004).
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2.5.2 DM Techniques
Traditional Techniques
Product costing is required firstly to allocate manufacturing costs between costs of 
sales and inventories for financial reporting purposes. Secondly, product costing is 
required for DM purposes so managers can decide which products are profitable and 
which are not. Traditionally, product costs generated for external reporting purposes 
have been used for DM. This is the basis upon which volume based absorption 
costing and marginal costing have been traditionally used. Volume based absorption 
costing involves allocating all costs, including fixed costs, to products based on some 
volume based measure such as labour hour or production volume. Marginal costs 
assign only variable costs to products, again, based on a similar volume based 
measure (Drury, 2004).
Discounted Cash-flow (DCF) involves ascertaining the present values of future cash 
flows so that a more realistic long term decision can be made which incorporates the 
declining values of future returns (Drury, 2004).
Cost plus pricing estimates the unit cost of a product and then simply adds a mark-up 
to provide a reasonable level of profit (Drury, 2004).
New Techniques
Cooper and Kaplan (1988) developed a more decision-relevant technique for 
allocating overhead to products and computing costs. ABC examines the activities 
driving costs and allocates costs to products based on the proportion of these 
activities which the product utilises in production.
Target costing originated in Japan and involves targets being set by external factors. 
A target price is set which is expected will allow the company sufficient market 
share. A desired profit margin is then deducted to determine the target maximum 
allowable product cost (Horngren el al, 2006).
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Lifecycle costing is particularly pertinent in advanced manufacturing environments 
where significant costs are incurred in researching and designing new products and 
processes. It fundamentally involves MAS carefully tracking and monitoring costs 
and commitments at the early stages of a product’s life cycle and providing 
information which will allow management to make effective decisions throughout 
the products lifecycle (Homgren et al, 2006).
Customer profitability analysis highlights which customers should be emphasised or 
de-emphasised. It involves using ABC type techniques in order to ascertain which 
customers are consuming the most resources and ultimately which customers are loss 
making.
These new management accounting practices are intended to provide more useful 
information to managers than the traditional techniques. Techniques such as 
benchmarking, non-financial performance measures and customer profitability 
analysis encourage the production of information which is broader in scope and less 
financially orientated than the information generated with traditional techniques such 
as variance analysis and ROI. The literature suggests that managers in recent years 
have developed more specific expectations with regard to the quality of the 
information they require (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; 
Mia and Chenhall, 1994; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001). As will be discussed below, 
the timing, relevance, level of aggregation and even scope of information often 
determines how useful it will be to managers.
2.6 THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
A consistent feature of the above discussion of control and DM is the importance of 
high quality information. Regardless of theoretical frameworks, tools, techniques or 
methodologies, ultimately, the function of the management accounting process is to 
provide the requisite information to managers for control and DM (Belkaoui, 1980). 
The type of information provided and the way in which it is provided often 
determines the role played by management accounting and the effectiveness with 
which that role is carried out.
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In focusing on information, it is important to note that one’s opinion on a piece of 
information or the product of an information system depends largely on the 
perspective from which it is viewed. Those who prepare information are generally 
satisfied once an information system works. This is described as achieving technical 
validity (Schultz and Slevin, 1975). Those who use this information are generally 
only satisfied if the information helps them to do their job better, thereby achieving 
organisational validity (Dickson and Powers, 1979). Where the preparers identify 
strongly with the users requirements, both are more likely to share similar views on 
system effectiveness (Dickson and Powers, 1979). Pierce and O’Dea (2003) reported 
that MAs, as preparers of management accounting information, attached more 
importance to technical validity often to the detriment of relevance or organisational 
validity. Effective information, therefore, is that which achieves organisational 
validity and such information must be evaluated in terms of its importance to users 
(Lucas, 1975).
Having established that the effectiveness of information for users is vitally important 
in assessing the value of information, it is necessary to consider what factors lead a 
user to regard a piece of information as useful. As Belkaoui (1980) points out:
... management accounting information should have certain properties so that
benefits are achievable (pp. 14).
These properties are the distinguishing characteristics or traits of information which 
render it more or less useful to management in managing their units. Much 
management accounting research has focused quite specifically on characteristics of 
information. A review of this literature provides a framework to help assess 
managers’ preferences in terms of management accounting information. The 
characteristics listed in figure 4 (which are in no particular order) have been derived 
from this literature:
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Figure 4: Information Chciracteristics Derived from the Literature
Characteristic Source
1 Timeliness Belkaoui (1980)
Chenhall and Morris (1986)
Bruns and McKinnon (1993)
Pierce and O’Dea (2003)
Van der Veeken and Wouters (2002)
2 Relevance Belkaoui (1980)
Bruns and McKinnon (1993) 
Pierce and O’Dea (2003)
3 Consistency Jonsson and Grönland (1988)
4 Accuracy Belkaoui (1980)
Pierce and O’Dea (2003)
Van der Veeken and Wouters (2002)
5 Aggregation Chenhall and Morris (1986) 
Bruns and McKinnon (1993) 
Mendoza and Bescos (2001)
6 Flexibility and Adaptability Belkaoui (1980)
Mendoza and Bescos (2001)
7 Scope Chenhall and Morris (1986) 
Mia and Chenhall (1994)
8 Reliability Yamey (1982)
Bougen (1994)
Friedman and Lyne (1997)
Timeliness
Timeliness refers to the age of information. It can refer to both interval and delay. 
Interval is the period of time lapsing between two successive reports. Delay is the 
time necessary to process the data, prepare the reports and distribute them, in other 
words, the lag between the action, and the reporting of the action (Belkaoui, 1980). 
Timeliness of information influences how quickly a manager responds to events and 
in conditions of uncertainty where rapid response to change is critical, timeliness 
becomes a key characteristic of useful information (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). 
Often accounting recognition, measurement criteria and the spurious pursuit of 
accuracy delay the recognition and reporting of issues and events until all
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uncertainties have been resolved (Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002). The single 
most important finding emerging from Bruns and McKinnon (1993) is that the desire 
for timely information is more likely than any other factor to drive managers to 
alternative sources for their information requirements. Findings from Pierce and 
O’Dea (2003) corroborated this in that most managers identified timeliness as a key 
area where improvement was needed.
Relevance
Relevant information is described as information that bears upon the decision being 
made. An important point with regard to relevance is that it depends on the particular 
user receiving the information and on his or her particular decision (Belkaoui, 1980). 
Bruns and McKinnon (1993) describe management accounting information as taking 
place in a vacuum lacking any tangible link between its function and objective. They 
conclude that MAs must try harder to provide information that informs managers of 
the link between their decisions, their actions and the achievement of their 
objectives. Pierce and O’Dea (2003) report evidence of a user-preparer expectation 
gap. Their findings show that in many cases, MAs focus on technical validity and 
produce information which is simply not relevant to managers who need more 
organisationally valid information.
Consistency
Consistency refers to the organisation’s adoption of the same rules and procedures 
over a period of time, which will ultimately lead to comparability of results over 
different time periods. This characteristic would be considered more useful in 
financial or quantitative information than it would in qualitative information. Jonsson 
and Gronlund (1988) reported that financial or quantitative information becomes 
more important as the time horizon lengthens. Comparative sets of results allow 
managers to build a mental model of the financial implications of their actions. 
Consistency becomes essential in such circumstances.
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Accuracy
Users are more likely to believe in the information if they know it to be accurate 
(Belkaoui, 1980). The perception of accuracy is not always positive though. While it 
is positively associated with greater perceived reliability (Van der Veeken and 
Wouters, 2002) and consequently increased acceptance of information, all too often 
it is relentlessly pursued to the detriment of timeliness and relevance (Pierce and 
O’Dea, 2003). Where possible, parameters should be set indicating the acceptable 
level of accuracy, or more importantly, the tolerable margin for error (Belkaoui, 
1980). Alternatively, the MA needs to understand the purpose of the information and 
to use their judgement to estimate the level of accuracy required to ensure that the 
effectiveness of the information is not compromi sed.
Aggregation
Aggregation refers to reducing the volume of data by presenting it in a synopsised or 
standardised format. Information may be aggregated around periods of time, 
responsibility centres, functional areas or projects, or it may be disseminated after 
being processed within a formal decision model (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). 
Numerous techniques, models, methodologies and methods have been discussed in 
the management accounting literature which supposedly provide more sophisticated 
methods of analysing costs and profits and which may alter the usefulness of 
accounting information (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993). Mendoza and Bescos (2001) 
report that 90% of managers are faced with redundant information. As a result, some 
of the information presented to them is either ignored or reviewed in brief. Managers 
require information that takes them directly to the key issues. However, there is a 
danger that while increased aggregation of information may reduce information 
overload, it may also lead to a loss of identifiability of the information so that users 
lose its context. This presents a very important challenge to MAs to judge the level 
of aggregation appropriate in each specific circumstance.
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Flexibility refers to the degree to which data may be used in several types of 
information or reports. It is often a function of the level of aggregation of the data. 
Adaptability is the extent to which information may be tailored or harmonised to 
specific needs. Again, this will often be influenced by the extent to which the data is 
aggregated (Belkaoui, 1980). As Mendoza and Bescos (2001) point out, the difficulty 
is in finding a happy medium between excessive standardisation of information in 
such a way as to make it less relevant to individual managers, and an overly 
individualised and flexible system which is inefficient.
Scope
Scope refers to the dimension of focus, quantification and time horizon associated 
with information. More narrowly scoped information focuses on events within the 
organisation, is quantified in monetary terms and relates to historical data. (Chenhall 
and Morris, 1986). In contrast, broad scope information is more externally focused 
and is generally non-financial and future orientated (Mia and Chenhall, 1994). There 
is evidence that marketing managers are exposed to greater levels of uncertainty than 
production managers and find broad scoped information to be more beneficial (Mia 
and Chenhall, 1994). This indicates that in conditions of greater uncertainty 
managers prefer broad scoped information. As indicated in section 3.2, a major 
feature of many companies’ operating environments is the unprecedented levels of 
uncertainty. This suggests that many managers, regardless of their function, will 
become increasingly reliant on broad scoped information.
Reliability
The Oxford English Dictionary associates reliability with words such as trust, 
confidence and dependability. Reliable information is that which a manager knows to 
be a correct representation of the facts. Accountants have traditionally been 
associated with reliability and much of the literature has reported that this perception 
has benefited the accountant (Yamey, 1982; Bougen, 1994). Reliable information is 
sometimes placed at odds with scope and flexibility (Friedman and Lyne 1997),
Flexibility and Adaptability
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tsuggesting that managers perceive the more numerical, financially driven 
information produced by the MA to be more reliable.
2.6.1 Control Information and DM Information Compared
The literature did not focus in detail on the extent to which these characteristics may 
be considered as important for control as for DM, and vice versa. There are obvious 
conflicts between the two roles of the MA which are discussed in greater detail in 
section 3.7.9. These conflicts also impact the usefulness of management accounting 
information. Sathe (1982) describes the necessity to balance the integrity of 
information which is required for compliance and control, with the effectiveness of 
that information for DM purposes. Bruns and McKinnon (1993) suggest that some 
types of information may be more relevant at different times depending on the task 
being undertaken by managers. Mendoza and Bescos (2001) maintain that DM 
information must be timely, sufficiently detailed, reliable and exhaustive. In their 
view formalized MAS, traditionally concerned with management control produce 
information which is generally focused on the past, subject to delay and is overly 
financial in nature. They consider it insufficient to produce information which 
merely counts the consumption of resources, it must contribute to strategy 
deployment (Mendoza and Bescos, 2001). Van der Veeken and Wouters (2002) 
found that different management levels required different types of information. 
Higher-level managers, focusing on cost control and containment, required output 
oriented information such as cost versus budget. Lower level managers, focusing on 
making the day-to-day decisions required to get the job done, were less reliant on 
accounting based measures and required real time, units based information. In other 
words, traditional management accounting information enabled more accurate 
control but was less useful in a DM context. Gordon and Narayanan (1984) 
suggested that broad scoped information was more valuable to those managers 
engaged in DM while Pierce and O’Dea (2003) reported a general willingness by 
managers to sacrifice accuracy for more timeliness when engaged in DM.
While a sample of the information related literature makes reference to the varying 
usefulness of the different information characteristics in control versus DM 
situations, none of these have focused on this in any great detail. This gap in the
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literature forms the basis for the study’s first research question, described in section
4.2.2. RQ1 examines the importance of the specified characteristics of information 
for control and DM purposes.
2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 2 presented the theoretical background of management accounting as a 
discipline. The key control frameworks are presented, each representing a 
progression of thought with regard to organisational control. These frameworks are 
compared and contrasted in section 2.3.5 ultimately concluding that Simons (1995) 
encourages a more evolved and ‘enabling’ type of control in contrast with Anthony 
(1965) who describes control in more regulatory terms.
The contribution of management accounting to DM is then discussed. A series of 
frameworks are presented which contextualise managerial DM and suggests how the 
MA contributes to this process.
This is succeeded by an introduction to some of the tools and techniques presented in 
the literature which may be used to apply the above mentioned frameworks. While 
the frameworks represent a progression of thought with regard to control and DM, so 
too do the techniques which are categorised into ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ techniques.
The discussion surrounding these tools and techniques highlights the importance of 
information as the key deliverable of the management accounting process. A list of 
information characteristics derived from the literature is presented which may be 
used as a basis on which to assess the information requirements of managers, as well 
as the ability of the MA to meet these information requirements. Having ascertained 
in section 2.2.4 that the MA’s role consists of two, often conflicting, elements, that of 
contributor to control and contributor to DM, it is not clear from the literature if the 
type of information required by managers for control differs significantly from the 
type of information required for DM, If a difference does exist between the type of 
information required for each of these purposes, this could have a serious impact on 
the extent to which the MA can satisfactorily provide both types of information, 
which may in turn, determine the role played by the MA in the organisation. Section
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2.6.1 describes how this has been referred to in some papers (Bruns and McKinnon, 
1993; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002) though it has 
not been pursued at length. Gordon and Narayanan (1984) found that managers 
engaging in decision-making prefer broad scoped information and Pierce and O’Dea 
(2003) reported that managers engaging in decision-making favour increased 
timeliness. None of these studies however focused largely on these conflicts and it is 
emerging from he literature that these conflicts may be having a significant impact 
on the management accountants’ pursuit of a meaningful role in a contemporary 
environment. This represents a gap in the literature which forms the basis of research 
question 1, which is set out in section 4.2.2
Having described the function of management accounting as traditionally presented 
in the literature, chapter 3 will examine how this function has changed according to 
the contemporary literature and how these changes may be impacting the MA’s role.
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CHAPTER 3
The Contemporary 
Role of the 
Management 
Accountant
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 focused on the theoretical literature underlying the traditional function of 
management accounting. The purpose of chapter 3 is to provide a review of the 
literature examining the changing function of management accounting and, more 
importantly, the changing role of the MA as a result. Section 3.2 analyses the 
changes occurring in the business environment over the past two decades. Section
3.3 examines the impact of these changes on the control function. Section 3.4 
describes a contemporary control framework as presented by Otley (1999) which 
recognises the changes detailed in preceding sections. Section 3.5 examines the 
impact of change on the MA’s contribution to DM referring to the frameworks 
discussed in chapter 2 and applying them to the current environment. Section 3.6 
examines the contingency theory of management accounting. Section 3.7 provides an 
overview of the wealth of research which took place in the 1990’s addressing the 
actual role played by the MA, concluding with a discussion surrounding the hybrid 
accountant as presented in the literature, together with a discussion of the conflicts 
inherent in such a role. Finally section 3.8 provides a list of the key SACs which 
feature prominently in the literature in discussions surrounding the MA. The 
literature suggests that the MA shows a natural adeptness for some of these SACs, 
while performing particularly poorly in relation to others.
3.2 THE EVOLVING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
The speed with which the business environment has developed and evolved in recent 
years is comparable with the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century in terms of its 
pace of change and shifting focus (Otley, 1994). This change raises several issues 
with regard to the MA’s role. It questions the effectiveness of the MA in terms of the 
traditional control or attention directing role. It addresses the suitability of the MA in 
terms of the DM or problem solving role. Finally, it highlights the shifting focus of 
managerial interest and the onus on MAs to keep abreast of these shifting interests.
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3.2.1 An Analysis of Change
The changes occurring in the business environment in the past decade have occurred 
at various different levels. In the wider context, various economic factors have been 
important in motivating change. Likewise, numerous technological factors have had 
a significant impact, and, from a more organisationally specific viewpoint, altering 
organisational structures have played an instrumental part in effecting change in the 
business environment (Bums et al, 1999). Each of these factors is discussed below.
3.2.2 Economic Changes
The expectations of customers have undergone massive change (Otley, 1994, 
pp. 291).
As Otley (1994) points out, technological developments have increased the quantities 
of products and services available and have affected their means of production and 
delivery. In the past decade and a half, this has resulted in the opening up of new 
markets leading to rapid globalisation and resulting in increased competition (Burns 
et al, 1999). This growth in competition has had a knock-on effect on the way in 
which many organisations operate. An organisation’s survival has become largely 
dependant on reducing costs dramatically across all areas of the value chain (Cooper, 
1996) and increased competitive forces mean that the managerial emphasis of control 
must shift away from internal processes towards customers and markets (Bums et al, 
1999).
3.2.3 Technological Factors
Technological factors refer to both information technology (IT) developments and 
developments in the technologies of production and logistics. Bums and Yazdifar 
(2001) reported from their survey of 279 CIMA members that 73% of respondents 
believed that IT was the most important driver of change in the tasks and roles of 
MAs in the preceding five years. Developments in software, database technology, 
integrated operations packages and communications technology mean that 
information, and particularly financial information, is becoming more dispersed 
around the entire organisation. Such technology, combined with increasingly
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widespread computer competence among the majority of organisational members, 
means that information previously within the domain of the MA is far more 
accessible to managers (Burns et al, 1996).
Developments in production technologies have resulted in significant amounts of 
labour being replaced by machinery. Consequently organisational costing structures 
have altered dramatically in the past two decades. In many organisations fixed 
production costs are replacing labour costs (Drury et al, 1993). Technological 
developments in logistics and communications, having facilitated the global 
marketplace described in 3.2.2, have resulted in most low technology, low skilled, 
mass production activities being carried out in developing countries where labour is a 
particularly cheap resource (Otley, 1994).
3.2.4 Organisational Structure
Organisational re-structuring has been identified as the second most important driver 
of change in the role of the MA in the past five years (Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). 
Economic factors have led to increased competition, leading to a greater emphasis on 
cost control, thereby forcing companies to focus on core competencies and critical 
activities. Technological factors have seen labour being replaced by capital, with 
more machines and computers taking over the work of humans. Organisations are 
downsizing, outsourcing and delayering (Bums et al, 1999). This is resulting in 
smaller business units, focusing on a narrow range of core issues. There are fewer 
middle managers, yet there is an expansion in the range of their responsibilities as the 
split between operational control, managerial control and strategic planning blurs 
(Otley, 1994).
3.3 THE IMPACT OF CHANGE ON THE MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTANT’S CONTROL FUNCTION
Organisations are undoubtedly subject to far greater levels of uncertainty than was 
the case two decades ago. All of the factors identified above are contributing to an 
increasingly unpredictable environment (Otley, 1994) and, as the literature reveals 
below, this is having repercussions on the MA’s traditional control function.
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3.3.1 The Decentralisation of the MA’s Function
Increased competition has placed greater challenges on organisations with regard to 
cost control. Cost control has become the responsibility of everybody within the firm 
(Cooper, 1995). Developments in IT are giving employees the tools to control and 
manage their own costs. In this way, they are performing tasks previously performed 
by the MA (Bums et al, 1999). The MA’s traditional control function is becoming 
more and more distributed in many organisations. Cooper (1995) asserted that this 
was resulting in:
... fewer MAs within the company but a wider use of management
accounting information (pp.7).
3.3.2 Employee Empowerment
Survival in the ever-changing business environment is becoming a greater challenge 
for most organisations. In response, organisations must devote more of their 
resources to adapting their operations to changing circumstances. Better adaptation 
may be achieved through increased planning. Planning requires the accurate 
prediction of the future consequences of actions which is proving increasingly 
difficult given the rate of environmental change. Another effective way of improving 
adaptation is by developing the flexibility to respond quickly to the consequences of 
change as soon as they become apparent. Organisations will not achieve the 
necessary levels of flexibility if the mechanisms for organisational adaptation are left 
to just senior management. Management under conditions of uncertainty and 
continual change therefore requires the active involvement of more members of the 
organisation, specifically those people that traditionally ‘report into’ management. 
This phenomenon of employee empowerment changes the parameters of the control 
process. Control systems must now incorporate greater levels of employee self- 
control and group accountability. Performance appraisal and accountability remain 
the key tools for effective management control. However such accountability must 
now become less hierarchical and based more on the development of mutual 
accountabilities between different organisational participants (Otley, 1994).
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Anthony’s (1965) distinction between operational control, management control and 
strategic planning is becoming increasingly blurred. Effective management control 
requires managers to continually reformulate strategies to match the evolving 
external environment, to continually monitor operational processes and ensure 
corrective actions are implemented when necessary. Management control clearly 
incorporates both strategic planning and operational control, the responsibility for all 
of which is now being pushed down to lower levels of management (Otley, 1994). 
As managerial activities cascade down traditional managerial structures, 
management control information requirements of all types are no longer restricted to 
just senior levels of management (Ezzamel et al, 1994).
3.4. A Contemporary Control Framework
In response to the changing environment and the implications thereof, Otley (1999) 
identified a need for a framework which progressed from measuring organisational 
performance to managing organisational performance. He argued that it is now 
necessary to pay more attention to the neglected elements of strategy and operations. 
He described an organisation as ‘performing well’ if it was successfully attaining its 
objectives, i.e. effectively implementing the appropriately chosen strategy. He argued 
that if ‘successful strategy implementation’ is the measure by which one is to assess 
the performance of the organisation, this measure must be built in as a key element 
of the control system. Otley’s (1999) framework is based on this premise.
This framework revolves around the answers to five key questions. These questions 
need to be asked of an organisation on an ongoing basis, as the answers will 
continuously change in response to the changing environment in which the 
organisation exists. The questions are as follows:
1. What are the key objectives central to the organisation’s future success and 
how does it evaluate its achievement of these objectives?
3.3.3 Altering Managerial Needs
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2. What strategies and plans has the organisation adopted and what processes 
and activities will be required in order to implement them? How does it 
assess and measure the performance of these activities?
3. What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve and how 
does it go about setting appropriate performance targets?
4. What rewards will managers gain by achieving these targets and what 
penalties will they suffer by failing to achieve them?
5. What information flows are necessary to ensure that the organisation is 
continuously learning and adapting its current behaviour in light of its 
experiences?
Question 1 incorporates the contingent principle that a control system will differ 
depending on the core objectives of the organisation. Question 2 operationalises the 
organisation’s objectives and sets measures against which actual performance can be 
assessed. Question 3 stems from traditional management control theory and concerns 
the optimum use of resources in order to achieve desired objectives. Questions 1 to 3 
form the structure of a typical budgetary control system in which objectives are set, 
plans are made and acceptable performance targets are set. However, Otley’s (1999) 
questions are not restricted to accounting measures and procedures. Non-financial 
and qualitative issues must be given as much if not more consideration than financial 
and accounting issues. This represents the core development of Otley’s 1999 
framework over any previous theories.
Question 4 addresses the motivation and incentives of employees to achieve set 
objectives and the issues surrounding measurement of their performance with regard 
to achieving these objectives. This addresses the accountability and governance 
structures within the organisation. Question 5 addresses the importance of 
information in control systems and the optimum use of this information so as to 
facilitate organisational learning, information must be used in order to continually 
revisit objectives and plans so as to take corrective actions if necessary. In order for 
information to be useful in this regard it must be the right information, at the right 
time, in the right quantities and it must be made available to the right people. 
Previously seen to be within the remit of Management Information Systems
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specialists, Otley (1999) asserts that this issue needs to be reviewed in the context of 
organisation learning, employee empowerment and emergent strategy.
Otley (1999) asserts that this framework should be used as a checklist against which 
an organisation’s management control practices may be assessed. Consistent use of 
the framework will give managers a complete picture of the organisation’s 
management control system in the context of its current environment. Weaknesses 
may be identified and improvements may be made as a part of the iterative process of 
analysis. Widening the perspective of analysis of the management control system in 
this way should result in more effective strategy implementation and more controlled 
management of performance.
3.4.1 Further Comparison of the Control Frameworks
Similarities can be identified between Otley’s (1999) control framework above and 
Simons (1995) control framework discussed in chapter 2. These similarities relate 
largely to the increased acknowledgement of the role of employees within the control 
system.
As described at section 3.3.2 above, organisational survival is dependant upon the 
organisation effectively adapting to its constantly changing circumstances. The level 
of flexibility required for such organisational adaptation can only be achieved by 
involving as many employees as possible in the process. This necessitates 
unprecedented levels of employee empowerment which inevitably alters the nature 
of the organisation’s control systems. Performance appraisal and accountability must 
become less hierarchical and more subject to mutual development by employees, 
(Otley, 1994). This is referred to in Otley’s (1999) framework in which question four 
asks what rewards employees will gain by achieving targets? This addresses the 
motivation of employees and raises the issue of accountability and governance within 
a modem control system. Simons (1995) had introduced this concept in his second 
lever of control, belief systems, discussed at section 2.3.4. Belief systems involve 
encouraging employees to move in the same strategic direction as the company. They 
promote empowerment through the communication of a clear mission and the 
encouragement of effective and creative input.
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Otley’s (1999) final question related to the information flows necessary to ensure 
that the organisation is continually learning and adapting. Similarly, Simons (1995) 
fourth lever of control focused on the requirement for formal systems of information 
flow designed to share emerging information in order to facilitate ongoing 
organisational learning.
Both frameworks recognise the growing empowerment of employees and the 
necessity to find new ways of controlling these increasingly empowered employees. 
Both frameworks accept that accountability and performance appraisal remain the 
key tools of control but they must now be applied in a mutually acceptable, all- 
inclusive manner, which motivates employees to strive toward organisational 
objectives.
3.5 DECISION MAKING IN TODAY’S BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Chapter 2 described DM in terms of structured decisions versus unstructured 
decisions. It also differentiated between decisions made within the context of 
strategic planning, management control and operational control. Structured decisions 
are those that have been faced by the organisation on numerous occasions in the past 
and a definite procedure has been identified as to how to deal with them (Belkaoui, 
1980). Such decisions involve a high degree of predictability. The business 
environment has become inherently less predictable (Otley, 1994) and so the 
decisions facing managers today are becoming increasingly unstructured in nature.
Similarly, the distinction between operational management, middle management and 
strategic management is blurring. A given manager will frequently face decisions in 
all of these three arenas (Otley, 1994; Ezzamel et al, 1994). The requirement for 
organisational adaptability and flexibility means that change management and 
environmental awareness is no longer restricted to senior managers. Management in 
conditions of uncertainty requires the active involvement of everybody in the 
organisation (Otley, 1994). This widens the MA’s target audience.
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3.6 A CONTINGENT APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
Having introduced the effect the changing environment has had on the MA’s
contribution to control and DM, it is clear that contextual factors originating in the
business environment, in the organisation or within the manager/MA relationship
will help to determine the MA’s role as an information provider. This introduces the
concept of contingency theory to the study of the MA’s role. Contingency theories
surfaced in organisational theory literature in the mid-1960s but did not appear in the
management accounting literature until the mid-1970s. The contingent approach to
management accounting is based on the premise that:
... there is no universally appropriate accounting system which applies 
equally to all organisations in all circumstances, the choice of appropriate 
accounting systems depends on the specific circumstances in which an 
organisation finds itself (Otley, 1980, pp.84).
There is a body of literature studying the effectiveness of MAS in light of structure, 
technology, strategy, uncertainty, environment and culture. Homgren (1972) 
recognises the interdependence between MAS design and organisational structure. 
Dermer (1977) describes the design of control systems as being necessarily 
‘situationally specific’. Piper (1978) and Daft and Macintosh (1978) cite 
technological development as a key contingent variable affecting the design of MAS. 
Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) assert that organisational structure has an 
important effect upon the way in which a management accounting system functions. 
Khandwalla (1972) finds that different levels of competition have different impacts 
on the use of accounting controls in an organisation. The findings of Otley (1978) 
suggest that the competitive intensity of the environment in which organisations 
operates strongly affects the way in which managers use budgetary information and 
Chenhall and Morris (1986) report on the effects of perceived uncertainty on 
information systems design.
In the 1980s, strategy began to emerge as a key contingent variable upon which 
management control systems should be based (Merchant, 1985; Govindarajan and 
Gupta, 1985; Simons, 1987). It has been established that management control 
systems which have been developed in a traditional context, are not sufficiently 
broad to apply in a contemporary business environment, (Otley, 1980; Emmanuel et
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al, 1991; Otley, 1994; Otley et al, 1995). By the late 1980s, the relationship between 
strategy and management control systems began to emerge as an area which could 
overcome the inadequacies of traditional theories (Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
Langfield-Smith’s findings provide evidence that management control systems can 
influence strategy formulation, implementation and change.
Chenhall (2003) suggested that future contingency-based research should focus more 
on contemporary contingency based factors, particularly those drawn from other 
theories such as economics, psychology and sociology. Such approaches would 
begin to focus on interactions between individuals and interactions within groups, all 
of which might impact the design and function of MAS and consequently the extent 
of the MA’s role within this MAS.
3.7 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING FIELD RESEARCH
Throughout the 1980s, the nature of management accounting was being questioned 
in the literature (e.g. Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1991). 
There was a noticeable recognition of the gap between theory and practice (Scapens, 
1985; Berry, Broadbent and Otley, 1995). The literature of the 1990s welcomed the 
introduction of new theoretical approaches and an expansion of field-based research 
methods. This resulted in an expansion in the range of management accounting 
topics being studied. The organisational role of the MA was now subject to 
discussion. The traditional role of the MA, the boundaries of the business and the 
nature of management accounting practices became the new subject matter for 
analysis (Scapens and Bromwich, 2001). Major findings from these lines of research 
are summarised below.
3.7.1 Lost Relevance
The MA’s role appears to have been in a state of transition for almost two decades. 
Johnson and Kaplan initiated concerns in numerous publications in the 1980s but 
most notably in their seminal text: Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of 
Management Accounting (1987). They are critical of the lack of technical
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developments within the management accounting profession in response to major 
changes in the business environment. This triggered more than a decade of research 
and discussion surrounding the restoration of the relevance of the MA. Many 
techniques were put forward as the possible saviour of management accounting. 
Lifecycle costing (Berliner and Brimson, 1988); target costing (Kato, 1993), ABC 
(Cooper and Kaplan, 1987; 1988; 1991) and quality cost analysis (Pasewark, 1991), 
represent a sample of the management accounting techniques which were presented. 
However, as described at 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 below, empirical results reveal little 
evidence of abandonment of ‘traditional’ practices in favour of ‘new’ ones.
3.7.2 Usage of Control Techniques
Pierce and O’Dea (1998) reported high usage of budgets, variance analysis and 
standard costing. Bums and Yazdifar (2001) also reported that these traditional 
control techniques were by far the most popular techniques used by MAs. Both 
surveys reported significant evidence of integration of non-financial performance 
measures with these traditional practices, yet the balanced scorecard appeared to be 
enjoying little or no practical application. Pierce and O’Dea (1998) suggested that 
managers and MAs alike are more comfortable informally integrating non financial 
performance measures into traditional budget reporting, as opposed to struggling for 
company wide buy-in to a formal balanced scorecard system. Reported use of ROI 
was still relatively high according to Pierce and O’Dea (1998), while the same 
survey reported a considerable usage of benchmarking, particularly in multinational 
companies. Quality cost analysis recorded high usage in Pierce and O’Dea (1998) 
and Burns and Yazdifar (2001), and cost of quality was identified as a key cost in 
earlier surveys by Clarke (1992), Merchant and Shields (1993) and Drury et al 
(1993).
3.7.3 Usage of DM Techniques
Bright, Davies, Downes and Sweeting (1992) reported little or no application of 
ABC or related management accounting techniques. Drury et al (1993) corroborated 
this by reporting that just 4% of respondents had implemented ABC. Innes and 
Mitchell (1995) reported that less then 20% of their respondents had implemented
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ABC and a large proportion of these implementations were limited in scope and in 
early pilot stage, less than 9% were actually using ABC extensively in a post pilot 
stage. Innes, Mitchell and Sinclair’s (2000) follow up review reported no growth in 
the popularity of ABC between 1994 and 1999. Bums and Yazdifar (2001) agreed 
and reported that ABC was the management accounting tool considered to be of least 
importance over the preceding five years, while Pierce and O’Dea (1998) reported 
that it was ‘rarely’ used by most companies surveyed. Cohen and Paquette (1991), 
Bright et al (1992) and Drury et al (1993) all reported high usage of traditional 
volume-based overhead absorption. Pierce and O’Dea (1998) reported only modest 
application of marginal costing and cost-plus pricing, though their reported 
application did exceed that of their supposed ‘newer’ substitutes, lifecycle costing 
and target costing, both of which reported little or no usage. Clarke (1992) and Pierce 
and O’Dea (1998) reported modest usage of DCF techniques. Clarke (1992) suggests 
that a purely accounting based approach to investment appraisal in a modem highly 
technological manufacturing environment may result in incorrect DM causing DCF 
to become one of the most questioned traditional techniques. Customer profitability 
analysis, together with non financial performance measures and quality cost analysis, 
are among the newer techniques enjoying comparatively wide-spread application 
(Pierce and O’Dea, 1998).
The evidence suggests that ‘new’ techniques were being integrated into ‘traditional’ 
techniques and the information resulting from traditional techniques was being 
adapted to meet the changing requirements of users (Pierce and O’Dea, 1998; Burns 
and Yazdifar, 2001). The changes which emerged in the management accounting 
profession is not so much in what management accounting techniques were being 
performed, rather in who was performing them and how they were being performed 
(Scapens et al, 1996).
3.7.4 Growing Usage of Non Financial Performance Measures
These results corroborate Clarke’s (1992) assertions that traditional management 
accounting techniques are far from redundant. He found a minority of companies 
using emerging cost and management accounting techniques. Bums and Yazdifar 
(2001), almost a decade later, agreed. They predicted that the real challenge lay in
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the necessity to present non-financial performance measures alongside traditional 
accounting-based results. Drury et al (1993) reported a similar reluctance by 
companies to let go of their traditional MAS, yet a growing reliance on non-financial 
performance measures. They too predicted that if the management accounting 
function failed to reconcile non-financial performance measures with traditional 
management accounting data, managers would turn elsewhere for more relevant 
information.
3.7.5 The Changing Focus o f M anagem ent Accounting Inform ation
Researchers at this point were discussing the necessity to redirect the MA’s focus 
from one of number crunching and record keeping to one of strategic context and 
commercial awareness. Shank and Govindarajan (1989) describe the necessity for the 
MA to engage in more strategic planning and less management control. Strategic 
management accounting encouraged DM which was considered in the context of a 
competitive marketplace as opposed to within the confines of the internal 
organisation (Bromwich, 1990; 1991). This transformation was to encourage the MA 
to furnish ‘softer’ accounting information, as opposed to the ‘hard’ numbers. Where 
previously, the MA boasted a strong tradition in ‘hard’ financial data, it was now 
necessary to incorporate qualitative, non-financial details which better enabled 
managers to tie financial performance back to actual success or failure in the 
competitive market place. Alongside sales margins and bottom lines, one could 
expect such things as production times, customer satisfaction feedback or employee 
turnover (Roslender, 1996).
3.7.6 Em pirical Findings
In the early 1990s financial executives were claiming that entry-level accountants 
were coming to work without the necessary skills and academic preparation. In 
response, the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) commissioned the 1994 
‘Practice Analysis of Management Accounting’ which was a study of the tasks, 
activities, jobs, competencies and skills involved in effectively carry out the role of 
the management accountant. This Practice Analysis was an attempt to close the 
academic and corporate skills gap in order to bring about better prepared entry level
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management accountants (Siegel and Kulesza, 1994). These practice analysis results 
were used by educators to amend and update curricula; by organisations to develop 
corporate skills training programs and by professional accounting associations to 
review qualification programs (Siegel and Sorenson, 1999). A follow-up Practice 
Analysis was conducted in 1999 in order to identify any changes that may have 
occurred in the tasks, activities, jobs, competencies or skills of the management 
accountant. The 1999 Practice Analysis reviewed the management accountant’s role 
in the context of globalisation, increased competitiveness and the growing power of 
technology (Siegel and Sorenson, 1999).
The changing focus of management accounting discussed above, was reflected in 
these two practice analyses, as well as in several other empirical studies investigating 
the contemporary role of management accounting. Siegel and Kulesza’s (1994) 
practice analysis results revealed that MAs perceived long-term strategic planning to 
be their second most important work activity, after maintaining their accounting 
systems and financial information. In addition, as indicated in figure 5, Siegel and 
Kulesza (1994) reported that the second, third and fourth most important knowledge, 
skills and abilities, according to MAs, are those which relate largely to problem 
solving skills and communication skills. These results indicate that while MAs are 
expected to have a thorough knowledge of basic accounting, they are also expected 
to display communications skills and the deeper business understanding of a general 
manager.
Siegel and Sorensen’s follow up practice analysis in 1999 described a management 
accounting profession in which change had accelerated even beyond that reported in 
the 1995 analysis. Almost 80% of respondents declared that they spent more time 
analysing information and being involved in the DM process than they did five years 
ago. Almost half reported that they spent less time preparing standardised reports and 
two thirds of MAs responded that they spent more time communicating and sharing 
business information now than they did five years ago. 70% of respondents stated 
that in their opinion, because of these changes, people outside the finance function 
believed that MAs bring more value to the company now than they did five years 
ago. Among the responses were:
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Finance has gone from a historical role to a much more collaborative business 
partner (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 8, US West).
We’re seeing less transactional and more décision-support type of work 
(Siegel and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 8, Boeing).
We spend more of our time analysing and understanding our samples,
understanding our margins, understanding our prices, understanding the 
markets in which we do business (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999, pp. 8, 
Caterpillar)
A marked change in the practice analysis results between 1994 and 1999 relates to 
the management accountant’s role as an information provider. Figure 5 illustrates 
that in 1994, ‘meeting the information needs of internal customers’ was the least
important of the MA’s knowledge, skills and abilities. However, the 1999 practice
analysis reveals that management accountants have extended far beyond ‘servicing 
their internal customers’ and are now working as internal consultants, analysing and 
interpreting information for managers. As illustrated in the quotations above, by 
1999, MAs certainly see themselves as business analysts, who are actively involved 
in organisational DM (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999).
Figure 5: Most Important Knowledge Skills and Abilities for MAs as Perceived by 
MAs
1. Work ethic;
2. Analytical/problem solving skills;
3. Interpersonal skills;
4. Listening skills;
5. Use of spreadsheets;
6. Understanding the business;
7. Understanding the bottom line implications of DM;
8. Writing skills;
9. Familiarity with business processes;
10. Understanding the relationship between the income statement, the balance 
sheet and cash flow;
11. Leadership skills;
12. Understanding and preparing the financial statements;
13. Understanding the accounting system;
14. Interpreting and analysing the financial statements;
15. Measuring, valuing and presenting revenue and expenses;
16. Understanding accruals and deferrals;
17. Speaking and presentation skills;
18. Meeting the information needs of internal customers
Siegel and Kulesza (1994)
57
Burns et al (1999) assert that underlying MAS and techniques have not changed 
significantly (as suggested in research findings from the early 1990s discussed 
above). However, the way in which they are used and administered have and these 
changes reflect a wider change in the process of management. For instance, 
technological advances mean that information is now so widely dispersed that 
managers have ready access to information which was previously provided by the 
MA. This has resulted in managers preparing their own budgets, updating their own 
forecasts and in some cases even assessing their own performance. This factor 
reduces the MA’s responsibilities in terms of basic information provision. It is 
accepted, however, that for information to have any real value it must be presented in 
a commercial context, mindful of strategic considerations and often expressed in 
non-financial terms. Burns et al (1999) assert that MAS will alter little in terms of 
the information they produce but it will be necessary to interpret this information in a 
broader context. Here, according to Bums et al (1999), lies the defining characteristic 
of the MA’s modern role:
the ability to place financial numbers in a broader context and relate them to
key non-financial measures (pp.29).
Like Siegel and Sorensen (1999), Burns et al (1999) see the MA working along-side, 
and advising process managers. MA’s must combine a financial knowledge with 
commercial awareness as well as, a broad-based understanding of the business and 
the market in which the organisation is operating.
Burns and Yazdifar (2001) re-enforce the findings of Bums el al (1999) with regard 
to the lack of change in underlying MAS, yet the substantial change in the MA’s 
role. The former reported that budgets and variance analysis continue to rank as the 
most critically important tools of management accounting. However, they are 
increasingly being adopted alongside strategy-led tools such as rolling forecasts and 
strategic management accounting. According to Pierce and O’Dea (1998):
... [there is] a high degree of tailoring of MAS to suit particular
circumstances (pp.58).
Bums and Yazdifar (2001) predict that while traditional management accounting 
practices will remain important, technological advances and the continued
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decentralisation of accounting information is likely to result in these techniques 
being practiced by fewer MAs and more general managers. In this way the MA 
contribution of control information will involve supporting managers as they engage 
in greater levels of self-control, by analysing and interpreting information and 
improving its context.
It is suggested that MAs will become increasingly involved in IT and strategy. They 
will be expected to perform a support role whereby they will be forced to develop 
their IT skills so that they can support management in their task of accessing 
management accounting information themselves. As well as this, they will be 
expected to develop their strategic awareness and business process knowledge so that 
they can become astute business analysts capable of analysing information and 
advising management of the optimum course of action (Burns and Yazdifar, 2001). 
In this way, the MA’s contribution to DM extends to a business partner style role.
3.7.7 The Hybrid M anagem ent Accountant
The term ‘hybrid accountant’ (Bums et al, 1999) is designed to encapsulate this dual 
role characteristic of the present day MA as presented in the contemporary literature, 
that of controller and business partner. The nature of each of these components has 
developed in response to the changing environment. With regard to the controlling 
component, Bums et al (1999) describe the necessity for the MA to put financial 
numbers in a strategic context and relate non-financial results to organisational 
objectives. In relation to the partnering role, Bums and Yazdifar (2001) describe the 
necessity for the MA to be strategically aware as well as displaying a business 
process knowledge sufficient to adequately advise management for the purpose of 
management DM.
A hybrid accountant still performs the core management accounting role presented in 
this study, that of providing information for control, and providing information for 
DM, the difference is that the hybrid accountant performs it more effectively given 
all of the changes and developments discussed above.
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In the late 1980’s Johnson and Kaplan, among others, indicted the MA for relying on 
antiquated and meaningless techniques which were restrictively controlling and led 
to sub-optimal DM. The present day MA, it is suggested, must simultaneously assist 
management in controlling the organisation’s financial interests while effectively 
advising and helping management to run the business.
3.7.8 The M anagem ent Accountant as a Business Partner
The business partner role is an extension of the MA’s role in contributing DM 
information (Byrne, 2005). While the traditional MA provides information to 
managers for the purposes of DM, the MA as a business partner is an equal member 
of the DM team and acts as a trusted financial advisor to management (Siegel and 
Sorensen, 1999). To perform this role effectively, MA’s must understand the 
complexities of the business and be capable of interacting with people throughout the 
organisation (Burns and Scapens, 2000). The MA as a business partner crosses the 
line from providing information to managers for DM, to collaboratively engaging in 
DM with those managers.
3.7.9 Conflicts Faced by the Hybrid M anagem ent Accountant
The role of the hybrid MA is described as that of simultaneous ‘controller’ and 
‘business partner’ (Burns et al, 1999). It is clear from the literature that this role 
represents a development from the traditional management accounting role which 
centred on assisting management primarily with monitoring and control while also 
providing some décision-support. Granlund and Lukka (1998) recognise the 
transition in the role of the MA from that of ‘business historian and company 
watchdog toward a more commercially oriented function’. They describe an 
expanding role, which incorporates newer and wider dimensions such as consultant, 
advisor, and change agent, all of which are carried out alongside the traditional 
function of financial monitoring and scorekeeping. Granlund and Lukka (1998) 
describe the Finnish experience as that of a dual -purpose MA. A ‘controller’ brings 
a financial perspective to DM and exists in an advisory and support capacity, thereby 
appealing to line staff and operations management within the organisation. An 
‘accountant’, monitors financial progress, oversees performance and exists in a
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centralised, governance capacity within the organisation, thus appealing to senior and 
corporate management.
Granlund and Lukka (1998) question whether both roles can be occupied by the same 
person. Firstly, candidates for each role would be inherently different in their 
academic orientation. A ‘controller’ would place greater emphasis on 
communication, people skills and general business acumen. The ‘accountant’ would 
be more mathematically motivated with a desire to report the facts accurately, as 
opposed to considering the facts commercially. A review of those SACs discussed at 
section 3.8 exposes some potential conflicts. Secondly, their time orientation is in 
direct conflict. The controller is concerned with real time current information and 
how it impacts on future actions. The accountant is more concerned with recording 
and restating past performance. The scope of their work within the organisation 
differs in that the controller frequently crosses functions through teamwork and 
communication, while the accountant is generally restricted to working within the 
finance function. Granlund and Lukka (1998) report that, from a Finnish perspective, 
both of these roles are filled by different people or at the very least, by the same 
person at completely different times.
Perrow (1970), Sathe (1978), Hopper (1980) and Sathe (1982) pose similar questions 
regarding the conflicts arising as a result of controller involvement versus controller 
independence. The scorekeeping role requires the controller to accurately report 
financial information to management and to do all in their power to ensure the 
protection of the company’s assets. This requires a degree of controller independence 
from management. Conversely, the controller also has a responsibility to assist in the 
business DM process. The more involved the controller is in the DM process, the 
more influence that controller holds over management. Sathe (1982) asks if these 
roles are mutually exclusive. He questions whether one person can simultaneously 
occupy the role of policeman or umpire versus active participant in the DM process. 
This question has not been pursued at length in the contemporary empirical research 
particularly from the perspective of managers, and so it will form the basis of 
research question 6 presented in section 4.2.7.
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3.8 THE SKILLS, ATTRIBUTES AND COM PETENCIES OF AN  
INFORM ATION PROVIDER
Chapter 3 has examined the role of the MA and how this role has changed within the 
context of the changing business environment. If the role of the MA has evolved, so 
too must their specific SACs. Figure 6 presents a list, derived from the literature, of 
the more prominently featured SACs which may be associated with the MA. This 
list, which is in no particular order, illustrates the abundance of empirical research 
conducted into the management accountant’s SACs. This literature suggests that the 
MA shows a natural adeptness for some of these SACs, while others are traits 
favoured by managers, but not necessarily exhibited to a high degree by MA’s 
generally.
Ethics
Governance, compliance and ethics are now a top priority in almost every 
organisation today. Consequently, ethics is an attribute which is now considered 
vitally important in all organisational employees, particularly those within the 
finance department (May, 1999).
Precision, Honesty, Single Mindedness and Conservativeness
Traditionally, accountants have been referred to as ‘bean-counters’, i.e. people who 
are single-mindedly pre-occupied with precision and form to the detriment of content 
and who are precise, doggedly honest and boring (Jackson, 1956; Yamey, 1982; 
Bougen, 1994). Bougen (1994) maintains that this stereotype has benefited the 
accountant historically as it lent itself to the image of a confident and trustworthy 
professional. Friedman and Lyne’s (1997) findings suggest the contrary. Their study 
provided evidence that the bean-counter is perceived as someone who cannot relate 
to the business, lacks initiative and creativity and encourages sub-optimal decisions.
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Figure 6: Skills, Attributes and Competencies Derived from the Literature
Attribute, skill or competency Source
Ethics May (1999)
Honesty Jackson (1956)
Yamey (1982)
Bougen (1994)
Friedman and Lyne (1997)
Precision Jackson (1956)
Yamey (1982)
Bougen (1994)
Friedman and Lyne (1997)
Sound business understanding Siegel and Kulesza (1994) 
Siegel and Sorensen (1999) 
Bums et al (1999)
Bums and Yazdifar (2001) 
Brignall et al (1999) 
Scapens et al (1996)
IT Skills Bums and Yazdifar (2001)
Financial Expertise Siegel and Kulesza (1994) 
Siegel and Sorensen (1999) 
Bums et al (1999)
Burns and Yazdifar (2001)
Communications and 
interpersonal skills
Siegel and Kulesza (1994) 
Siegel and Sorensen (1999) 
Bums et al (1999)
Dickson and Powers (1979)
Problem solving and analytical 
skills
Siegel and Kulesza (1994) 
Siegel and Sorensen (1999) 
Bums and Yazdifar (2001)
Teamskills Siegel and Sorensen (1999) 
Bums et al (1999)
Bums and Yazdifar (2001)
Impartiality Hopper (1980)
Sathe (1982)
Granlund and Lukka (1998)
Creativity Siegel and Sorensen (1999)
Conservativeness Jackson (1956)
Yamey (1982)
Bougen (1994)
Friedman and Lyne (1997)
Single-mindedness Jackson (1956)
Yamey (1982)
Bougen (1994)
Friedman and Lyne (1997)
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Sound Business Understanding
Siegel and Kulesza (1994), Scapens et al (1996), Siegel and Sorensen (1999), Bums 
et al (1999) and Burns and Yazdifar (2001) all reported ‘a broad-based business 
understanding’ as a key trait required of any modern MA. This trait incorporates 
general business acumen as well as a sound understanding of how the organisation’s 
specific business operates in terms of business processes and workflows. Brignall et 
al (1999) found that many managers they surveyed were sceptical of the MA’s 
understanding of the business drivers and processes.
IT Skills
Bums and Yazdifar (2001) suggested that IT skills would become among the most 
important of the MA’s SACs. As information becomes more dispersed around the 
organisation through Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, web-based 
communications and automated processing, their research suggests that the MA may 
be relied on as a support function in accessing such information.
Financial Expertise
Sound financial know-how is not to be ignored in the analysis of the modem 
accountant and it is a characteristic identified as critically important in almost all 
surveys of MA’s competencies (Siegel and Kulesza, 1994; Siegel and Sorensen, 
1999; Bums et al 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001).
Communication and Interpersonal Skills
The Siegel and Kulesza (1994) study ranked ‘interpersonal skills’ and ‘listening 
skills’ as being among the most important characteristics of any MA. Five years 
later, communication skills ranked the highest in the succeeding 1999 practice 
analysis. In a UK survey, Bums et al (1999) reported that ‘broad based personal 
skills and commercial capabilities’ were among the most important attributes 
necessary to carry out the work of the MA.
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Dickson and Powers (1979) found that where preparers of information identify 
strongly with users’ requirements, users and preparers are more likely to have similar 
perceptions as to the effectiveness of an information system. To identify with user 
requirements, preparers must communicate with, and listen to, users. Greater 
communication between MAs and managers will undoubtedly result in managers 
needs being met more closely.
Problem Solving and Analytical Skills
In Siegel and Kulesza’s 1994 practice analysis, MAs themselves voted ‘problem 
solving’ as the second most important trait of a MA. Their findings suggested that as 
contemporary MAs became liberated from the mechanical tasks of the traditional 
MA, they have more time to engage in analysing information as opposed to merely 
generating it. This was confirmed in Siegel and Sorensen’s subsequent practice 
analysis in 1999, where 80% of MAs reported spending more time analysing 
information now than preparing it. Burns and Yazdifar (2001) reported that 81% of 
respondents agreed that analytical skills were the most important traits of the MA in 
the last 5 years, while 61% expected them to be the most important in the next 5 
years, with analytical and problem solving skills ranking the highest of all skills on 
each occasion. The nature of information has altered in that financial numbers must 
be examined in a strategic context and non-financial results must be related to 
organisational objectives. Information must reflect the strategic, commercial and 
financial, implications of the issue at hand. The added complexities of today’s 
information places greater challenges on the MA to explain it and discuss it, as 
opposed to merely present it.
Teamskills
Siegel and Sorensen (1999) found that the ability to work in a team situation was a 
critically important trait. This was re-iterated in the Burns et al (1999) findings 
where it was similarly highlighted. Bums and Yazdifar (2001) found teamskills 
currently to be considered the third most important trait over the past five years at 
62%, the same sample anticipated it would drop to fifth in importance in the next 
five years. Findings suggest in this case that IT and the ability to integrate financial
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and non-financial data may replace it in importance. As organisational structures 
have flattened, DM has been decentralised from senior management to empowered 
teams of employees and middle management. As opposed to feeding the relevant 
information to senior managers, MAs are now required to facilitate DM by providing 
valuable insight and knowledge while on cross-functional DM teams. Teamskills will 
also result in MAs identifying more closely with managers’ needs.
Impartiality
The literature has identified two diverse roles for the contemporary MA, that of 
controller and business partner (Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982; Granlund and Lukka, 
1998). The controller function involves monitoring performance to ensure that 
planned results are achieved, while the business partner function involves the MA 
becoming an equal member of the DM team. There are some potential conflicts 
between the two roles which are discussed in more detail at section 3.7.8 above. 
However, impartiality represents a key source of such conflict. The controller role 
requires the MA to accurately report financial information to management and to do 
all in their power to ensure the protection of the company’s assets. This requires a 
degree of controller independence from management which demands complete 
impartiality. Conversely, the business partner has a responsibility to assist in the 
business DM process. The more involved one is in DM, the more influential one is 
and the more impartiality may be sacrificed.
Creativity
Involvement in cross functional teams, taking part in organisational-wide DM and 
taking an active involvement in the problem solving of the organisation are very 
different tasks to generating monthly spend reports and delivering management 
accounts. While creativity is not an attribute traditionally associated with the MA, 
some of the new challenges facing the accountant would suggest that increased 
creativity may be required (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999).
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3.8.1 Providers of Control Information and Providers of DM Information
Having ascertained at section 2.2.4 that the MA’s role consists of two, often 
conflicting, elements, that of contributor to control and contributor to DM, it is clear 
from section 3.7.9 and 3.8 that MA’s are presented with a conflict in terms their 
contribution of control information and their contribution of DM information. If the 
MA is to progress to the hybrid accountant role which incorporates a broader 
contribution to control and a more involved ‘business partner’ style contribution to 
DM, clearly, many of the SACs discussed above are not equally compatible with 
both of these functions. Some may be considered more useful in MAs providing 
control information, while others may be more useful in MAs providing DM 
information. Granlund and Lukka (1998) report that an accountant engaged in 
providing information for DM would require stronger communications and team- 
skills while the accountant engaged predominantly in providing information for 
control would be restricted to working within the financial function and so would be 
less reliant on communication and team-skills. This conflict issue is significant 
enough to prevent the MA from engaging in the hybrid accountant role discussed at 
3.7.7 and more specifically the business partner role discussed at 3.7.8. Hopper 
(1980) suggests that a controller might be more concerned with impartiality than a 
business partner. While Bougen (1994) maintains that the MA’s reputation for 
‘dogged honesty’ benefits the traditional MA who was perceived as a trustworthy 
and impartial contributor. However, Friedman and Lyne (1997) reported that this 
image portrayed a MA who lacked the creativity and knowledge to become more 
involved with the DM process. Some studies, such as these, have referred to the 
conflicting attributes of the MA, given the diverse nature of his/her contemporary 
role. The literature has specifically addressed the overall issue of conflict within the 
MA’s diverse role (Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 1978; Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982). 
However, few studies have focused specifically on the manager’s views of the 
importance of different SACs in the MA depending on what type of information 
he/she is providing. Perceived differences in the importance of the various SACs in 
providers of control information as compared with providers of DM information, 
may help to explain the extent of the MAs’ involvement in the provision of control or 
DM information, which may in turn help to determine their role as well as the
67
reasons for their gravitation towards this role. This forms the basis for research 
question 2, detailed at 4.2.3.
3.9 S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S IO N S
Chapter 3 presented a review of the literature relating to the MA’s changing role over 
the past two and a half decades. The changes occurring in the business environment 
during that period are presented as well as an overview of the effects of these 
changes on the key control and DM functions of the MA. A contemporary control 
framework (Otley, 1999) is presented which is compared to Simons (1995) control 
framework which was first introduced in chapter 2. Chapter 3 then revisits the DM 
frameworks introduced in chapter 2 before going on to provide an overview of the 
contingency theories of management accounting.
Developments in field based research methods in the 1990’s led to a growth in the 
range of management accounting topics being researched. The role of the accountant 
and the changes occurring in that role were researched at length. An account of this 
is provided in chapter 3. This account provides a description of the hybrid accountant 
as presented in the literature together with the conflicts inherent in this role. The 
extension of the MA’s contribution to DM into a type of ‘business partner’ role is 
also described before going on to present a list of MA’s SACs derived from the 
literature. The literature has not examined the extent to which managers perceive 
these SACs to be as important in providers of control information as compared with 
providers of DM information, and vice versa. This provides the basis for research 
question 2 in section 4.2.3. Section 3.7.9 provides an account of the literature 
addressing the conflicts inherent in the MA’s role as a simultaneous ‘controller’ and 
‘supporter’. Few studies have examined this from the manager’s perspective. This 
forms the basis of research question 6, outlined in section 4.2.7.
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CHAPTER 4
Objectives and 
Methodology
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 presents the objectives of the study, as well as the methods adopted in 
addressing these objectives. Section 4.2 describes the overall objective, followed by 
an outline of each of the underlying research questions. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 detail 
the methods of data collection and analysis respectively. Section 4.5 describes the 
measures taken to address reliability and validity issues while section 4.6 concludes 
the chapter.
4.2 O B J E C T IV E S  O F  T H E  S T U D Y
Based on a review of the relevant management accounting and management 
information systems literature as summarised in chapters 2 and 3, a general overall 
objective was formulated, together with a series of specific research questions as set 
out below.
4.2.1 G eneral O verall O bjective
The literature suggests that the traditional MA may be perceived to be somewhat 
inadequate in today’s business environment. The issues described in chapter 3, 
including technology, competitiveness and downsizing have placed new challenges 
on MAs in terms of the information they’re expected to provide (Siegel and Kulesza, 
1994; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; Burns el al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). The 
modern MA must provide meaningful and useful information, reflecting all of these 
changes, for both control and DM. There are many challenges to controlling in 
today’s environment- empowered work-forces, distributed information and increased 
incidence of employee self control have changed the parameters of control (Otley, 
1994). MAs must put financial numbers in a strategic context and relate non- 
financial results to organisational objectives (Burns et al, 1999). The ability to assist 
in DM requires MAs to provide information which reflects fully the strategic, 
commercial and operational, as well as financial implications of the decision at hand 
(Burns and Yazdifar, 2001). This suggests that the contemporary MA is responsible 
for providing an increasingly wide range of information. Some of the literature 
(Burns et al, 1999; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999) suggests that this can only be
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achieved if the MA transforms into a ‘hybrid accountant’ who assists managers in 
controlling the organisation given all of the significant changes and developments 
described above, while also performing a ‘business partner’ role in which the MA 
progresses from providing information to managers for DM to actively participating 
in the DM process. However, the literature suggests that in many ways the MA does 
not appreciate this breadth of information required by managers (Pierce and O’Dea, 
2003). Research indicates that MAs are still providing information which is largely 
confirmatory and historic (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993), synoptic and financial 
(Mendoza and Bescos, 2001) and often they are providing it too late to be useful and 
in a format which is difficult for managers to understand and use (Pierce and O’Dea, 
2003). Such findings suggest that managers generally are not satisfied with the role 
being played by the MA. These findings undermine the MA’s ability to contribute 
effectively to control and/or DM and certainly place doubts over his/her ability to 
become a ‘hybrid accountant’. Few empirical studies have examined the MA’s 
contemporary role from the manager’s perspective (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; 
Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002). Enquiries of MAs 
do little to establish the needs of managers (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). This indicates 
that there is a need for an examination of managers’ perceptions of the role of the 
MA in the provision of information for control and DM purposes as well as the 
factors influencing this role. It is intended to achieve this overall research objective 
by posing a series of research questions, as presented in the following sections.
4.2.2. Research Question 1
Section 2.6 discussed a specific body of management accounting literature which 
describes information in terms of its value to managers (Belkaoui, 1980; Chenhall 
and Morris, 1986; Jonsson and Gronlund, 1988; Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Mia 
and Chenhall, 1994; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003; Van der 
Veeken and Wouters, 2002). From this review, a comprehensive list was derived of 
the specific characteristics most frequently referred to by managers when discussing 
the merits or lack thereof in information they use. Section 2.6.1 describes a need to 
ascertain what type of information managers perceive to be important for control and 
DM and whether or not significantly different types of information is required in 
each case. In this way it will be possible to ascertain if these two sets of information
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requirements conflict and whether the MA is particularly suited to providing either 
type in light of such conflicts.
RQ1: What characteristics of information do managers perceive to be important for 
the following purposes:
(a) Control
(b) Decision Making?
4.2.3 Research Q uestion 2
Chapter 3 discusses the developments occurring in the business environment over the 
past two decades as well as the repercussions of these developments on the role of 
the MA. Section 3.8 provides a review of the empirical research which has taken 
place in relation to the various SACs of the MA (Siegel and Kulesza, 1994; Siegel 
and Sorensen, 1999; Burns et al, 1999; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003) and presents a 
comprehensive list of the SACs often referred to when describing an information 
provider. The literature has not focused in detail on the extent to which these SACs 
may be perceived to be as important for control as for DM, and vice versa (3.8.1). 
RQ2 therefore asks if managers look for something different in providers of control 
information as opposed to providers of DM information.
RQ2: What skills, attributes and competencies do managers perceive to be important 
in providers of information for the following purposes:
(a) Control
(b) Decision Making?
4.2.4 Research Question 3
Chapter 3 describes the contemporary MA as a ‘hybrid accountant’ who is a 
simultaneous controller and business partner (3.7.7). This contemporary MA must 
provide both control and DM information and this is proving increasingly 
challenging in today’s business environment (Burns et al, 1999; Siegel and Sorensen, 
1999; Burns and Yazdifar, 2001). RQ3 therefore asks managers to describe their 
MAs role in information provision for control and DM.
72
RQ3: To what extent is the MA providing information to managers for control and/or 
DM?
4.2.5 R esearch Question 4
Previous surveys of managers have concentrated on managers’ perceptions of the 
importance of particular information characteristics or on the MA’s ability to 
produce information containing these characteristics (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; 
Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Van der Veeken and 
Wouters, 2002). According to Pierce and O’Dea (2003), few studies have 
specifically attempted both. Pierce and O’Dea (2003) themselves compared the 
perceptions of managers and management accountants in the same organisations 
regarding information supplied by the management accounting function. This study 
builds on Pierce and O’Dea’s research by first asking managers what they look for in 
their information and then asking them how their management accountants perform 
relative to these expectations. This study focuses more exclusively on managers’ 
perceptions and examines why some management accountants fall short of manager 
expectations and if this is impacting the management accountant’s overall role. RQ4 
therefore examines managers’ perceptions of the usefulness of the information 
provided by their MAs relative to their expectations. Responses to this question are 
expected to provide reasons for the MA’s level of involvement in the provision of 
information for control and/or DM.
RQ4: How effective is the MA perceived to be in providing useful information?
4.2.6 Research Question 5
At this point, the managers have indicated how important they perceive various 
SACs to be. In order to provide further insight into the factors influencing the MA’s 
role in the provision of control and DM information, RQ5 asks managers if their 
MAs meet expectations in terms of exhibiting those SACs. Responses to this 
question will highlight gaps between the MA’s capabilities and the manager’s 
expectations. Few studies to date have examined the MA’s SACs in this way.
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RQ5: To -what extent does the MA display the skills, attributes and competencies 
associated with providers of useful information?
4.2.7 Research Q uestion 6
The literature is clear about the existence of some conflicts in the MA’s role as a 
simultaneous provider of both control and DM information (Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 
1978; Hopper, 1980). As the MA’s role develops into that of a hybrid accountant, 
evidence suggests that such conflict increases (Granlund and Lukka, 1998). Sathe 
(1982) describes the conflicts between controller involvement and controller 
independence. The controlling function requires MAs to accurately report results and 
monitor performance. This requires a degree of independence from management. 
Conversely, the MAs’ contribution to DM affords them power and influence. 
According to Sathe (1982), the more involved one is in DM the more influential one 
is. This conflicts with the independence required for control. Studies to date have not 
examined managers perceptions of these conflicts. RQ6 therefore investigates 
managers’ perceptions of the conflict between the MA’s alternate roles.
RQ6: To what extent do managers perceive a conflict in the MA's capacity to 
provide both control and DM information?
4.3 D A T A  C O L L E C T IO N
There is a general acceptance that a true insight into the performance of the MA can 
only be achieved through discussion with managers (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; 
Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001). MAs’ own responses are 
susceptible to response bias and provide little insight into the true requirements of 
managers and the performance of MAs relative to these requirements (Pierce and 
O’Dea, 2003). Data was therefore collected by means of 18 semi-structured 
interviews with managers in varying roles, in many different types of companies 
varying from an Irish indigenous specialist biomedical enterprise to a large 
multinational computer component’s manufacturer.
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4.3.1 A Qualitative and Quantitative Study
Quantitative methods involve using standardised measures so that people’s varying 
responses can fit into a limited number of response categories. Quantitative measures 
allow the responses of a large number of people to a limited number of questions to 
be compared and statistically aggregated (Patton, 2001). Quantitative data collection 
focuses on the measurement and analysis of variables and these results are presented 
in the form of numbers (Punch, 2005).
Qualitative methods allow a study of the issues in depth and detail and can generate a 
lot of information about a smaller number of cases (Patton, 2001). Qualitative data is 
presented in the form of words and may include interview transcripts, recordings and 
notes, observational records and notes, legal documents and personal experience 
materials such as diaries (Punch, 2005).
Quantitative data collection does not allow people to provide information using their
own terms, meanings and understandings as qualitative data collection does.
However, peoples own terms, meanings and understandings are almost impossible to
compare in a standardized fashion. Systematic comparisons of structured responses
are valuable, but the in depth insights of respondents using their own terms and
concepts are also valuable (Punch, 2005). Punch therefore suggests:
... combining the two approaches in such a way as to retain the advantages of 
each (Punch, 2005).
Quantitative and qualitative data collection have different strengths and weaknesses 
but they are not mutually exclusive. A qualitative study may be adopted in 
combination with a quantitative approach. An interview that asks both closed and 
open-ended questions is an example of combining quantitative measurement with 
qualitative enquiry (Patton, 2001).
4.3.2 Interview approach
The main qualitative data collection methods used are interviews, observation and 
document review (Punch, 2005). In this case, an interview approach to data
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collection was adopted. This approach offered the distinct advantage of facilitating 
both quantitative and qualitative data collection. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in which both standardised questions with a predetermined range of 
answers as well as open-ended questions were put to the interviewees.
Interviews allow verbal exchanges, which facilitate added explanations of the 
information required by the interviewer, and enhanced elaboration of responses by 
the interviewee (Swenson, 1995). Interviews offer the best opportunity to understand 
somebody else’s perspective. They provide an insight into feelings, thoughts and 
intentions that few alternative qualitative data collection methods will facilitate 
(Patton, 2001). Survey results will offer a succinct summary of major patterns but 
interviews allow the researcher to attain depth, detail and individual meaning (Patton, 
1990). Aaker and Day (1983) maintain that semi-structured interviews facilitate 
greater depth, perspective and insight by allowing open discussion in a structured and 
logical manner. This approach helps to avoid potential misunderstandings and 
facilitates the probing and clarification of interviewee responses.
4.3.3 The design of the study
To ensure ‘comprehensive and systematic interviewing’ (Patton, 1990, pp.283), an 
interview guide was used, a copy of which is included at appendix A.
Specific quantitative information was requested with regard to question 1 (relating to 
the perceived importance of various information characteristics), question 2 (relating 
to the perceived importance of various SACs), question 4 (relating to perceptions of 
the MAs performance in terms of producing information containing the various 
information characteristics), and question 5 (relating to perceptions of the MAs’ 
performance in terms of exhibiting the various SACs). Managers were asked to 
choose these responses from a pre-determined rating scale. Questionnaires were 
completed during the course of the interviews to record the structured data gathered 
in these responses. A copy of this questionnaire is included at appendix B. The 
managers were then asked follow-up open-ended questions. While the questionnaires 
provided statistically generalisable patterns, follow-up open-ended enquiry was
76
required in order to ascertain the depth, detail and meaning of the managers’ own 
experiences.
Open-ended questions only were used to elicit information with regard to question 3 
(relating to the extent of the MA’s involvement in control and DM) and question 6 
(relating to the perceived conflict between both). Attempts were made to make all 
questions as clear, neutral and open-ended as possible in keeping with suggestions by 
Patton (1990).
4.3.4 Sampling
The study was conducted using a purposeful random sampling approach. Purposeful 
random sampling does not automatically eliminate any possibility from a random 
selection of cases. This type of sampling reduces bias but will not permit statistical 
generalisations to a large population (Patton, 2001). The sample selected in this study 
was random in the sense that managers of all types of organisations (manufacturing, 
government, retail) and all types of organisational functions (production, logistics, 
distribution, sales, marketing and general) were sourced and interviews were 
arranged without any initial enquiries as to the managers’ relationship with the MA. 
Any manager from the list of CIMA companies and the researchers own work related 
contacts (discussed in section 4.3.5) could have been selected for interview. 
However, the sample was purposefully selected in that only managers with 
responsibility for a department, line, division or function were targeted. In this way 
the managers were screened to ensure that they had the appropriate experience to 
contribute effectively to the study.
4.3.5 Sourcing the Sample
The most fundamental issue that any field researcher confronts is an ability to gain 
access to the field, that is, an ability to gain access to contemporary organisations 
(Baxter and Chua, 1998). Gaining access to an appropriate sample of managers 
presented many challenges, which were overcome in a variety of ways. The 
researcher began the sample selection process by writing to fifty CIMA registered 
MAs (obtained from the CIMA 2003 Members Yearbook) and requesting the contact
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details of an appropriate manager within their organisation. A copy of this letter is 
included at appendix C. Two interviews resulted from this approach. Where no 
response was received, these letters were followed up with phone calls within 
approximately one week. In some cases the MA to whom an initial enquiry had been 
sent had left the company, and so a follow-up conversation was conducted with the 
replacement MA, a manager within the company, or a member of HR. This resulted 
in a further four interviews. Capitalising on more opportunistic methods (Patton, 
2001), the researcher’s own personal and work related contacts resulted in a further 
six interviews. In these cases, the manager was directly sourced without contacting 
the MA. The remaining 6 were sought out through cold calling a large number of 
companies and attempting to make direct contact with the relevant managers. This 
list of companies was obtained from the IDA and Enterprise Ireland web sites.
Due to the guarantee of confidentiality, all company and manager names have been 
disguised using a simple letter referencing system. Appendix D provides a profile of
the interviewees.
4.3.6 Data Gathering
Face-to-face interviews of approximately 60 minutes were conducted with each 
manager at either a neutral meeting point or at their own premises. Interviewees were 
provided with a brief summary of the areas to be discussed in advance of the 
meeting. All interviewees granted permission to record the interviews. As described 
in 4.3.3 above, questionnaires were completed in relation to some of the questions. 
During each interview, as recommended by Patton (2001), additional notes were 
taken to record issues such as setting, reaction to questions, body language and 
rapport. After each interview, further notes were added as part of a brief post 
interview review. Patton (2001) advised that these will later provide a context in 
which to interpret the findings. They also assisted in preparation for the next 
interview.
78
Data analysis began after each interview when the transcripts were prepared and the 
interview notes and questionnaires were reviewed. All of the transcripts were 
completed by the researcher. At this point, notes were made regarding potential 
issues and themes which appeared to be emerging in the initial findings.
After all of the interviews were complete, quantitative responses were entered into an 
excel spreadsheet designed to collate and summarise all quantitative results.
The completed transcripts and notes together with the initial quantitative results were 
then reviewed together. Further notes were made regarding potential issues or 
themes. These notes were recorded on the transcripts and notes themselves. After this 
the detailed data analysis commenced.
4.4.1 Quantitative Analysis
Regarding question 1, managers were asked to rate specified information 
characteristics, and in relation to question 2, they were asked to rate specified SACs, 
in terms of how important they perceived each to be for (a) control, and (b) DM. A 
rating scale of 1 to 5 was used, where 1 equated to not at all important; 2 somewhat 
important; 3 quite important; 4 very important and 5 extremely important. This 
resulted in the calculation of a mean importance rating for each characteristic of 
information for (a) control and (b) DM, and for each SAC for (a) control and (b) 
DM.
Further statistical procedures examining the differences between the means were 
necessary in order to provide some indication of a relationship between variables. 
Non-parametric methods are considered more appropriate than parametric methods 
where the samples are smaller and/or the populations are not normally distributed 
(Anderson, Sweeney and Williams, 1990). Wilcoxon signed rank testing is the non- 
parametric equivalent to the one sample t test and the matched pairs test. In a 
matched pairs situation, each experimental unit generates two paired or matched 
observations, one from population one and one from population two. The differences
4.4 DATA ANALYSIS
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between the matched observations provide insights concerning the differences 
between the two populations (Siegel, 1956). Wilcoxon signed rank testing is used in 
two ways in relation to questions 1 and 2.
Firstly, the mean responses for each characteristic or attribute in relation to control 
are assumed to reflect one population, while the mean responses for each 
characteristic or attribute in relation to DM are assumed to reflect a second 
population. Using Wilcoxon signed rank testing the significance of the differences 
was calculated between the mean responses for each characteristic or attribute for 
control and the comparative mean responses for each characteristic or attribute for 
DM. These results are presented and discussed in chapter 5 in tables 1 and 2 and 
sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. Secondly, in relation to question 1, the mean 
responses in relation to the importance of each characteristic for control purposes are 
assumed to reflect a series of populations. The responses in relation to each 
characteristic are in turn compared with the responses in relation to every other 
characteristic in the list, each individual test resulting in the matching of two separate 
populations. In this way it is possible to ascertain the significant difference between 
each characteristic, initially for control purposes. This testing was repeated again in 
order to ascertain the significant difference between each characteristic for DM 
purposes. These results are presented in appendices I and J respectively and are also 
discussed at section 5.2. The same methods were used for question 2 in order to 
ascertain the significant difference between the importance of the various SACs, 
initially for control purposes, and then for DM purposes. These results are presented 
in appendices K and L respectively and are discussed at section 5.3.
In questions 4 and 5, managers were asked to rate their MA’s performance in relation 
to each of the information characteristics and each of the SACs, respectively. They 
were asked to rate their MA’s performance on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 equated to 
bad; 2 fair; 3 good; 4 very good, and; 5 excellent. In these cases, the managers were 
responding with regard to their MA’s overall performance, and not their performance 
in relation to control as distinct from DM. Probing during the initial interviews 
revealed that the managers were of the opinion that their MAs did not perform 
differently in control versus DM scenarios and so the managers themselves were 
unable to provide differing scores. The MAs’ performance scores at questions 4 and
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5 were compared with the managers’ expectations scores at 1 and 2 and an 
expectations gap, if one existed, was calculated. These results are presented in tables
3 and 4 in chapter 5, and are discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.
As described for questions 1 and 2 above, the mean responses in relation to the MAs’ 
performance for each characteristic, and for each SAC, were tested using Wilcoxon 
signed rank testing in order to ascertain the significant difference between the MAs’ 
performance for each. These results are presented at appendices M and N.
All non-parametric testing was conducted with the assistance of Microsoft Excel 
based Analyse-It software.
4.4.2 Qualitative Analysis
Quantitative measures are systematic, standardised and are easily aggregated for 
analysis. In contrast, qualitative findings are very detailed and variable. A substantial 
amount of transcripts and field-notes must be reduced to a manageable number of 
themes or insights. The first step in achieving this is the development of a 
classification or coding scheme which facilitates the generation of ideas and themes 
(Patton, 2001). Once all of the field research was complete, each interview transcript, 
together with the corresponding notes, was reviewed as described at the data analysis 
introduction in 4.4 above. A coding system was established based on the results of 
this review. The codes relate to the key topics emerging within each research 
question. Each section of the transcripts and notes were coded. Coloured highlighter 
pens were used to identify each coded section.
A grid-like framework was established which was designed to capture the results in a 
logical and meaningful fashion. Each coded section of the notes and transcripts was 
placed in its appropriate part of the framework. Once fully collated, this framework 
presented an initial draft of the qualitative results, presented by research question and 
by initial findings. The actual collation of the coded sections underwent several 
iterations before the draft results were clearly presentable.
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Once a draft copy of the results was prepared, it was reviewed in detail several times. 
Consistencies and commonalities were grouped in an effort to ascertain potential 
patterns. Miles and Huberman (1994) identified pattern analysis as a key method of 
drawing and verifying conclusions from qualitative findings. Pattern analysis was 
conducted whereby data were reviewed for evidence of confirmation or contradiction 
of previously identified patterns. These patterns were reviewed together with the 
supporting evidence, in the context of the quantitative findings, so that significant 
themes could be identified with the specific research questions. The pattern analysis 
revealed initial findings out of which a framework emerged through which the 
findings could be interpreted and conclusions drawn.
The interpretation of findings is one of the greatest challenges facing the qualitative 
researcher. Qualitative interpretation is exposed to subjective interpretation and bias 
fuelled by the researchers own experiences. In addition, qualitative interpretation is 
considered difficult to replicate and is therefore considered somehow untrustworthy 
(Bryman, 1985). With this in mind, a process of AI was applied to this interpretive 
process. AI is a sequence of rigorous analytical procedures applied to qualitative 
results so that the findings as interpreted are a true reflection of the phenomenon 
being investigated (Bryman, 1985). It is a process by which the researcher 
continually challenges or attempts to ‘disprove’ or ‘disconfirm’ the concepts or ideas 
emerging from the findings (Ragin, 1994). By exposing the results to such rigorous 
analysis, AI increases the validity and reliability of qualitative findings. This process 
was particular pertinent for research questions 3 and 6 because these findings were 
entirely qualitative and could not be triangulated with any comparative quantitative 
findings. The AI process is discussed in greater detail in section 4.5 below.
All of these results were then reviewed together with the key literature so that the key 
conclusions of the findings could be stated and supported. The key results, both 
quantitative and qualitative, analysed in the context of the research questions, are 
presented in chapter 5. The interpretation of these results, identifying the core themes 
and issues emerging from the study, is presented in chapter 6.
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4.5 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
Ultimately, every researcher must convince the reader of the credibility of their 
findings. The two key concepts in any discussion on the credibility of research 
findings are reliability and validity (Silverman, 2001).
Reliability has been described by Hammersley (1992) as:
... the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same 
category by different observers or by the same observer on different 
occasions (pp.67).
Reliability essentially means that if the analyses were to be repeated by a second 
analyst, he/she would arrive at the same results. Such reliability is easier to guarantee 
in relation to quantitative analysis because a quantitative analysis can be ‘re­
produced’ quite easily given the standardised nature of most statistical operations, 
but it does prove to be much more difficult in relation to qualitative analysis where 
the analyses techniques are not quite so structured and standardised. Punch (2005) 
suggests that the best way to increase the reliability of qualitative findings is to 
document the methods of data analysis which were used in as much detail as possible 
in order to expose them to the maximum amount of scrutiny. A detailed account of 
both the qualitative and quantitative data analyses carried out in this study are 
presented throughout section 4.4 above. Further detail as to how the findings were 
interpreted is provided in chapter 6, in section 6.2.
Validity is referred to by Hammersley (1990) as:
... the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena 
to which it refers (pp.57).
Validity means the extent to which the findings may be considered ‘true’. It may be 
broken down into internal validity and external validity. Internal validity addresses 
the internal logic and consistency of the study. In quantitative research analysis this 
addresses the extent to which the relationship between the variables are correctly 
interpreted. In qualitative research analysis it addresses the extent to which the 
findings represent reality. External validity addresses the question of generalisability. 
It asks to what extent are the findings generalisable to a wider population (Punch, 
2005).
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Every researcher must convince the reader that their interpretations of the findings 
are a true reflection of the reality studied. In other words, they must convince the 
reader that their interpretations are valid. Silverman (2001) suggests some techniques 
to assist this process. Firstly, Respondent Validation, which involves taking ones 
findings back to the subjects being studied. This is not practical in every case as 
often the findings would be contaminated by the subjects input (Reason and Rowan, 
1981) and this was considered to be the case in this study. A second method 
suggested is Triangulation, which is applied in this study and is discussed in section
4.5.6 below. Finally, Silverman (2001) suggests a series of analytical techniques one 
of which is AI, which is applied in this study and is discussed in section 4.5.5 below.
Throughout this research process several measures were taken in order to maximise 
the reliability and the validity of these findings.
4.5.1 Sampling Procedures
As described at 4.3.4, a random sampling approach was adopted in selecting 
managers for interview. This means that no potential interviewee was ruled out. In 
other words, all interviews were arranged without any pre-conceived notion on the 
part of the researcher as to the manager’s relationship with the MA.
4.5.2 Post Interview Review
The period after an interview or observation is critical to the rigour and 
validity of the qualitative findings. This is a time for guaranteeing the quality 
of the data (Patton, 2001, pp.383).
As described in the introduction to 4.4 above, following each interview, field notes 
were reviewed to ensure that they were clear and made sense. Two follow-up calls 
were conducted in order to clarify some details of the interview. Post interview notes 
were added recording observations made during the interview and emerging thoughts 
and ideas. Patton (2001) described the post interview period as a time of quality 
control to ensure that the data gathered is correct and reliable.
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4.5.3 Confirmation of Transcripts
A copy of each transcript was sent back to each interviewee. Interviewees were 
asked if they would read the transcript and satisfy themselves that the transcript 
represented a true reflection of the interview and that they were not quoted 
incorrectly. The managers were advised that their non-response would be assumed to 
be an indication of their satisfaction with the transcript. Ten interviewees responded, 
nine of which were completely satisfied with the contents. One manager wished to 
make some amendments to minor details included within his quotations in order to 
avoid any possible compromise to the confidentiality of the interview.
4.5.4 Rigours of Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis
The validity of quantitative measures depends on the correct and appropriate 
administration of the mathematical tools used for quantitative analysis (Patton, 
2001). This study involved the use of non-parametric testing as described at 4.4.1. 
The researcher conducted an extensive study of parametric and non-parametric 
testing procedures. The researcher also sought advice and review from a statistics 
expert before placing any reliance on the statistical testing results.
The validity of the qualitative analysis is more dependant on the skills, competence 
and rigour of the researcher (Patton, 2001). Section 4.4.2 above described the 
rigorous approach pursued in carrying out the qualitative analysis. The system of 
data review and coding, followed by the collation of draft results, followed by pattern 
analysis was an iterative process carried out several times as the researcher gained 
more knowledge throughout the data analysis process. This was followed by a 
rigorous AI process as described in the following section.
4.5.5 Analytical Induction
AI is a term which was developed by Znaniecki in 1934 and may be described as:
the systematic examination of similarities between cases to develop concepts 
or idea’s (Punch, 2005, pp. 196).
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AI is a methodology with which researchers challenge or try to ‘disconfirnv concepts 
of ideas that they are developing. In doing so, they focus particularly on negative 
cases or exceptions (Ragin, 1994). The following represents a simple approach to AI. 
Firstly, each case is tentatively classified into a category. Secondly, common features 
of the cases subsumed within a particular group are noted. Thirdly, deviant cases are 
examined in order to determine if the list of common features need to be expanded or 
if a new category needs to be established. Finally there is further scrutiny of the cases 
in each category (Bryman, 1985). Many different texts describe slight variances, 
more steps or extra iterations, but this captures the basic steps of AI. The AI process, 
as it is applied to this study, is described in section 6.2.
4.5.6 Triangulation
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that triangulation supports a finding by showing 
that independent measures agree with it, or at least, do not contradict it. This study 
adopted both qualitative and quantitative measures of analysis, the results of both of 
which supported each other.
When quantitative and qualitative research are jointly pursued, much more
complete accounts of social reality can ensue (Bryman, 1985 pp. 126).
During the semi-structured interviews, research questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 began with 
each manager choosing from a list of predetermined numbered options which were 
then subject to quantitative analysis by the researcher as described in section 4.4.1. 
As described in section 4.3.3, the managers were also asked open-ended questions in 
relation to these specific research questions in order to establish greater depth and 
meaning from the managers’ experiences. These responses were then subject to 
qualitative analysis as described in section 4.4.2. In this way, these research 
questions were addressed using two alternative methods and in most cases, they both 
revealed consistent results. There were just two instances where the quantitative and 
qualitative results contradicted each other. Firstly, the qualitative responses indicated 
a difference in the importance of accuracy and consistency in control as opposed to 
DM information while the quantitative responses indicated no significant difference, 
as described in section 5.2.2. Secondly, the qualitative responses indicated a 
difference in the importance of problem solving skills in providers of control and
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DM information while the quantitative data indicated no significant difference, as 
described at section 5.3.3. These were the only two real instances of contradiction 
between the qualitative and quantitative findings. The remainder were mutually 
supporting.
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The objective of the study is to provide an examination of managers’ perceptions of 
the role of MAs in the provision of information to managers for control and DM 
purposes, as well as the factors influencing this role. Chapter 4 begins with a detailed 
description of the research questions posed in order to achieve this research 
objective. A qualitative and quantitative study was designed based on data from 18 
semi structured interviews with 18 different managers. The data collection 
techniques are described explaining why the interview technique was chosen and 
describing how this approach was implemented. The chapter goes on to discuss the 
data analysis techniques, describing in detail the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
conducted. The chapter concludes with a description of the measures taken in order 
to maximise the validity and reliability of the findings in terms of sampling 
procedures, post interview review, confirmation of transcripts, rigorous quantitative 
and qualitative analysis including analytical induction and triangulation.
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CHAPTER 5
Presentation of 
Findings
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 5 reports the qualitative and quantitative findings of the study. Each of the 
subsections, section 5.1 through to section 5.6, deals with the research questions 1 
through to 6, as outlined in chapter 4. The analysis and interpretation of the findings 
is set out in chapter 6 and throughout chapter 5, references are made to the associated 
discussion point in chapter 6.
5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1
What characteristics of information do managers perceive to be important for the 
following purposes:
(a) Control
(b) Decision Making?
The managers were asked to rate specified information characteristics in terms of 
how important they perceived each to be in (a) control, and (b) DM information. A 
rating scale of 1 to 5 was used, where 1 equated to not at all important and 5 
extremely important. The results are summarised in table 1, with further statistical 
analysis presented at appendices I and J. A detailed breakdown of the individual 
manager responses is included in appendix E.
5.2.1 High Importance for both Control and DM Information
Relevance and reliability were considered the most important characteristics for both 
control and DM information. Relevance was considered significantly more important 
than consistency, flexibility, timeliness, aggregation and scope for control purposes 
(refer to appendix I) and timeliness, accuracy, flexibility, scope, aggregation and 
consistency for DM purposes (refer to appendix J). Reliability was considered 
significantly more important than flexibility, timeliness, aggregation and scope for 
control purposes (refer to appendix I) and considered significantly more important 
than flexibility, scope, aggregation and consistency for DM purposes (refer to 
appendix J).
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The managers perceived little or no difference in the importance of either whether 
the information was for control or DM:
Irrelevant information, in any case, is simply not useful and wastes my time
(F).
Surely reliability is a given. If its not reliable for a start it jeopardises the 
entire system (G).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of importance of characteristics of (a) control 
information and (b) DM information
Characteristics of 
Information
Control Information DM Information Wilco
Signet
Resull
xon
i Rank
ts
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
Rank Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
Rank Z P
Score
Relevance 4.78
(0.53)
1 4.89
(0.31)
1 -1 0.317
Reliability 4.50
(0.76)
2 4.56
(0.76)
2 -1 0.317
Accuracy 4.44
(0.96)
3 4.06
(1.31)
4 -1.38 0.168
Consistency 4.00
(0.67)
4 3.56
(1.30)
8 -1.14 0.26
Flexibility and 
Adaptability
3.89
(0.66)
5 3.89
(0.74)
5 0 1
Timeliness 3.56
(0.96)
6 4.28
(0.87)
3 -2.14 0.03*
Aggregation 3.44
(0.83)
7 3.56
(0.76)
7 -1 0.317
Scope 3.11
(1.20)
8 3.78
(1.31)
6 2.58 0.01**
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
5.2.2 Key Differences between Control and DM Information
As indicated in table 1, timeliness and scope were both considered significantly more
important in DM information than in control information:
With regard to control or historical information, timeliness is somewhat 
important but it’s not paramount. However for DM purposes, I can tolerate 
far less accuracy as long as timeliness is improved (A).
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Timeliness [for control] is not an issue insofar as we know the dates, there’s 
lots of clarity there, everybody understands it... as regards projects it really 
depends on the importance of the projects and the potential turnover. I have 
just come out of a project there where the date was set. It had to happen, end 
of story (B).
Manager R, tended to turn elsewhere for project information:
Project information requirements are much more responsive, this information 
tends to come from the purchasing department and is not so report driven (R).
Some managers expressed similar sentiments in relation to scope:
Project information would generally involve a greater necessity for broader 
scope (B).
Key decisions would require broader input from all parties (H).
The most revealing feedback in relation to scope however was from managers who 
simply did not perceive the provision of broad scope information to be within the 
domain of the MA:
From the MA, I require 3 key pieces of informational output, my controllable 
lines. That’s all I’m interested in from a management accounting perspective. 
If those things are reported adequately, that would be everything I am 
concerned about (E).
You see finance stuff is always after the fact... MAs give the facts and they 
give them well. There are plenty of other people around here whose job it is 
to crystal ball gaze (G).
Scope may have played a larger role in DM information, but ultimately, MAs are
valued for their traditional, more narrow-scoped information:
Tell me about the statutory rules, tell me about the changing tax laws, tell me 
about the new European directives, I mean the scope is important but I am 
looking at my controllable lines, my COGS as a per cent of revenue and my 
cost per unit. These other things are important and if you have things like this 
to tell me that’s great, but they will not be the first topic of conversation (D).
To be honest, I want my numbers. That’s my priority. From a financial 
analysis point of view, I want our costs compared with forecast, budget and 
our competitor sites. They know that and they give it to me. I like to get the 
picture behind it when I need it, probably more so when considering projects 
(K).
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Many managers appeared to value broad scoped information but did not rely on the 
MA to provide it:
In thinking about the finance function, I distinguish very much between the 
accountant and the financial controller. On the one hand, the financial 
controller is very much a member of the management team who plays the role 
of the expert financial analyst. On the other, the traditional, reactive, narrow- 
scoped finance function, incorporating the MA and his team (A).
I need all of the relevant information. The wider scope stuff tends to come 
from the business side more than the finance side (J).
While the descriptive statistics in table 1 indicated no significant difference between
the importance of accuracy and consistency in control as opposed to DM
information, the qualitative results indicated otherwise:
When examining financial results, you don’t want any mistakes, but for 
planning and projects, I would sacrifice accuracy for timeliness (A).
For analysis of results and accounts, accuracy is most important. If it’s not 
accurate I’m screwed. For projects it would be less so because a lot of the 
time we’re still figuring out our end-to-end models so it’s about churning out 
your information very quickly. Accuracy would take a back seat to timeliness 
in these cases (D).
Consistency is vital so that I can monitor progress month-on-month but for 
projects each one is individual and what you need for one may differ from 
what you need for another (B).
Consistency of control information is very important as it makes it easier for 
us to decipher what the questions and issues are. The same format all the time 
is critical as it translates into the same format which I distribute to the various 
audiences. For projects, this is not so important (K).
These findings suggest that managers have distinct differences in what type of 
information they prefer depending on whether the information is for control or DM. 
This is discussed in section 6.7.1. These findings also contribute to the analysis of the 
effect of manager expectation on the role played by the MA as discussed in section
6.5.1 as well as the managers’ apparent appreciation for the traditional MA, as 
discussed at section 6.7.3.
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\5.2.3 Low Importance for Control and Decision-Making
Statistically, aggregation was perceived to be among the least important of all of the
characteristics, with little or no difference in its perceived usefulness in control
information as opposed to DM information. It was considered significantly less
important than relevance, reliability, accuracy and consistency for control purposes
(refer to appendix I) and significantly less important than relevance, reliability and
timeliness for DM purposes (appendix J):
We need the background. We need the detail. The reality is that highly 
aggregated data is not that practical for the likes of me (K).
Aggregation is important but it’s very important that the background isn’t lost
(Q).
I like aggregation for reference, but I need the detail as and when 
circumstances call for it (R).
There was comparatively little feedback in relation to flexibility and adaptability. As 
indicated at appendix I, it was considered significantly less important than relevance, 
reliability and accuracy for control purposes and according to appendix J, it was 
considered significantly less important than relevance and reliability for DM 
purposes. Most managers assumed a level of flexibility and adaptability within the 
system:
I take it as a given. This is how we’ve set things up (H).
It’s important that the various elements of the system can talk to each other, 
otherwise the timeliness won’t matter, the reliability you wont get and the 
relevance will be lost (F).
5.2.4 Summary
Ultimately, the managers questioned valued relevance and reliability above all else. 
Timeliness and scope were considered significantly more important for DM while 
the qualitative results revealed that accuracy and consistency were favoured more for 
control. Some managers were willing to trade accuracy for increased timeliness in a 
DM scenario. The most interesting feedback related to the lack of importance placed 
on scope by many of the managers. Aggregation was perceived to be comparatively 
unimportant in both control and DM information. Finally, flexibility and adaptability,
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though not perceived as unimportant, was assumed to be a key requirement in all 
information and so generated little or no response.
5.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 2
What skills, attributes or competencies do managers perceive to be important in a 
provider of information for the following purposes?
(a) Control
(b) Decision Making?
The managers were asked to rate a selection of S ACs in terms of how important they 
perceived each to be in their core provider of (a) control information, and (b) 
decision making information. Each SAC was rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
equated to not at all important and 5 extremely important. A summary of the findings 
is presented in table 2 with further statistical analysis presented at appendices K and 
L. A detailed breakdown of the individual manager responses is included in appendix
F.
5.3.1 High Importance for Control and DM Information
Ethics was perceived to be the most important SAC of the MA for both control and 
DM purposes. It was considered significantly more important than everything except 
honesty for control purposes (refer to appendix K) and it was considered 
significantly more important than precision, IT skills, team-skills, problem solving 
skills, financial expertise, creativity, impartiality, conservativeness and single 
mindedness for DM purposes (refer to appendix L).
Almost all of the managers rated honesty to be very or extremely important, 
indicating no difference in importance whether the information was for control or 
DM. It was considered significantly more important than impartiality, creativity, 
conservativeness and single mindedness for control purposes (refer to appendix K) 
and impartiality, conservativeness and single mindedness for DM purposes (refer to 
appendix L).
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Just two managers, N and O, both sales managers, considered honesty only quite 
important:
Honesty is important to a degree but so is using some cop on. Things can be 
hidden and moved around. Yeah, I think honesty is important but I want 
people to be practical about it (N).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of imvortance of SACs in providers of (a) control 
information and fb) DM information
Skills, Attributes 
and
Competencies of 
an Information 
Provider
Provider of Control 
Information
Provider of DM  
Information
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Results
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
Rank Mean
(Standard
Deviation)
Rank Z P
Score
Ethics 4.83
(0.37)
1 4.72
(0.56)
1 -1 0.317
Honesty 4.44
(0.68)
2 4.44
(0.68)
3 0 1
Precision 4.33
(0.75)
3 4.33
(0.75)
5 -1.63 0.103
Sound Business 
Understanding
4.33
(0.58)
4 4.61
(0.49)
2 -2.24 0.02*
IT Skills 4.11
(0.66)
5 4.22
(0.71)
6 -1.41 0.16
Financial
Expertise
4.06
(0.91)
6 3.94
(0.91)
9 -1 0.317
Interpersonal and
Communications
Skills
4.00
(0.58)
7 4.39
(0.59)
4 -2.33 0.02*
Problem solving 
and Analytical 
Skills
3.83
(0.96)
8 4.00
(1.00)
8 -1.73 0.084
Team-skills 3.78
(1.03)
9 4.22
(1.41)
7 -2.53 0.01**
Impartiality 3.67
(1.20)
10 3.50
(0.97)
11 -1.34 0.18
Creativity 3.22
(1.13)
11 3.72
(1.11)
10 -2.25 0.02*
Conservativeness 2.33
(0.94)
12 2.06
(0.94)
12 -1.89 0.06
Single-
Mindedness
1.94
(0.97)
13 2.00
(0.97)
13 -1 0.317
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
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5.3.2 Key Differences between Control and DM.
The results in table 2 indicate that 4 of the SACs were considered to be significantly 
more important for DM than for control: sound business understanding, interpersonal 
and communications skills, team-skills and creativity.
A sound business understanding was considered to be among the most important of
the SACs for both control and DM:
I can’t express how important a sound business understanding is. In my view 
it’s the difference between a useful accountant and an accountant whom you 
merely put up with (N).
They have to understand what they are looking at, otherwise they will bring 
no value (J).
It was considered significantly more important for DM than for control:
They’ve got to show their understanding of what’s behind the figures. That’s 
absolutely critical for projects (C).
They may get by without a huge business understanding for the day-to-day 
stuff, but for DM and projects, a sound business understanding would be 
critical (P).
The weight of qualitative evidence suggests that the managers in question were in
favour of their MA exhibiting strong interpersonal skills generally:
It’s important to be able to sit down in a meeting and share information, not 
just mill through spreadsheets (C).
People will tell them things. People will involve them. It’s like anything. If 
people can communicate with them and they feel a rapport with them they are 
going to get on with them. It’s as simple as that... the guy I have here gets on 
with everyone and nobody hides anything from him. He is seen as one of us 
(G).
Again, table 2 indicates that this SAC is considered significantly more important for
DM and the qualitative data substantiate this:
If the system is going to be useful in terms of making any decisions, it’s 
important that communications skills are strong in order to facilitate this (K).
We would encourage everyone here, including the accountant, to be open. It’s 
important that they are not afraid to speak out and they’re not afraid to give 
opinions, particularly in a project situation (D).
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Managers who rely on their MA more for DM information appear to have higher 
expectations in terms of interpersonal and communications skills. This is analysed at 
section 6.5.1.
Many of these sentiments were echoed in relation to team-skills, with most managers
seeing the two sets of competencies as mutually helpful. As indicated in table 2,
team-skills were revealed to be significantly more important for DM than for control:
I would see team-skills as important, particularly in terms of breaking from 
that old traditional role... being able to challenge in a helpful and 
constructive way is where I would like to see them developing more (M).
Interaction with people is key and this is no more important than in a 
company wide DM situation (N).
Team-skills are key here. If they can’t work as part of a team, they won’t 
work out (H).
None of the issues discussed with the managers were as divisive as creativity. As
indicated in table 2, it was considered significantly more important in a DM scenario:
In a project sense creativity goes up even further in terms of coming up with 
new ideas of presenting data or new ways of analysing data for a project (K).
The key for me is getting the right balance. I want them to be conservative 
when they’re generating my monthly reports but I don’t want them to be 
blind to new idea’s or improvement (E).
One manager even went so far as to say that he would utilise his MA a lot more if
they were a little more creative:
If these guys were a little more creative, a little more idea driven, I’d use 
them more (N).
However, some managers attached little or no importance to creativity in any
capacity in their information provider:
Creativity is not at all important to me. There’s no room nor necessity for it 
(B).
Creativity is not a desired quality in an accountant (R).
Again, those managers valuing creativity more were those who relied on the MA for 
DM information as well as control information. This contributes to the discussion on 
manager expectation at section 6.5.1. Managers’ differing expectations of their MA
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as an information provider depending on whether they are providing DM as opposed 
to control information are discussed in greater detail at section 6.7.1.
5.3.3 Qualitative Results
The statistical results relating to two of the SACs; impartiality and problem solving 
and analytical skills revealed little, but the qualitative results proved more 
interesting.
The weight of evidence suggests that impartiality, though not a favourite of any
manager by any means, was still largely appreciated as a characteristics of the MA.
As summarised in appendix F, nine managers considered it extremely or very
important in a contributor of control and DM information and a further five
considered it quite important. It was considered significantly more important than
conservativeness and single mindedness for both control and DM (refer to
appendices K and L, respectively). Many managers appear to still value the role of
the MA as the unbiased, hard faced, black and white contributor:
The financial numbers cannot afford to be skewed in favour of a certain 
standpoint, I value impartiality in that sense (J).
I like them to be able to stand back and make a call on the numbers (N).
One manager however did not always fully value such impartiality:
Impartiality is important as a benefit, but sometimes it can be a pain. You 
want them on your side a bit more sometimes... because sometimes they 
don’t understand the whole implications of what they say, you know 
something is bad but it will recover next month, it doesn’t need to be brought 
out in the open, but they always insist on bringing everything out in the open
(G).
This is further discussed in the context of managers’ differing expectations of the 
MA in section 6.5.1 and the general appreciation for the traditional MA as discussed 
in section 6.7.3.
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Again, problem solving and analytical skills achieved a comparatively low
importance rating according to table 2, yet the qualitative results reveal that some
managers were particularly interested in this competency. Manager G cited problem
solving and analytical skills as a key trait in his preferred MA:
I am getting bypassed more and more on the day-to-day stuff. They go 
straight to [the MA] now and that’s where I want him to be. That is central to 
his role (G).
In Manager H’s case, his Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system generates
much of the monthly data. The MA’s responsibility is in further analysis and
effective use of this data. This requires strong problem solving and analytical skills,
and cross training and functional sharing contributes to this:
The system “provides” the information. A good MA analyses it 
constructively and contributes something (H).
Manager M, like Manager G, welcomed problem solving and analytical skills as a
way of diverting more of his managerial work to the MA:
They have got to be able to determine the issues and deal with them. It 
shouldn’t be up to me (M).
Though the statistical results indicated no difference in its perceived importance
between control and DM, most of the managers concurred that there would certainly
be a greater demand for their problem solving skills in a decision making situation:
The bar would be raised most definitely in terms of problem solving and 
analytical skills with regard to DM information, particularly the problem 
solving skills (C).
My experience is that for DM and projects problem solving would certainly 
raise itself as key (D).
5.3.4 Low Im portance
As appendix F indicates, some managers did, to some extent, value conservativeness
in their information provider. The typical responses in these cases appeared to relate
much more to the MA’s controlling role:
I like finance to be a little more conservative. It can be a good push back on 
the business people (D).
They have to play by the rules that they are financially under and that dictated 
a certain degree of conservativeness which is unavoidable (Q).
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A significant proportion of the managers interviewed viewed conservativeness as not 
at all important, for the simple reason that they did not consider it necessary in order 
to provide good quality control or DM information.
As indicated in table 2, single mindedness was the least valued skill or competency 
in any information provider of either control or DM information. In the main, these 
managers viewed single mindedness as useful in the context of getting a job done 
and meeting requisite deadlines, but wholly detrimental in the context of their wider 
contribution:
I prefer open mindedness. Where I see single mindedness as important is 
where I expect them to fight for something that they know is important or 
they know is wrong. If they see me breaking any rules, I want them to push 
back on me, but I would much rather them to be open-minded from the point 
of view of listening to what the business has to say (P).
I want them to be driven to get a job done. Single minded in terms of meeting 
deadlines but I don’t want that single mindedness to spill over into their 
contribution (G).
They need to stand over the information but they need to be open to advice 
and discussion (K).
Some managers saw nothing positive in single mindedness as a skill or competency:
I would strongly contend that this is not an admirable quality (E).
I see single mindedness and a good business understanding as completely 
contradictory (J).
Just one manager saw single mindedness as an entirely positive characteristic,
considering it very important in providers of control information and extremely
important in providers of DM information:
I see single mindedness as edge. It’s a leadership capability, the ability to 
fight a cause, it’s what makes managers (H).
5.3.5 Low Rate o f Response
The managers questioned had few opinions on IT skills and financial skills. 
Undoubtedly, managers valued them and both were assumed to be natural 
competencies of the MA. As indicated in appendix F, IT skills were considered very
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or extremely important by fifteen of the managers. Just three managers considered IT
skills only quite important in any case, two of which are quoted below:
IT skills are a core competency to work here anyway. They don’t have to be 
any better than anyone else. They should just be good enough to make their 
own work efficient (D).
I don’t care how good they are as long as they do their job (J).
The majority of managers took financial expertise for granted and appeared to be 
surprised to be asked to rate its importance:
It’s their job (A).
It’s what they’re employed to do (B).
It’s what they’re trained for (C).
Some managers did appreciate such skills slightly more:
In my opinion, when any production guys wants a financial guy, he wants 
them for a particular reason, because they haven’t got the information they 
need to do something and we rely on finance and their expertise to produce 
whatever it is we need... our priorities are very much our efficiencies, our 
costs and our spends... the MA plays a vital role in watching these for me (J).
He needs to understand what to report, how to report it and what rules we 
have to play with (D).
5.3.6 Summary
Ethics was considered the most important SAC in providers of both control and DM 
information. Honesty was also considered extremely important in providers of both. 
Sound business understanding, communication and interpersonal skills, team-skills 
and creativity were considered significantly more important in providers of DM 
information than in providers of control information, though the qualitative results 
did indicate that a sound business understanding and communication skills in 
particular were valued in providers of control information also. Responses in relation 
to creativity varied widely with some managers seeking it out in their MA, while 
some saw no place for creativity in their MA. Impartiality emerged from the 
qualitative findings as a SAC valued by many managers while problem solving and 
analytical skills were also valued by managers, particularly those who were keen to 
divert some of their managerial activities to the MA. IT skills and financial expertise
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were assumed to be key competencies of the MA. Finally conservativeness and 
single mindedness were the least valued SACs in providers of both types of 
information.
5.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 3
To w hat extent is  the MA p ro v id in g  in fo rm ation to m anagers fo r  con tro l and/or D M ?
The answers to this question varied significantly from company to company but they 
may be grouped into companies in which (i) the MA is perceived to provide control 
information only, or (ii) the MA is perceived to provide information for both control 
and DM.
5.4.1 The M A Provides Information for Control Only
According to Manager A, the role of Finance in control, and the role of finance in
DM, is discharged by two very different people. The former position is occupied by
the MA with the assistance of the lower levels of the finance team, and the latter is
occupied by the financial controller:
I think you have to distinguish between the different roles within the finance 
function. It’s not a homogeneous role. There is a machine there producing 
information and you want those people to be moderately conservative and 
they don’t need to be that creative. On the other hand, the financial controller, 
who is on that team helping to make plans and make decisions, you want him 
to be a bit more radical in his approach and thinking, and a bit more creative
(A).
Manager E echoed much of this sentiment. The MA, with the assistance of some
lower level staff, was concerned with meeting month end requirements, rolling up
costs and generating reports on monthly performance. Anything additional to that
required the input of the financial controller:
... our financial controller is probably one of the most respected men in the 
company... he would be hugely respected and he would have a huge 
knowledge of the business (E).
The structure of Manager E’s organisation is such that the Irish operation does not 
appear to have a great deal of DM autonomy. It generally follows orders from their
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German head office. Managers A’s organisation is also a subsidiary of a foreign 
owned multinational.
As examined in section 6.4.4, a key issue worth noting in both of these circumstances 
is the general lack of active involvement of the MA in the running of the business. 
Even their involvement in control is limited to ‘reporting’ information only.
Manager I indicated that his MA, indeed his company’s finance function in general, 
played little or no role in providing information for DM. He explained that he relied 
heavily on the MA for control information. He worked quite closely with him on 
yields, efficiencies and spends, but he did not utilise him at all in a DM scenario. 
Any additional information required to assist in DM was gathered by the manager 
himself with the assistance of his direct reports on the factory floor, the MA 
contributed routine control information only
Manager L was adamant that the MA did not have a sufficient understanding of the 
political process that his organisation operated within. The only role occupied by the 
MA was one of controlling and reporting the funds and that is the only area they 
were expected to be involved with. Manager L described how the MA did not 
understand or appreciate the job that the manager was trying to do, his controlling 
input took over. In other words, they could not both control the organisation, and 
contribute to the organisations DM process.
Managers P and Q, both managers of bulk or secondary bulk pharmaceuticals
companies, spoke of their MA not having a strong voice in any respect, but certainly
not in a DM capacity. Manager P, in particular, very much attributed this to the
pharmaceuticals sector in general:
... I don’t see them particularly assisting us, or being involved in DM. I 
would see them having quite a low profile to be honest. Things are much 
more technology led here... but when it comes down to deciding on a piece 
of plant the cost accountant may be involved in generating some scenario’s 
but wouldn’t make any of the decisions (P).
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When asked if he thought the MA could reposition himself into a ‘business partner’ 
role where he was more influential and had a greater impact on the business, he 
replied:
I have no doubt but that they can. And I am sure that they are, in your 
Smurfits and Diageos, but not in this sector (P).
Managers L, P and Q specifically cite their industries’ as having a key impact on 
their MA’s role. The association between industry and the role of the MA is 
discussed in detail in section 6.4.1.
Manager Q was critical of the time spent on corporate reporting:
I have no doubt but that the finance department here are working to absolute 
capacity... but it’s all reporting up and up and up and out... (Q).
When asked if he thought that the MA could play a more involved role in the future
if he was afforded the opportunity, he replied:
It’s hard to know if they would be pushed at a corporate level to add value, 
and even if they were afforded the opportunity now, it would be hard to 
change the culture. I interact with site services, quality etc all the time but 
finance, they could be on Mars for all I know. They might be keeping 
information flows moving but they are certainly not helping to drive down 
costs or helping us to monitor progress. They are not providing a service to us 
at all (Q).
Many of these managers resort to preparing their own management accounting 
information. Manager A prepares his own Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), 
Manager E analyses his own variances, Manager Q investigates his own yields and 
Manager L prepares his own budgetary information. These managers specifically 
cited the poor timeliness and relevance of the information provided by their MA as 
driving them to prepare their own information. This is discussed again in section
5.4.2 and in greater detail in the context of manager independence from the MA in 
section 6.5.4.
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5.4.2 The MA Provides Information for Control and DM.
Conversely, there is a group of managers whose MAs provide information for control
and DM. Manager B perceived no problems with the MA controlling and
contributing to projects and DM:
It is a very logical process. From the outside looking in it might look like a 
possible bone of contention, and in some places it might be, but not here, it’s 
understood that markets can’t be built without money and this is all discussed 
well in advance during budgeting and forecasting. It depends on how it’s 
managed and it’s different in different companies (B).
A scenario was put to Manager B in which, in a meeting, she announced that she
needed to spend $300k on something. She was asked if she would anticipate a
‘typical’ reaction from her MA, Manager B replied:
No, because you would never do that. If I need to spend a large amount of 
money on something, I have sat down with the MA to come up with that sum 
and as well as that I rarely if ever have cause to need funds that I haven’t 
already discussed with finance earlier in the budgeting and forecasting 
process. Everything is open and communicated in advance (B).
Manager C was similarly welcoming of the MA playing a dual role:
I mean, we use the term consensus forecasting, our plans, budgets and 
forecasts are all set by consensus. And as regards the projects... If it’s a win 
we all win, if it’s a lose, it doesn’t come down to ‘oh well, the MA came up 
with the numbers’. It’s a pure team effort. If you’re sharing the win, you’re 
sharing the loss and I think they’re as capable as anyone of getting stuck in, 
they can put on their project hat and more and more I see them enjoying that 
role (C).
Manager D, a manager of an extremely successful Irish subsidiary of a multinational 
computer software company was adamant that the MA can and should partake in 
both roles:
In fact, if we can’t have that, than we run into difficulties. The day-to-day 
stuff gives them the knowledge of how the P and L works and how the 
business fits in. I want that input on a project or DM team. I want to know 
what we have to sacrifice on one line to gain on another line etc so I want 
them there (D).
Finance here are a support function, not a controlling function. And I think 
that’s an important diffcrcnce between this company and a lot of places (D).
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Manager D did qualify this:
I see it as one of these things where they are responsible for reporting the 
financials but they’re not accountable. Day-to-day they don’t own the 
business, they are reporting on a function (D).
Manager G, shared the views of Managers D:
We use the term business partner here for our higher-level accountants but 
they wouldn’t feel that sense of ownership and they wouldn't get the same 
grief that I would if things are going wrong, really once they report the 
information, the buck stops with me (G).
In this way the MA is not perceived to be an equal stakeholder in decisions. This is 
discussed in more detail in section 6.7.7.
When pushed further as regards whether or not Finance are prevented from being a
true business partner because of the watchdog function, Manager G replied:
It’s not like the MA is seen as a party pooper ogre who won’t let us spend 
money or invest in creativity or improve things, but than you might be asking 
the wrong person, this company is reasonably successful. While they do 
manage things reasonably tightly, they still have a bit of money there, you 
know, if you have a good idea and its going to cost you 500,000 dollars and 
you can justify it you will get that money (G).
This introduces the potential issue of the effect of a company’s financial security on 
the role of the MA as discussed in section 6.4.3.
Manager H described the advantages which a MA offers in this role:
... accountants are motivated by money and this often drives them to see 
opportunities others might miss (H).
He finished by saying:
The number cruncher keeping the books, we don’t need that guy any more
(H).
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IManager J, a manager of an organisation which has recently been taken over, 
maintained that the MA was certainly more comfortable providing control 
information:
They are getting a bit more proactive. But there is a certain guard dog aspect 
to the finance function, which is natural. She does get involved to a larger 
extent now but she is still a bit of a purest. Finance people tend to be 
purists... it’s almost the controlling side of DM (J).
Manager K, the manager of an Irish subsidiary of a multinational components 
manufacturer which enjoyed success in the past but is now coming under increasing 
competitive pressures from overseas manufacturers, spoke of the role held by the 
MA:
The advantage that the accountant brings is that they bring that harsh 
perspective ... I think their level of detachment allows them to just come out 
with exactly what the figures say, almost like a ‘worst case scenario’ and I 
find that very useful. You might not agree or go with it, but its good to have it 
(K).
When asked if he perceived the MA’s role as changing in light of the organisation’s
changing circumstances he replied:
They are definitely getting more of a voice now because our cost position has 
become much more concerning... there is definitely a correlation between the 
bad years and an increase in their voice... In the better years the core issue 
would have been availability of product that utterly superseded the finances. 
In times like that, the MA would not have had a great voice because what 
they said about the finances held much less business priority. It was a lot 
easier in times like this to override them (K).
When asked what the MA was expected to contribute, Manager K replied:
They are never really brought in for any creative contribution. They are 
brought in because they give us that base line financial angle (K).
Manager R’s background is somewhat similar to that of Manager K. His organisation 
is an Irish subsidiary of a US multinational which manufactures computer 
components. Manager R maintained that to date his MA had little input to any of the 
DM processes within the organisation, but he did concede that their involvement in 
projects has increased in recent years as the organisation has become more 
susceptible to competitive pressures and therefore more cost conscious.
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He described how their role to date has been little more than generating reports and
that he saw that role declining, and being replaced by more effective control:
The IT systems churn out the data. I imagine my involvement with them [the 
MA’s] on a day-to-day basis will be probably more in terms of cost 
justification and actual cost control (R).
The competitive pressures faced by the organisations may be associated with the 
MA’s role. This is discussed in section 6.4.2.
When asked if he considered that the MA could be an equal member of the DM
team, Manager M replied:
There is a core financial analysis role there that we will always need 
accountants for that. A certain amount of analysis is necessary and we need 
them to do that. The added value part of that is where we can have 
improvements but we can never have an accountant who sees himself in the 
management role, he needs to recognise that the core analysis role is 
necessary. They need to retain their traditional role because they have to do it, 
but do it better, add more value, with better communication and initiating 
change (M).
When asked why the MA could not be treated like a manager, manager M replied:
They are not accountable. My ass is on the line. I am not expecting the MA to 
own any of the processes or anything but they could play a bigger role in 
identifying issues. They are not in anyone’s camp. They have a greater 
capacity to talk openly with these guys.
Manager N liked the idea of his bringing this controlling influence to the DM 
process:
At the end of the day, the accountant is there to make sure that you are going 
to make money, he’s there to count the bucks. Even if he is getting better at 
adding value, I still want him to play this role. I need him to hold the reigns. 
He has to be impartial... he helps me make decisions, he helps me make a 
call on things (N).
Manager N believed that the MA could most definitely be a business partner, but 
bringing that controlling influence everywhere he went and that is the role that 
Manager N wants the MA to play, he considers that this opportunity will not be 
exploited to it’s full capacity until such time as the MA displays a greater 
understanding of the business.
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Both managers M and N were adamant that the controlling role needs to maintained. 
Both managers appeared to want better quality controllers with some of this 
controlling contribution being utilised in a DM context. They did not cite any 
conflicts in this scenario, but they did cite the MA’s failure to grab the initiative and 
take on this role.
Manager O is a sales manager in a very successful biotechnology company at quite
an early stage in their lifecycle:
Everybody has to be very clear about what our vision is, what we’re going to 
do about it, how we’re going to get there and this must be common amongst 
everyone. We have to achieve this and work and be innovative and solve the 
problems of the business within those constraints and we all have a duty as 
part of the management team, and this goes for the MA in the same way as 
anybody else, to make this happen. She is the business partner (O).
Manager O pointed out that his company’s specific circumstances contributed to this:
This is probably quite specific to the Biotech industry. I have seen this in 
other Biotech companies. We are in set up, we are out there trying to raise 
money on the one hand, spend money on the other hand, create a good 
product, generate customers, all as part of a small integrated team, it’s a 
different nature. You go to some of your major manufacturing companies and 
I’m sure the accountant plays a very different role there (O).
When asked if he considered the MA to enjoy this multitasking role, Manager O 
replied:
I think they’re reluctant, but once they get more involved in the process, they 
are more comfortable with it. They have a total lack of self- confidence, they 
don’t have the ‘shmooze’ that sales and operations people have (O).
These managers also appeared to be very reliant on their MAs. They source all of 
their management accounting information from the MA. When asked if they would 
prepare any such information themselves, manager D and G replied:
Absolutely not, that’s what they’re paid for (D).
I wouldn’t know where to start (G).
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1Section 5.4 dealt with the open-ended third research question in which managers 
were asked what role their MA played in the organisation. These responses were 
purely qualitative and the findings are categorised into those managers whose MAs 
provide control information only and those whose MAs provide control and DM 
information. The results highlighted some contingent variables which may influence 
the role played by the MA; industry (6.4.1), level of competition (6.4.2), financial 
security (6.4.3), the manager/ MA relationship (6.5.3) and the extent of manager 
independence from the MA (6.5.4). These results also introduce some findings in 
relation to the ‘conflict’ issues, which is discussed further in section 5.7. Section 5.4 
contributes significantly to the basis of the framework through which all of the 
findings will be interpreted and discussed in chapter 6.
5.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 4
How  effective is  the M A p e rce ived  to be in  p ro v id in g  usefu l in fo rm ation?
Each manager was asked to rate how well their MA performed in terms of providing 
information that reflects each of the previously discussed characteristics. They were 
asked to rate their MA’s general performance on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 equated to 
bad and 5 excellent. The managers’ responses were based on their perceptions of the 
characteristics of their MA’s information in general. Table 3 provides a comparison 
of these responses compared with the responses in relation to characteristic 
preferences at RQ1. Further statistical analysis of these results is presented in 
appendix M. A detailed breakdown of the manager responses is included in appendix
G.
5.4.3 Summary
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T able 3: M ean ra t in s  by m anagers o/'M A ’s perfo rm ance w ith  reg a rd  to in form ation  
ch a ra c te ris tic s com pared w ith  mean im portance o f  each ch a ra c te ris tic
Characteristic 
of Information
Mean 
Rating of
MA
Performance
(Standard
Deviation)
Control Information DM Information
Mean
Importance 
per RQ1
Expectation
Gap
Mean
Importance 
per RQ1
Expectation
Gap
Accuracy 3.78
(0.71)
4.44 -0.66 4.06 -0.28
Consistency 3.78
(0.71)
4.00 -0.22 3.56 +0.22
Reliability 3.72
(0.99)
4.50 -0.22 4.56 -0.84
Timeliness 3.72
(0.93)
3.56 +0.16 4.28 -0.56
Aggregation 3.33
(1.05)
3.44 - 0.11 3.56 -0.23
Relevance 3.22
(1.36)
4.78 -1.56 4.89 -1.67
Flexibility
and
Adaptability
3.00
(1.11)
3.89 -0.89 3.89 -0.89
Scope 2.67
(0.94)
3.11 -0.44 3.78 -1.11
+ above expectation - below  expectation
As table 3 indicates, the MAs are perceived to perform better at accuracy, 
consistency, reliability and timeliness and comparatively worse at aggregation, 
relevance, flexibility and adaptability and scope.
5.5.1 The M A ’ s Stronger Characteristics
The descriptive statistics in table 3 highlight accuracy, consistency, reliability and 
timeliness as being the MA’s stronger points, all of which were rated as significantly 
stronger than flexibility and adaptability and scope (refer to appendix M). Generally, 
the MA scored higher on those characteristics perceived to be more important in 
control information. This is discussed in section 6.7.2. The qualitative findings,
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however, appear to focus more on the weaknesses perceived by managers, even 
within these ostensibly stronger characteristics.
A ccu ra cy
Accuracy was the characteristic for which the MA scored highest and that which 
most managers identified as one of the particular strengths of the MA:
1 haven’t been burnt on figures in a very long time (D).
They’re as accurate as the system allows them to be (E).
I don’t need them to be any better (F).
Despite this, on average the MA performed below expectation with regard to
accuracy, particularly in relation to control information, indicating just how
important managers perceive accuracy to be:
I think any inadequacies here are down to the system. Garbage in. Garbage 
out. While accuracy is probably one of their strengths personally, there are 
just too many inputs to the system (K).
Manager O maintained that they were better at providing accurate day-to-day 
information, for the simple reason that he felt that they were more comfortable with 
this data. Just one manager, manager L, rated his MA as fair at producing accurate 
information. Again, in this case it was the system that was being called into question 
as opposed to the MA personally. However, manager L did hold the MA responsible 
due to his poor training and explanation of the system to other staff members. 
Manager P held similar reservations as to the accuracy and reliability of the 
information generated by the system. He too, held the MA responsible, due to his 
lack of understanding and his lack of attempts to develop a better understanding.
Consistency and  R e lia b ility
The MA scored comparatively well in relation to consistency and reliability:
In terms of routine control information, they are excellent. They have 
templates. They roll them off every month. I mean it’s not rocket science (A).
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However, the qualitative findings indicate that some managers were not altogether
satisfied with the consistency or the reliability of the data they received, particularly
in a DM capacity. These concerns were largely in relation to the systems that the
MAs were working within and in many cases the MA was criticised for his apparent
lack of understanding of the system. This is discussed at section 6.7.4:
Sometimes if you ask one accountant for a figure and you ask another 
accountant for the same figure, due to the complexity of inputs and outputs, I 
would often get different answers. It is often a case of taking the data out of 
the system in its raw form, compiling it and aggregating it in the way I want 
because it might not always be consistently or accurately done (K).
I cannot be confident that all of the information I need is reflected on the 
system. People’s understanding of the system and what they need to do on it 
is poor as a result of poor training and poor communications from finance 
(L).
Tim eliness
As table 3 indicates the MA scored comparatively highly in relation to timeliness.
They exceeded manager expectations in respect of the timeliness of their control
information but underperformed in relation to DM information:
They’re very good, if there’s a delay, they’ll always fill us in, explain why 
and give us a time (D).
They work very hard. We are aware of the massive time constraints they are 
under (E).
I have never had a problem where I didn’t have a piece of information when I 
needed it (I).
We have a very good system set up and timeliness is dealt with (M).
Most managers attributed the lack of timeliness to corporate reporting requirements
and general excessive workload:
We are part of a bigger corporation and there is always somebody messing 
about with timelines and demanding things from them. Group reporting can 
take over... and their usefulness to me diminishes when they have to fulfil so 
many reporting requirements (K).
While I would rate the timeliness of their information as good, I am aware 
that they are subject to heavy reporting requirements... and that is what 1 
think is one of the failings of the MA, the information doesn’t come back to 
me in time, it’s very rarely real time. It’s what stops us being proactive a lot 
of the time (J).
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In some cases this was driving managers to source their information elsewhere.
They [MAs] just don’t have time. I need the information daily so I rely on my 
line supervisors to provide it (Q).
Manager O indicated that he would have to start learning more about his contract 
pricing so that he could start generating these figures himself as opposed to relying 
on the MA to provide it. As discussed in section 6.7.5, the lack of timeliness is 
driving many managers to source their own information.
5.5.2 The M A ’s W eaker Characteristics
As revealed in appendix M, the MAs were perceived to perform significantly worse 
in relation to flexibility and adaptability and scope than in their stronger 
characteristics of accuracy, consistency, reliability and timeliness.
Lack of flexibility was often identified as a distinct weakness in the information
produced by the MA:
The system itself is pretty flexible but the people aren’t always. They like to 
give fixed reports every month in a certain format. It can take a little time to 
get what you want out of them (K)
I can’t ascertain what makes up the numbers... There is a tendency for them 
to produce spreadsheet upon spreadsheet upon spreadsheet (R).
As summarised in table 3, scope was the characteristic on which the MA achieved
the lowest rating. As indicated in appendix G, just four managers assessed their MA
to be ‘very good’ at providing broad scoped information, though this appears to be as
a result of comparatively lower expectations on the parts of these managers in respect
to the breadth of scope of information:
On general stuff she was good, but on pricing and DM, she didn’t have the 
same insight (O).
This would be a distinct weakness. They lacked the business understanding 
and the commercialisation (A).
I just get the financial stuff off them, nothing else (J).
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At times they throw me out additional stuff. The purchasing department score 
better on this though. It’s more complete in terms of having different facets. 
The MA wouldn’t have the background or the resources to produce much 
more than they produce (R).
Accountants care only for numbers. They don’t understand that I need to go 
into the [counsel chambers] and I will be questioned on this stuff and I just 
can’t hold up a spreadsheet. I won’t be asked about numbers. I’ll be asked 
about issues, but accountants do not appreciate what is important to me in 
terms of informational requirements. We ourselves have to marry up what the 
numbers say with our other information. They would not think of this (L).
These results are surprising, given the managers apparent lack of interest in broad 
scope information as described at RQ1. This is addressed in section 6.4.1 in 
discussing how managers’ expectations and managerial strength affect the MA’s 
performance.
Though the MAs’ scores with regard to relevance were not significantly worse than
their stronger characteristics, relevance is the characteristic which, according to table
3, achieved the largest expectation gap:
They tend to miss what I am getting at sometimes. They are always trying to 
get it back to the nearest numbers... my experience of accountants is that they 
made things a lot more rigid for us and that is extremely difficult to cope with 
in a political environment (L).
The lateness just eliminates the relevance (Q).
As described in section 5.4.1, this is driving many dissatisfied managers to preparing 
their own management accounting information.
Manager P very much attributed the score on relevance to be directly related to the 
industry in question, which affects the managers’ point of focus (refer to section 
6.5.2):
I think it depends so much on the business. If you take the pharmaceuticals 
technologies sector, a lot of the time we don’t have options as to whether we 
spend it or not so it’s not considered from a financial perspective. In a lot of 
these high technology businesses it’s a case of let’s make it, let’s make it well 
and let’s make it on time and as time moves on we’ll have to start considering 
the costs. Now I would say that that attitude relegates the accountant to a 
somewhat secondary role and I would say that that phenomenon is extremely 
prevalent in this industry... I would certainly say that accountants get their 
day once things become tighter financially (P).
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Other managers, though somewhat satisfied, did point out that it could be better if
they had more time available to them:
There is a huge management pack produced every month, it’s not all relevant 
to me, but each bit is relevant to someone (J).
There is a sense that she does the best she can given the time constraints she’s 
under. I truly believe she would be up at the maximum if she had the time 
(O).
Two managers specifically rated their MAs as very good at producing relevant 
information for control purposes but bad at producing the less routine information for 
DM:
With regard to the core financial information or results, they are very good, 
but they would not have the insight into the business, which would allow 
ancillary information to be prepared. The financial controller would fill that 
gap (A).
They are very good with the facts but poor with everything else (C).
Manager H was satisfied, considering his MA as good at producing relevant
information but indicated that it needs to be improved and that this requires an active
effort on the part of management as well as the MA:
We’re only getting there on this. We have managed to work well with SAP 
on drilling the reports out of the system through the knowledge of the finance 
team. Some stuff was coming out a few years ago which was irrelevant but 
we have worked hard on it and it often has to be revisited but it is quite good 
now (H).
Any managers who rated their MA as very good or excellent in terms of providing
relevant information attributed this entirely to the strong communication channels
between the MA and the manager, as well as the clear direction from management as
to what was required. These communication channels contributed to such clear
direction to the MAs that they produced more relevant information:
We give such clear direction here and finance are so involved. It’s such a 
holistic process. No information is generated in isolation. We don’t let 
finance sit in isolation (D).
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MAs achieved comparatively low scoring in terms of aggregation, though not 
significantly worse than the MA’s stronger characteristics. The qualitative results did 
reveal that some managers were dissatisfied with the MAs in this regard:
I see too much information (A).
What they think I need to see and what I need to see as I learn more and more 
about the figures is quite different. It’s good to have to context around it but I 
don’t see the context changing all that much. I sometimes turn to these guys 
and say every month we spend days and days on this stuff, how can we 
reduce it (D).
I get too much junk, but it’s driven by corporate who need big packs. I get 
this spreadsheet every month with 17 tabs on it and I look at none of it (J).
I get tonnes of data but little information (P).
1 get more detail than I need (R).
In general the excessive data was attributed to excessive group reporting, which 
managers were expected to rely on for internal management purposes.
Some managers were comparatively less dissatisfied with the MA’s performance in 
this regard:
We have a good system here, we produce summaries and if I need the detail I 
pick up the phone (B).
We have worked out what I need to see (N).
One of these managers did not perceive such aggregation as a strength at all:
It’s too aggregated. It falls down because I need to see behind the figures. 
Often the information is too aggregated. That second level is important and 
often it is lacking. I might see that a certain figure has decreased on last 
month and I ask why and they don’t know (G).
5.5.3 Summary
Managers’ responses to question 4 indicated a general dissatisfaction on the part of 
managers with the information produced by their MA. This is discussed in greater 
detail in section 6.7.4. MAs performed comparatively well in relation to accuracy, 
consistency, reliability and timeliness, exceeding managers expectations in relation 
to the timeliness of control information and the consistency of DM information. The
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qualitative findings indicate less satisfaction with these characteristics. The MA 
performed particularly poorly in relation to relevance, flexibility and adaptability and 
scope, falling dramatically short of manager expectations in all cases.
5.6 RESEARCH QUESTION 5
To what extent do management accountants display the skills, attributes and 
competencies associated with providers of useful information?
The managers were asked to rate how well their MA rated in terms of possessing 
each of the previously discussed attributes, skills and competencies. They were asked 
to rate their MA’s general performance on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 equated to bad 
and 5 excellent. Again, the managers’ responses were based on their perceptions of 
the attributes, skills and competencies of the MAs in general. Table 4 provides a 
comparison of these responses with the responses in relation to the managers’ 
perceived importance of the various SACs. Further statistical results are presented in 
appendix N. A detailed breakdown of manager responses is included in appendix H.
As indicated in table 4, the MAs received the highest scores in relation to ethics, 
honesty, IT skills, precision and financial expertise. They exceeded the managers’ 
expectations in the case of honesty, IT skills and financial expertise and fell 
marginally short of expectations in respect of ethics and precision. Single 
mindedness, conservativeness and impartiality were three characteristics which were 
not perceived as important by the managers questioned. However the MA exceeded 
expectations in all three cases, despite receiving comparatively low scores in single 
mindedness and conservativeness, which is reflective of the managers perception of 
the importance of these two characteristics. The MA scored comparatively poorly on 
interpersonal and communications skills, sound business understanding, creativity, 
team-skills and problem solving skills, performing below manager expectation in all 
cases. The MA’s poor score in relation to these skills is discussed in section 6.7.4,
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Table 4: Mean ratings by managers of MA performance with regard to skills, 
attributes and competencies compared with mean importance of each
Skills,
Attributes and 
Competencies
Mean
Score
(Standard
Deviation)
Control 1)M
Mean
Importance
Difference Mean
Importance
Difference
Ethics 4.67
(0.58)
4.83 -0.16 4.71 -0.04
Honesty 4.56
(0.60)
4.44 +0.12 4.44 +0.12
IT Skills 4.33
(0.58)
4.11 +0.22 4.22 +0.11
Precision 4.22
(0.92)
4.33 - 0.11 4.33 - 0.11
Financial
Expertise
4.17
(0.60)
4.06 +0.11 3.94 +0.23
Impartiality 3.94
(0.91)
3.67 +0.27 3.50 +0.44
Problem 
Solving and 
Analytical 
Skills
3.44
(0.90)
3.83 -0.39 4.00 -0.56
Team-skills 3.11
(0.99)
3.78 -0.67 4.22 -1.11
Single
Mindedness
3.11
(0.81)
1.94 +1.17 2.00 +1.11
Sound
Business
Understanding
3.11
(0.94)
4.33 -1.22 4.61 -1.50
Conservativen
ess
2.78
(2.78)
2.33 +0.45 2.06 +0.72
Interpersonal
and
Communicatio 
ns Skills
2.72
(0.87)
4.00 -1.28 4.39 -1.67
Creativity 2.44
(0.90)
3.22 -0.78 3.72 -1.28
+ above expectation - below expectation
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5.6.1 The MA’s Stronger Skills, Attributes and Competencies
Ethics and Honesty
The findings suggest that the MAs in question excelled with regard to possessing
sound ethics. Just one manager, Manager C, scored his MA as quite good. Further
probing revealed that there was no particular reason for this low score. The MA
merely had no opportunity to prove himself any better than this. Similarly, the weight
of evidence suggests that the MA was considered extremely honest in the carrying
out of his work. The MAs scored significantly higher at ethics and honesty than at
impartiality and all lower rated SACs (refer to appendix N). Manager R explained
that one of the advantages that the MA had over his nearest information providing
competitor, the materials and purchasing department, was their honesty and
impartiality and absolute absence of any agenda of their own. However, such honesty
was considered, in some cases, to be excessive and often detrimental to their
perceived usefulness. This is an example of the manager ‘looking for the best of both
worlds’ (refer to section 6.7.6):
They are sometimes too honest. They always like to do the right thing, often 
to the detriment of creativity... or even a quiet life. Sometimes you need time 
to sort things out, but your accountant doesn’t always give you that time, they 
want everything out in the open (K).
Honesty is excellent but they can be too bloody honest, if they could combine 
honesty with a bit of cop on. Sometimes not everything has to be brought to 
the table each month. Things can be parked for a while, particularly when we 
know that they will go away and will be rectified the following month but 
they insist on bringing everything to the fore (N).
I would say that this is the one thing that they lack, in a business context. 
Sometimes you don’t want everything aired at a meeting but they bring 
everything to the forefront. Often, that is appreciated by the other party. They 
appreciate the honesty and the openness, they often find it refreshing and it 
can have a good fallout and lead to us carrying more weight but I do find that 
they just lack a little savyness in terms of playing their cards close to their 
chest. The absolute truth has to be brought out at all times (O).
Some things are better left unsaid and sometimes being the data driven people 
that they tend to be, they tend to want everything out in the open (G).
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Financial Expertise and IT Skills
As appendix H summarises, sixteen managers rated their MA as very good or 
excellent with regard to financial expertise, the remaining two rating them as quite 
good, but as good as they need to be. Their managers generally perceived the MA’s 
financial expertise to be strong. Similarly, the MAs in question were perceived to 
excel with regard to IT skills. The managers performed significantly better at 
financial and IT skills than at problem solving and all lower ranked SACs (refer to 
appendix N).
Precision
Generally, precision was identified as one of the MA’s strengths. Such precision was 
largely appreciated, given that seventeen managers rated precision as very or 
extremely important for control purposes and fifteen rated it as very or extremely 
important for DM purposes. One manager, however, viewed his MA’s precise nature
to be sometimes excessive:
They can be too bloody precise sometimes. I’ve had them correcting me in a 
meeting if I round something to the nearest thousand (G).
Another manager appreciated the precision but suggested that it is skills like these
which may prevent them from developing further:
The most useful thing I find about them is their attention to detail. I can 
worry about the bigger picture because they are working on finer details and 
the systems issues and this is valuable to me. They love implementing rules 
and they’re good at it. When we get to the big picture I feel they are not 
singing from the same hymn sheet I am. They like to get stuck in the detail... 
until they can appreciate the big picture, any further usefulness to me will be 
limited (L).
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5.6.2 The MA Exceeding Manager’s Expectations
The MAs exceeded expectation in the case of impartiality, single mindedness and 
conservativeness.
Impartiality
Impartiality was considered relatively important by the managers questioned.
Bearing this in mind, thirteen of them rated their MAs as very good or excellent with
regard to displaying impartiality. They scored significantly better at impartiality than
at team-skills (refer to appendix N). Many managers appreciated this level of
impartiality and welcomed it as a strength:
I find them good at pushing back on me and my directs in terms of doing the 
right thing and stating everything correctly (D).
I appreciate their strong ethic and their ability to call things as they are. They 
see things from a black and white view, which isn’t always possible or 
effective but it can be good from the point of view of progressing an issue 
(R).
Overall, those managers who favoured impartiality rated their MA very good or
excellent at it. Two further managers considered impartiality quite important, though
found their MA to be excessive in his display of it:
1 think they can be a little too clinical while not always trying as hard as they 
need to understand things (C).
Impartiality is something I would appreciate in my accountant, to a degree, it 
is certainly something which I have come to expect, almost to the point where 
sometimes I feel that they lack human emotion. I would consider this a strong 
trait of theirs (E).
One manager, though rating his MA as excellent in terms of impartiality, also 
indicated some negative feeling with regard to this trait:
I find them a bit too impartial. I wish they could be on my side a bit more (G)
This re-iterates some of Manager G’s feelings with regard to excessive honesty. 
Overall, the MA appeared to be considered very precise and impartial, largely in a 
positive way. Manager B in particular highlighted that this was what she considered 
one of their key strengths to be.
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As section 5.3 described, single mindedness was not a favoured skill though the MA 
scored significantly higher at single mindedness than at creativity (refer to appendix 
N). Eight of the fifteen managers who rated their MA as good or very good with 
regard to single mindedness favoured single mindedness as a trait in a MA and they 
were of the opinion that their MA displayed an appropriate amount of it. Three 
managers rated their MA as bad or fair, but they were satisfied with this rating as 
they did not value single mindedness and had no desire for the MA to become any 
more single minded. This left seven managers who rated their MA as either good or 
very good in terms of possessing singe mindedness as a skill, but considered it to be 
entirely negative in that they were excessively single minded in their approach. This 
resulted in the MA exceeding expectations on an overall basis. Conservativeness was 
not considered important by managers generally, though some did appreciate that air 
of prudence it brought to the accountant’s work. Three managers rated their MA as 
very good in terms of conservativeness but accepted it as part of their role:
A certain degree of conservativeness is unavoidable and I accept that (K).
She is very conservative. She really pushed that line and she has to do that. 
She pushes us to justify ourselves and back up our talk. We know we don’t 
have a business in the morning if we don’t have cash and so we rely on her to 
be like this (O).
Two further managers also rated their MA as very good in terms of possessing 
conservativeness. However, in these cases, they were considered excessively 
conservative. They suggested that they were excessively constrained by what the 
figures said and lacked any creativity or business awareness in their approach.
Twelve managers rated their MA as good or very good in terms of being
conservative. Again, this reflected a certain desire by these managers for their MA to
display a certain amount of conservativeness:
In terms of how they manage the finances, they’re conservative. If they look 
at a trend from previous year and make an estimate, it will be a conservative 
one and than they will talk it through with the business owner to make sure 
they’re comfortable with it. This is good. They are conservative in that way 
(D).
They always err on the side of caution, which is good (G).
Single Mindedness and Conservativeness
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Three managers (C, H and R), rated their MA as fair in terms of conservativeness, 
but again, in the context of these particular managers’ preferences in terms of 
conservativeness, this was considered perfectly acceptable. Three further managers 
(F, J and M) rated their MA as not at all conservative, which was in line with their 
preferences.
5.6.3 The M A’s Weaker Skills, Attributes and Competencies
The MA scored lowest, and fell short of manager expectations, in relation to problem 
solving and analytical skills, team-skills, sound business understanding, interpersonal 
and communications skills and creativity. This is discussed in section 6.7.4. The last
4 of these SACs- team-skills, sound business understanding, interpersonal and 
communication skills and creativity, were perceived by the managers questioned to 
be significantly more important for DM than for control.
Problem Solving and Analytical Skills
Problem solving and analytical skills was the strongest of the MA’s weaker SACs in 
that it still scored significantly higher than interpersonal and communication skills 
and creativity (refer to appendix N).
Several managers expressed satisfaction at with their MAs problem solving and
analytical skills. Manager H was satisfied that his MA was sufficiently in tune with
the business and actively solved problems on a regular basis. Manager I was
confident that whenever he had a problem or an issue, there was no problem calling
the accountant and he would always sit and work through it with him. Managers D
and M expressed that they found their MA good in terms of problem solving and
analytical skills. Both managers attached high importance to this skill but they did
express that their MAs did not show a natural adeptness for it:
They can do it, but they are not project people. When they see a blank canvas, 
they see a blank canvas. When I see a blank canvas, I see potential and 
opportunity. Now as we start to draw on the blank canvas they can fill in the 
gaps but if you give these guys a blank sheet in the morning, they’ll still have 
a blank sheet by the end of the day. That’s fine though. You have got to look
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at how people think. Accountants have an analytical mind, that’s what we 
value them for. That analytical mind works well for structured decisions 
based on financial numbers but if those numbers don’t already exist, it will be 
very difficult for finance to get in the starting blocks and start from scratch
(D).
I would say that they are good and I think they would be better but it’s down 
to the business. It’s the retail trade and the costs analysis and reporting is 
huge. They don’t have the time to get stuck into it. (M).
Managers E and K pointed out that they were entirely happy with the MA’s 
analytical skills but could not comment on their problem solving skills at all because 
they never had an experience of them problem solving. Indeed these particular 
managers did express a preference for strong analytical skills but they did point out 
that problem-solving skills were not a requisite.
Three managers rated their MA as fair at exhibiting problem solving and analytical 
skills.
They may have the skills. I don’t know. They don’t use them enough (J).
When asked at what stage the MA would become involved with a decision, Manager 
J explained that if, for example, a new client was coming on board, a multifunctional 
group would be gathered together to review it and there would be a finance 
representative on that group. The finance representative, however, would not attend 
all meetings. He explained that when they got down to the finance side of things, 
they would call him. He also explained that this was how the MA wanted it. He 
didn’t want to attend the meetings unless they directly involved finance issues.
Manager N’s experiences were similar:
The accountants just don’t do any of this. Analytical skills yes, but problem 
solving no. They just aren’t involved... (N).
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Manager F held the strongest opinions with regard to the MA’s problems solving
skills, or lack thereof. He considered them only fair despite considering problem
solving skills as extremely important. He questioned the accountant’s inherent
capacity to solve problems:
Generally, in any company, you will find thousands of thousands of problems 
but when you narrow things down you will come down to four or five root 
causes. You address the root cause and you solve the problem. The thing is 
not to address the problem but to address the root cause. Accountants are very 
poor at that. Maybe it’s because I am an engineer and I encourage 
engineering philosophies but accountants don’t get to the base of the 
problem, they don’t get to the root cause (F).
Team-skills
As indicated in table 4, the MA’s team-skills were ranked eighth. They appeared to 
display comparatively stronger team-skills than they did interpersonal skills in 
general. However, some managers criticised their MAs for their lack of team 
approach. Manager G accused his MA of preferring to work alone while manager O 
has already highlighted that he thinks that any of his MA’s weaknesses are driven by 
excessive busy-ness, he was of the opinion that the solution would be for her to 
delegate more and rely on the team more, he criticised her inability to do so.
Sound Business Understanding
Sound business understanding was rated as vitally important by almost all managers.
As appendix H indicates, just eight managers rated their MA as very good in terms of
possessing a sound business understanding, all of whom attributed this to strong
communication channels within the organisation as well as their MAs’ heavy
involvement in the day-to-day business:
I would attribute this very much to the strong communications channels here
(B).
Any project that we look at it is all about ROI so finance have to be involved 
right up front and we’ve done a very good job in doing that... they certainly 
provide value added because they make us think about the things we need to 
think about. We don’t worry about obsolescence, we don’t worry about scrap, 
we have the finance guys who come in and say we have to build a Profit and 
Loss, to build a Profit and Loss we have to think about this and this and this,
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inevitably these issues drive decisions and drive us in different directions. 
That financial structure that they put around new ideas is critical (D).
It is suggested in section 6.6.1 that the MA’s level of business understanding may be
associated with the role played by that MA. Other managers maintained that their
MA may have a strong business understanding from a financial sense in that they
would know what would drive the finances, but their understanding would end there
and consequently their business understanding could definitely be improved:
I think this business understanding is good but sometimes you end up in a 
situation where they do get it, but their purist style comes to the fore. We can 
be right and lose a client or we can compromise and keep the client. They 
wouldn’t always think beyond the figures... that kind of understanding won’t 
come out of the figures. That comes out of contact with clients (J).
I think they have a good understanding of the business. There is an overlay of 
communication in the culture of the organisation, which would help that. It’s 
their level of engagement within the organisation that is missing. They need 
to be more up front, more proud of their role, eliminate the bean-counter 
image. I think that they make the bean-counter image a little self-fulfilling. 
They expect people to see them a certain way and therefore live up to it. They 
don’t have to, they could rise above that image (M).
As appendix H indicates, five managers rated their MA as fair or bad in terms of
possessing a sound business understanding:
I sometimes feel that they are managed by spreadsheets and if the 
spreadsheets say we shouldn’t do it, than we shouldn’t do it. There is, at 
times, an absence of any judgement that it non-fmancially driven (K).
Without accountants the financial management suffers, but in my experience 
the accountants have no flexibility whatsoever. They seem to think that they 
set up financial reports so that they can come in on budget. They don’t 
understand that that is not the core objective. The core objective is to run a 
department and provide a service (L).
Manager N rated sound business understanding as fair. He did not recall having 
experienced it greatly. He felt that this was obvious, given a lot of their reporting 
demands which were unreasonable and unrealistic. Manager A maintained that a 
sound business understanding in his view was a key skill, and this along with 
communication skills was his MA’s main weakness. Manager P gave conflicting 
results. He spoke of a very strong accountant who had a good business 
understanding, attributing this to her continuous eagerness to learn and involve 
herself in the day-to-day operations. Conversely, he had a very poor accountant who
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had a very bad business understanding, who never appeared to show any initiative or 
willingness to get involved in anything outside of their core reporting role.
Interpersonal and Communication Skills
As summarised in table 4, communication and interpersonal skills was among the 
lowest scoring SACs of the MA, and it was the competency at which they earned the 
poorest score relative to expectation, particularly with regard to DM. Despite this 
poor score, communication skills were seen by many as an individual issue. Those 
managers rating their MA as very good in terms of interpersonal skills attributed this 
to having built up a good relationship with them over a period of time and generally 
the fact that they are particularly strong individuals in terms of communication skills. 
Manager O rated his MA as very good but with a short fuse, which was driven by 
busy-ness. Manager Q similarly rated his MA as good in terms of interpersonal skills 
and again, attributed any shortcomings in this regard to excessive busy-ness. Section
6.6.2 discusses how the interpersonal and communications skills of the MA directly 
impacts on his/her role as an information provider.
Other managers expressed either reservations or dissatisfaction with regard to their
communication skills:
You guys can be geniuses with your spreadsheets but there is not that many 
of you that can sit down in a meeting and share information (C).
I think that their communications skills could be improved because while we 
don’t meet very often, when we do the meeting aren’t always the most cordial
(E).
Their interpersonal skills aren’t great. They are either too quiet or very 
dogmatic. There isn’t always a sense of lets sit and talk about this and be 
calm and be reasonable. I think the solution might be to involve them in 
decisions earlier. Often they are brought in just to justify a decision or 
monitor the progress once the project has been decided upon, very much after 
the fact (R).
Manager K was of the opinion that communication skills were very much a matter 
for the individual, not specific to the profession. This is discussed in greater detail in 
section 6.6.2.
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Creativity
Creativity was the competency at which the MA scored the lowest, though many 
managers attached little or no importance to creativity, for instance, three managers, 
A, B and R, rated their MAs as bad or fair in terms of creativity, however, they were 
satisfied with this as they did not value creativity at all.
Manager F perceived creativity to be quite important but only rated his MA as fair in
relation to it. Manager FI and C both rated their MA as fair also, despite considering
it an important aspect of the MAs role. Manager N, again, despite rating creativity as
quite important, rated his MA as fair:
I wish they could be a little more creative, a little more idea driven. If they 
were, I’d use them a little more. I’d have them with me at meetings (N).
When probed as to what he thought the reasons for such poor creativity, manager N 
replied:
It just wasn’t in them (N).
Similarly manager L rated his MA as not at all creative:
Problem solving and creativity would be a weakness. Some are good. 
Sometimes it’s very much down to the individual. Generally, they are very 
straight jacketed (L).
Managers K, M and D rated their MA as good in terms of displaying creativity but
could stand improvement:
They’re good on projects, which is good. I would like them to be a little more 
creative with the reporting. How can we do that more effectively (D).
They are surprisingly good but I would like them to think beyond the 
spreadsheets a little more (K).
They’re good but they could be better. I’d like them to show more initiative, 
kick-start more idea’s, find solutions (M).
The remaining managers rated their MA as good or very good in terms of creativity, 
in line with their expectations.
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5.6.4 Summary
Above all else, the managers perceived their MAs to excel with regard to ethics and 
honesty, some managers pointing out that the MA’s excessive honesty inhibited their 
pursuit of a wider role.
Technically, the managers were perceived to be highly proficient in terms of their IT 
skills and financial expertise, exceeding manager expectations for both control and 
DM. The MA scored very highly in relation to precision, though still falling 
marginally short of manager expectation, indicating just how important managers 
perceive precision to be.
Impartiality, single mindedness and conservativeness were not rated high in 
importance by managers. Despite achieving comparatively low scores, particularly in 
relation to conservativeness, the MA did exceed manager expectation in each of 
these traits. The qualitative results indicated that some managers valued these 
competencies. Some viewed their MAs capabilities in this regard as a factor 
inhibiting their performance and others viewed it as not affecting them at all.
The results did indicate that the MAs scored significantly lower in relation to 
problem solving and analytical skills, team-skills, interpersonal and communications 
skills and creativity, than they did in relation to ethics, honesty, IT skills, precision 
and financial expertise. The MAs performed below expectation in relation to all of 
the former, falling dramatically below expectation in relation to interpersonal and 
communication skills and creativity. This is discussed in section 6.7.4. On a macro 
level, the most significant issue arising is that, three of the SACs which the managers 
rated as significantly more important for DM than for control, i.e. sound business 
understanding, interpersonal and communication skills and creativity, were the same 
three SACs for which the MA achieved the poorest scores.
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5.7 RESEARCH QUESTION 6
To what extent do managers perceive a conflict betM>een the information provider’s 
capacity to provide both control and DM information?
Managers perceptions on this issue fell into three groups of six: Firstly, Group l ’s 
managers suggested that there was a distinct conflict which prohibited the same 
person from providing both types of information. This may be described as a 
prohibitive conflict. Secondly, Group 2’s managers perceived that sufficient conflict 
existed which restricted their contribution of DM information. This may be described 
as an inhibitive conflict. These managers perceived their MA as contributing control 
information only, all be it to control and DM situations, but in an exclusively 
controlling manner. Finally, Group 3’s managers embraced the MAs contribution of 
information to both control and DM situations. In this group the MAs not only 
provided DM information, but unlike those MAs in groups 1 and 2, they actively 
engaged in the DM process.
5.7.1 Prohibitive Conflict
Six managers (A, E, I, L, P and Q) perceived sufficient conflict to exist to prevent the 
MA from contributing any DM information.
Manager A was conscious of a conflict between both roles:
They are somewhat different mindsets. It is difficult to be creative and 
conservative (A).
As a result, Manager A utilised his MA purely for control information, in which he
valued conservativeness, consistency and accuracy. He utilised his financial
controller for assistance with DM where he perceived creativity, sound business
understanding and scope to be more important. Manager I echoed this sentiment:
I think financial people running a business is a recipe for disaster because 
most financial guys are too cautious on spend. They don’t take chances. To 
run a business, most MDs are marketing or operations people, they’re not 
afraid to attack the market place. They work in a uniform way, they are very 
reluctant to take risks and take chances and for a business to grow you need 
someone who is not afraid to tackle problems, spend money and innovate and 
the financial guys would lack the flair to do that (I).
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Manager L was similar in his views. The MA did not have a sufficient understanding 
of the business which would allow them to effectively contribute DM information. 
Their one remit was ‘contribution of control information’ and they could not 
overcome the limitations of this role in order to expand into anything wider. 
Managers P and Q reported a serious lack of involvement or influence on the part of 
the MA at all. This was attributed to industry sector, both were bulk pharmaceuticals 
organisations which is discussed in greater detail in section 6.4.1.
5.7.2 Inhibitive Conflict
A further six managers (J, K, R, F, N and M) were satisfied with the MAs ability to 
provide information in both cases, but they did concede that their contribution to the 
DM process was almost entirely controlling. Many of these managers revealed that 
those characteristics of information, and those SACs which the MA’s demonstrated 
so effectively in contributing control information could not be cast aside so that the 
MA could contribute in a less controlling manner to the DM process. These 
managers were specifically asked if the SACs exhibited by their MA’s as 
‘controllers’ would stifle their involvement in DM. Typical responses were as 
follows:
The initial tendency would be towards conservative ... I think the watchdog 
function is an integral part of it and while the purism tends to be restrictive, it 
goes with the territory (J).
I think they have a certain mindset of how things should operate that is 
financially based and I think as a consequence they have a very black and 
white perspective. I don’t think it’s their involvement in controlling that 
makes them less useful in projects, but I do think that the way they think and 
the way they view things and the way they operate make it so that the role 
that they play in projects can be limited. That’s not to say that they don’t play 
a role, but they provide a service to the project in that they provide an answer 
that is used within the realms of the project as opposed to being a key 
decision maker or a key person within the project (K).
They are involved in DM at a high level, but it is as accountants. As we all 
become cost conscious, their input will be required more and more, but it is 
as accountants, in my view (R).
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I don’t think accountants make good managers and that’s only a perception 
that I have. The reason being that they are too clinical. They won’t look at 
things from any angle other than what’s the bottom $. They will not look at 
the people aspect. They won’t look at the technical aspect. They just don’t 
appear to be capable of it. You always revert back to your core base. My core 
base is technical and no matter what I work at, I think I will always use the 
tools and methodologies and approaches from my background in order to 
approach any job, and I think is entirely true with accountants also, they will 
always entertain the financial angle first (R).
5.7.3 No Conflict
Manager R attributed this to their training:
The remaining six managers (B, C, D, G, H and O) stated that they perceived no
conflict between the MA’s dual involvement in information provision. Most
maintained that it was essential to the effective performance of each, that they
performed both. Manager D, a manager of an extremely successful, Irish subsidiary
of a multinational IT company was adamant that no such conflict existed. He
perceived one role as supportive of the other, not in conflict with it:
I mean, the business makes the decisions, the business owners make the call, 
but finance are at that table... while they look at this stuff from a financial 
point of view, they understand the business, they understand where the 
business is coming from, they translate the number into business (D).
When asked if he was aware of any stifling effect that they may have had on the
decision making process, Manager D replied:
Usually the discussion takes place out and about anyway, finance aren’t 
pulled into a meeting and literally told about the plan, they are as aware as 
anybody from preliminary discussions surrounding the issue, so there’s 
plenty of opportunity to iron out issues and queries early on. By the time we 
actually sit down to review it, everybody’s on the same page and all the hard 
discussions have happened anyway’ (D).
When asked to give his perceptions of any conflict existing between the potential
dual role played by the MA, Manager H replied:
I would see this dual role as necessary but we need effective people on the 
team. The challenge within the team would be that everybody would be very 
capable of challenging robustly the way the figures are, the person won’t get 
away with any ambiguity (H).
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Manager H does not perceive a stifling effect, in fact he sees the two roles as
mutually supportive:
... just because you are dealing with numbers your contribution should not be 
inhibited or restricted (H).
Manager O, a sales manager in a very successful biotechnology company at quite an 
early stage in their lifecycle, similarly did not perceive any conflict in the MA 
playing both roles:
No, I don’t see a conflict. I think they are enlightened enough to do 
both...they are mutually supportive roles (O).
The MA’s in Group 3 appear to have crossed the line from MA to hybrid accountant, 
and moreover their contribution to DM appears to have progressed into that of a 
business partner, where the MA is not just providing information for DM, but is 
actively engaging in the DM process together with the DM team. These views on 
conflict form a major part of the manager expectation discussion in section 6.3.4.
5.7.4 Summary
The managers perceptions with regard to the specific issue of conflict fell into one of 
three main groups.
Group l ’s managers perceived significant conflict to exist in the MAs role in control 
and DM. The MAs were not perceived to have the level of business understanding or 
creativity required to contribute to the DM process. Group 2’s managers perceived 
less conflict than the managers in group 1 but they did perceive sufficient conflict to 
restrict the MA’s contribution of DM information. While these MAs did contribute 
information to the DM process, this was in a purely controlling capacity. 
Specifically, the SACs which caused them to excel with regard to control 
information, adversely affected their ability to provide DM information. They were 
described as ‘conservative’ ‘cost conscious’ and ‘watchdogs’ and it appeared that 
they could not take off their ‘controlling hat’ and put on their ‘financial expert’ hat. 
Group 3’s managers perceived no conflict in their MAs role. They considered their 
MAs roles in control and DM to be mutually supportive. These MAs surpassed the 
traditional role of providing information for DM and were actively involved in the
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DM process engaging with cross-functional teams as the financial expert. Managers 
in this group described their MAs as ‘enlightened’, ‘supportive’ and responsible for 
‘translating the numbers into business’.
The managers’ views on conflict appear to depend a lot on the managers’ own 
expectations of the MA which is discussed in detail in section 6.5.1.
5.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 5 presented the findings of the study, analysed by research question. First, 
the type of information required by managers was discussed, distinguishing between 
their information requirements in a control context and their information 
requirements in a DM context. The MAs information requirements differed 
significantly depending on whether the information was required for control or DM. 
This was followed by a description of what the MA looks for in an information 
provider, both in a control and a DM context. Again, the MAs wanted different 
things from a provider of DM information than from a provider of control 
information. These sections begin to present a picture of what it is the managers want 
in their MA. Both of these sections combine some of the quantitative and qualitative 
results gathered during the study.
The chapter then presented an analysis of the role of the MA, from the perspective of 
each of the eighteen managers. These findings were purely qualitative and the 
general responses fell into one of two groups: those MAs who provide information 
for control only and those MAs who provide information for control and DM.
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 presented an account of the type of information provided by the 
MA and the SACs they display when providing it, both analysed in the context of the 
managers expectations. These sections begin to present a picture of where the MAs 
strengths and weaknesses lie and how this fits in with the MAs’ overall role. These 
two sections also combine some of the quantitative and qualitative results gathered.
The final section presented the managers views in relation to the potential conflicts 
inherent in the MA’s role as a simultaneous provider of control and DM information.
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All of the quantitative results were tabulated and presented either within chapter 5 or 
in the appendices. All quantitative data were subjected to extensive non-parametric 
testing and these results are also provided either within the chapter or in the 
appendices.
These results begin to present a picture of the type of MAs these managers are 
working with. It is evident that the role of the MA is not homogenous to every 
organisation and these findings do suggest some factors which may influence the role 
played by the MA in specific circumstances. The findings also provide a much 
needed insight into what managers actually want and how they perceive MAs to be 
performing in terms of addressing their needs.
Chapter 6 goes on to discuss the key issues arising from these findings.
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CHAPTER 6
Discussion of 
Findings
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a discussion and interpretation of the findings presented in 
chapter 5. In discussing the role of the MA as an information provider, the findings 
suggest the existence of several different types of MA. The first part of this 
discussion presents a MA classification system in which the various possible types of 
MA are reduced to four categories: (i) the Reporter, (ii) the Guardian, (iii) the 
Interpreter and (iv) the Participator. Several different factors are associated with the 
MAs within these specific categories. These may be organisationally specific factors, 
manager related factors or factors pertaining to the MAs themselves. This forms the 
basis of the second part of the discussion in which the MA’s role as an information 
provider is discussed in the context of (i) the Organisation, (ii) the Manager and (iii) 
the MA.
Section 6.2 presents the classification system derived from the findings, which will 
be used to interpret the main results. Section 6.3 contextualises this classification 
system by reference to prior literature. Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 specifically address 
the individual components of the framework for analysis, i.e. the organisation, the 
manager and the MA. Further insights emerging from the findings which fall outside 
of the immediate scope of this framework are discussed in section 6.7. Section 6.8 
provides a discussion and conclusion.
6.2 THE MA CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
This classification system was derived as a result of the data analysis and 
interpretation techniques described in chapter 4, specifically pattern analysis and AI.
It is clear from the findings as presented in chapter 5 that different managers depict 
very different types of MAs. The first step in analysing these findings is to identify 
the different types of MAs, as perceived by the managers.
During the analysis stage of the study, clear signals indicating the MA’s role, in the 
context of control and DM, were noted and a profile was compiled of the role of each 
MA as described by each manager. These profiles were reviewed for evidence of
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consistencies, inconsistencies, commonalities or dissimilarities. This review led to 
the development of three preliminary groups of MA, (i) the Guardians, (ii) the 
Interpreters and (iii) the Participators. Each of the eighteen MAs was tentatively 
allocated to one of these three groups. The process of examining the common 
features of the cases within each of the three groups was then continued and 
repeated. These features specifically addressed the MA’s provision of information to 
managers, i.e. the frequency with which they provided information, the methods by 
which they provided it, the type of information they provided, their level of inter 
action with managers and the extent of their involvement in the provision of 
information for DM as well as control.
This process of scrutiny was repeated several times in order to confirm that the cases 
within each group were sufficiently similar in order to be grouped together. Two 
deviant cases emerged. Two of the MAs originally allocated to the Guardian group, 
upon more detailed analysis were subsequently considered not to share sufficiently 
common features with the rest of the MAs within that group. This led to the 
development of a fourth group of MAs, the Reporters. These deviant cases are 
specifically discussed in sections 6.2.1.
These final classifications were scrutinised one more time to ensure that the cases 
were appropriately allocated to each group. The key criteria for classification were 
finalised and there was no evidence of any other contradictory or deviant cases. All 
classifications at this point were considered to be final, and so it was interpreted from 
the findings that each of the eighteen managers interviewed perceived their MA to 
fall within one of the following four groups: the Reporters, the Guardians, the 
Interpreters and the Participators. The breakdown of the MAs into each group is 
available in appendix O.
This is not a scientific framework for analysis. The lines between the four groups can 
at times be blurred but they do represent four distinct groups among which there are 
clearly discernible degrees to which it is possible to classify the managers’ 
perceptions of the role played by the MA. The groups are mutually exclusive in that 
a MA cannot occupy more than one of the groups. The MAs within a given group are 
not homogeneous. There are some differences between MAs in the same group and
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they may exhibit some of the common features to varying degrees but they will share 
sufficiently common features for them to be allocated to the same group. This is 
illustrated in figure 8 below:
Figure. 7: Management Accounting Classification System
Manager 
Perceptions of the 
Following;
Reporter Guardian Interpreter Participator
Emphasis on 
routine reporting
HIGH HIGH MED LOW
Interaction with 
managers
LOW MED HIGH HIGH
Effective
controlling
influence
LOW MED HIGH MED
Extent of
contribution to DM 
process
LOW LOW HIGH HIGH
Involvement in
cross-functional
teams
LOW LOW MED HIGH
Emphasis on 
interpretation of 
results
LOW MED HIGH HIGH
Strength of voice in 
the org as a whole
LOW MED HIGH HIGH
The range of features listed in figure 7, E.g. Emphasis on routine reporting, 
interaction with managers, effective controlling influence, etc... illustrates the 
potential for conflict which exists for any MA engaging in both control and DM. As 
discussed in section 3.7.9, Granlund and Lukka (1998) recognise the expanding role 
of the MA as that of a consultant, an advisor, a change agent as well as a traditional 
scorekeeper and monitor. They indicate some key conflicts which exist for any MA 
attempting to carry out all of these roles. Perrow (1970), Sathe (1978), Hopper 
(1980) and Sathe (1982) question the MA’s ability to overcome these conflicts.
6.2.1 Reporter
The first type of MA, hereafter referred to as the Reporter, reports monthly, routine, 
control information and does not provide any DM information. The Reporters 
interact very infrequently with the managers. As described in section 5.4.1, Manager 
A describes his MA as a ‘machine which produces information’ while Manager E 
could not recall when he had last spoken to his MA, almost all communication 
consists of the monthly e-mailing of routine reports. These managers appeared to be
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guided more by corporate headquarters or the board of directors than by the MA,
who appeared to be engaged in more group reporting:
I certainly would not look to the MA to help me decide on a course of action. 
That review would take place at a much higher level (E).
The role of the Reporter shares some similarities with the Guardian and so is 
explained in further detail in section 6.2.2.
6.2.2 Guardian
The second type of MA, hereafter referred to as the Guardian, interacts with 
managers in order to provide them control information. To a greater extent than the 
Reporter, the Guardian monitors the organisation’s performance and communicates 
the results to the managers as a control measure.
The Guardian group in this study consists of the MAs working with Managers I, L, P 
and Q. As indicated in section 5.4.1, Manager I relied on his MA for key control 
information but he did not utilise him/her for DM:
They balance the books and tell us whether we’re in the black or the red (I).
Manager L suggested that the MA’s role did not extend beyond routine reporting of
numbers and controlling of funds. Managers P and Q both maintained that their MAs
did not have a very strong voice in any respect but they played little or no role in
DM. Their opinions were typified by the following response:
You have someone who traditionally tells you whether you did well or not... 
he doesn’t impact DM in any real sense (P).
Managers in both the Reporter and Guardian groups suggested that there is an innate 
conflict in their MAs’ roles which prevents them from providing both control and 
DM information (5.7.1). Like the Reporters, the Guardians do not have a strong 
voice in the organisation but they do represent a progression from the Reporter role, 
in that each of the Guardians reportedly interact with management to a much greater 
extent than the Reporters. At the beginning of the data interpretation stage of the 
study, the two MAs in the Reporter group were tentatively allocated to the Guardian 
group. Upon further scrutiny, it emerged that the two Reporters were not sufficiently
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similar to the Guardians. The Reporters only communicated with the managers on a 
monthly basis and this was generally only by e-mail or perhaps by telephone. The 
Guardians communicate with their managers on a much more frequent basis and they 
interact with them in person. The Guardians may not necessarily influence their 
managers, but they do communicate and interact with them.
6.2.3 Interpreter
The third type of MA, hereafter referred to as the Interpreter, provides control 
information for both Control and DM. In this group, the MA is seen to progress 
further again from merely ‘reporting’ and ‘communicating’ monthly information to 
actively ‘interpreting’ information on a day-to-day basis in such a way as to engage 
in more effective day-to-day control than that provided by the Guardian. In this 
study, the MAs working with Managers F, J, K, M, N and R are classified as 
Interpreters.
The Interpreter recognises and embraces the challenges of providing control
information in a contemporary business environment, i.e. the necessity to put
financial numbers in a strategically relevant context and to relate non-financial
results to organisational objectives (Bums et al, 1999).
The system is so numbers oriented... the accountant’s job is to make the 
numbers make sense (K).
Unlike the Reporter and the Guardian, the Interpreter contributes information to the 
DM process also:
... He helps me make decisions. He helps me make a call on things, by 
bringing that well founded, well backed up, controlling influence (N).
However, the Interpreters’ input to DM is accepted to be a controlling influence:
... Finance are always going to bring that controlling aspect. That is the 
nature of them (J).
All of the managers whose MAs occupy this group consistently refer to their MA as 
a particularly controlling force, who has a strong voice within the organisation. 
Manager J describes his MA as a ‘guard dog’ and refers to their input as ‘the 
controlling side of DM’. Manager K appreciates his MA’s ‘harsh, worst case
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scenario perspective’ and Manager R interacts with them in the context of cost 
control and cost justification. Managers M and N welcome an expansion of their 
MAs’ role as controllers. The managers in this group suggested that a conflict exists 
in their MAs’ role which restricts their contribution to DM to a strictly controlling 
influence (5.7.2).
Section 3.7.8 describes a business partner as a MA who crosses the line from merely 
providing information to managers to assist them in their DM, to collaboratively 
engaging in the DM process with managers as part of a team. The Interpreter does 
not occupy a business partner role. The findings indicate that they perform their 
control role very effectively, as indicated above, but their contribution to the DM 
process remains within the confines of this controlling role and so is somewhat 
limited as a result. They contribute the financial parameters of a decision, and little 
more.
6.2.4 Participator
The final MA, hereafter referred to as the Participator, extends beyond the mere
provision of control and DM information. The Participator plays a more interactive
role in their organisations than any of the MAs in the other categories and is
generally considered to be the financial expert within the organisation who
participates regularly in cross-functional teams.
If they are going to be business partners, they have to have a business head on 
them, but they have to make things work in the way that they know, in the 
same way that I have to go and make things work by making a sale. I can’t do 
this without resources and finance take care of this. We support each other to 
get the job done (O).
The Participator contributes to DM just as much as he contributes to control.
Manager H, a manager in a successful, indigenous Irish drinks company described
his MA’s role as ‘dynamic’:
They are well able to put on their controlling hat and their business partner 
hat. We would expect him to be able to do both or draw on other resources to 
support him from his team (H).
Routine information is generally extracted from the IT system or generated by more 
junior members of staff:
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We’ve done a lot of work in order to get the information we want out of SAP. 
The MA’s job is to take this a step further and make this information mean 
something (H).
I see two levels, the MA and from that level on up, they try to get very 
involved and try to take the time to get involved in the business, 
commercially, operationally etc... The lower you go down the channel, they 
must be so bored at having to produce that same report every Friday or every 
month end, they just don’t seem to care (C).
Section 5.4.2 presents the views of Managers B, C, D, G, H and O in relation to their 
MAs’ highly evolved role within the organisation. Manager B describes how the MA 
is involved in her projects and proposals from a very early stage. Manager C 
describes how his MA takes the time to get involved in the business on an 
operational and commercial level. Manager D differentiates his MA from MAs 
elsewhere by referring to his MA as a support function and not a controlling 
function, while Manager G refers to his MA specifically as a ‘business partner’. The 
Participators differ from the Interpreters in that they focus comparatively less on 
control and more on DM. As well as this, their role in the DM process is less of a 
‘controller’ and more of a ‘financial expert’. The managers in this group perceive no 
conflict in their MAs’ capacity to contribute to both control and DM (5.7.3).
6.3 THEORETICAL CONTEXT
In order to gain a better understanding of this MA classification system, it is useful to 
review it in the context of some existing frameworks in the literature as presented in 
chapters two and three:
6.3.1 Simon et a l’s (1954) Accounting Framework
As described above, the Reporter is engaged in a scorekeeping role (Simon et al, 
1954). The Guardians and the Interpreters are carrying out the scorekeeping and 
attention directing roles though the attention directing function appears to be carried 
out to a far greater effect by the Interpreter than by the Guardian. The Participator is 
engaged in all three of Simon et a l’s (1954) functions but appears to spend 
comparatively less time scorekeeping and more time attention directing and problem 
solving.
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6.3.2 Otley’s Control Frameworks
The Guardians and the Interpreters appear quite similar. The key difference between 
them is that the Guardian encompasses a more traditional, ‘feedback’ and ‘feed­
forward’ style control, as put forward by Otley and Berry (1980), while the 
Interpreter is more aware of the demands of control in a modem environment as 
discussed in Otley (1999). The Interpreter places more emphasis on giving managers 
access to meaningful and understandable control information which is more useful in 
a modem environment (Otley, 1999).
Section 2.3.3 describes Otley and Berry’s (1980) control framework as a simple 
model which compares outputs, or anticipated outputs, with plans before deciding 
what changes must be made to inputs and processes as a result. This type of control 
is pursued by the Guardians, who tell the managers how their department, area or 
function is performing financially (6.2.2). Section 3.4 describes Otley’s (1999) 
framework as a model which focuses on managing the organisations’ pursuit of its 
organisational objectives as a whole. The Interpreters contribute to this type of 
control by engaging with managers to help explain how the organisation is 
performing relative to its objectives as a whole (6.2.3).
The Reporters are similar to the Guardians in terms of their resemblance to Otley and 
Berry’s (1980) control framework, though they would not be as effective as the 
Guardians. The Participators may be classified with the Interpreters as their 
contribution to control is consistent with Otley’s (1999) framework, though their 
contribution to control is not quite as significant as the Interpreters.
6.3.3 Simons’ (1995) Control Framework
As described in section 2.3.4, Simons (1995) developed a control framework 
containing the four fundamental elements necessary to engage in effective control 
without sacrificing flexibility, innovation and creativity. The four categories of MA 
described in the classification system above display a varying mix of these elements 
of control.
145
Diagnostic control systems allow managers to track the progress of individuals, 
departments or units by measuring their performance against pre-defined targets. 
This is consistent with the Reporter, who provides routine, financial information but 
does not interact with managers in any meaningful way.
Boundary systems involve setting limits and rules which employees are discouraged 
from exceeding or breaking. The Guardian, as well as engaging in diagnostic control, 
also engages in boundary control in that they interact with managers and inform them 
when they are performing below target.
Belief Systems encourage employees to work in the same strategic direction as the 
rest of the company. The Interpreters embrace this belief system more than the 
Reporter and the Guardian. The Interpreter embraces the challenge of controlling in a 
contemporary business environment and carries this out by being aware of where the 
organisation is moving strategically. According to Simons (1995), belief systems 
work hand-in-hand with boundary systems and this fits in with the description of the 
Interpreter as a ‘guard-dog’ (J) who ‘brings a controlling influence’ (N) and ‘makes 
the numbers make sense’ (K).
The Participator functions within a more enabling type of control framework, more 
consistent with both belief systems and interactive control systems presented in 
Simons’ (1995) levers of control. Interactive control systems are formal systems 
designed to share constantly emerging information. This lever of control is 
implemented through frequent face-to-face meetings and discussions and debate 
about underling plans and assumptions. This is consistent with the ‘supportive’ (D), 
‘business-partner’ (D, G, H, O) described in section 6.2.4.
6.3.4 The M A’s Evolving Role
Section 3.7 describes results from field research conducted in recent years into the 
MA’s evolving role. Most of this research concluded that the focus of management 
accounting information is moving away from number-crunching and record-keeping 
to one of strategic context and commercial awareness. This reflects the tendency for 
the MA to furnish ‘softer’ accounting information, as opposed to ‘hard’ numbers.
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Siegel and Kulesza’s (1994) practice analysis revealed that analytical and problem 
solving skills together with interpersonal skills were among the most important traits 
of the MA. Siegel and Sorensen’s (1999) follow-up practice analysis revealed 
descriptions of collaborative business partners engaging in less transactional work 
and more decision-support. Much of this literature described the present day MA as a 
hybrid accountant. The role played by the Participator, as perceived by the managers, 
is closest of the four categories to that of the hybrid accountant as presented in the 
literature (Bums et al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). The hybrid accountant is the 
name given to accountants who encapsulate the dual role of controller and business 
partner (3.7.7). The business partner is described in the literature as an accountant 
who has expanded his/her role from contributor of information to the DM process, to 
a collaborative member of the DM team (3.7.8). Of the six managers whose MAs 
were categorised as Participators, four volunteered the term ‘business partner’ in 
describing the role of their MA. None of the managers whose MAs occupied the 
other groups used such terminology. These managers viewed a ‘business partner’ as 
someone who was by their side on a DM team, from the early stages of the DM 
process.
6.4 ORGANISATION
The literature asserts that the effectiveness of a MAS may vary from company to 
company, depending on the circumstances of that particular company. This reflects a 
contingent approach to management accounting which suggests that:
the particular features of an appropriate accounting system depends on the
specific circumstances in which an organisation finds itself (Otley, 1980,
PP85).
Technological development (Piper, 1978; Daft and Macintosh, 1978), strategy 
(Langfleld-Smith, 1997), competitive pressures (Khandwalla, 1972), organisational 
structure (Hopwood, 1972) and other situationally specific factors (Dermer, 1977) 
have all been described in the literature as key issues affecting the design and 
operation of MAS. The interpretation of the findings from this study apply these 
principles of contingency theory to the role of the MA as opposed to just the 
operation of the MAS.
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Industry, level of competition, financial security and group structure have all been 
identified in this study as potential key contingent variables influencing the role 
played by the MA. It appears that these variables often affect the manager’s point of 
focus, which in turn affects what exactly they want from their MA. Many of these 
findings are confirming issues discussed in chapter 3 where contingency theory was 
introduced in the context of the effects of uncertainty and change on the role of the 
MA (3.6). This concept has also appeared in recent literature. Pierce and O’Dea 
(1998) reported evidence of organisations tailoring their MAS to suit the particular 
circumstances of the company, namely, size and ownership.
6.4.1 Industry
The findings provide evidence that the particular industry in which the organisation 
operates is associated with the role of the MA.
In the Guardian group, the MA reported and provided some control information and 
had little or no involvement in the provision of DM information. Two of these 
companies are bulk pharmaceuticals companies, which have already been shown to 
be companies which are not excessively concerned with cost control and are driven 
by technology and market more then cost and margin, (refer to the perceptions of 
Managers P and Q, described at section 5.4.1). The type of influence typically 
brought to bear on a situation by the MA was not appreciated in these types of 
organisation:
I’m sure some plants are crawling over their paperwork, in other sectors 
where they are pumping out machines and costs are hugely critical. I don’t 
really care. My budgets are flexible enough so I don’t consider my reports all 
that much (Q).
This is consistent with Piper (1978) and Daft and Macintosh (1978), who cited 
technological development as a key contingent variable determining the nature of a 
company’s MAS.
A local government manager within this group, (refer to Manager L at section 5.4.1) 
asserted that his MA simply did not hold a sufficient understanding of the 
complexities of the specific industry to play anything other than a passing role in
148
control and contributed very little to DM. The nature of the industry was such that 
the MA was detached from it on a day-to-day basis and never gained a sufficient 
understanding to be perceived as useful. This supports the findings of Dermer (1977) 
who reported that the design of control systems is ‘situationally specific’. In this 
case, ‘Industry’ can be identified as a ‘situationally specific’ factor.
In contrast, the Interpreters and Participators (5.4.2) operate in more ‘finance 
friendly’ industries, such as computer components manufacture, secondary bio­
medical pharmaceuticals and consumer retail. These are more business oriented 
industries, operating within a supply chain which is more familiar to the MA and 
which are subject to competitive and financial pressures which are easier for the MA 
to understand. MAs focus on issues such as financial performance, market share, 
costs and budgets. Regardless of the type of MA it is, and no matter how advanced 
his methodologies and approaches might be, it is a given that these are the areas upon 
which he/she is likely to focus (Nixon and Innes, 1998). The organisations in the 
Interpreter and Participator groups are in industries where these are the likely areas 
of focus for the managers also. The MA is perceived to be more useful in such 
organisations, and therefore appears to play a more useful role:
We have a team of 4 or 5 finance people and they manage everything. They 
do physical inventory checks, to projects, to day-to-day P and L management, 
to finance packs. I mean they do everything and that’s the way I like it, (D).
In addition, industry type may be associated with the control culture of the company. 
These bulk pharmaceuticals companies and the civil service department appear to 
operate within traditional control systems focusing on feed-back and feed-forward 
mechanisms (Otley and Berry, 1980), diagnostic control systems and boundary 
systems (Simons, 1995), while the mass manufacturing organisations appear to 
embrace a more modem interpretation of control, consistent with Otley (1999) and 
Simons’ (1995) belief and interactive levers of control.
While the findings would suggest that industry type is an important factor in 
determining the role of the MA, this is over-ridden in some cases, however. 
Managers A and E are both in the Reporter group. Manager A is from a 
telecommunications manufacturing company, while Manager E is in an electronics 
consumer products manufacturing company, both of which are industries in which
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one would expect the MA to have a strong voice such as that of an Interpreter or a 
Participator as described above. In these particular instances, the group structure
(6.4.4) is determining the MA’s role to a greater effect than the industry.
6.4.2 Level of Competition
The results indicate that the level of competition to which the company is exposed 
influences the role played by the MA, as well as the power and influence which the 
MA is perceived to possess.
Of the six companies in the Interpreter group, two have just been subject to takeovers
(Companies N and J), which have moved the organisations into a more vulnerable
position. Two are Irish subsidiaries of US multinational computer component
manufacturers (Companies K and R). Both organisations are facing increasing
pressure from group competitors. The remaining two companies are in the retail
consumer products industry (Companies M and F), and in recent years have entered a
more competitive phase in their industry. In all six cases, increased competitiveness
is leading to growing cost control pressures which is altering the importance of the
MAS within these organisations. All six of the managers associated with this group
confirmed that the MA’s profile within the company had increased as the
competitive pressures increased (5.4.2):
In any operation where there is a low cost operation outside of Ireland doing 
exactly what you’re doing, margin has become a big issue over the past 
couple of years and this is where cost control has become a big issue and 
Finance are listened to more. There’s a greater instance of decisions being 
made which are outside of your control, which are more financially based 
(K).
This suggests that growing competitive pressures may be associated with greater 
reliance on Simons’ (1995) belief systems of control. Everybody within the 
organisation has a common goal of maximising competitiveness through cost 
containment and the MA is relied upon to support this.
In contrast, the organisations falling within the Guardian group are not subject to the 
same competitive pressures, and consequently their MA did not enjoy such a high 
profile. For instance, according to Managers P and Q, the bulk pharmaceuticals
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industry is so regulated and patented that there are significant barriers to entry. The 
competitive pressures in this industry revolve around product innovation and 
technology, neither of which, according to these managers, were areas in which the 
MA excelled. Similarly, according to Manager L, the county council department is 
subject only to internal financial pressures, as opposed to external competitive 
pressures, and the Guardian was not perceived by management to have a sufficient 
business understanding to contribute anything significant to that process, which 
limited his/her role. This is consistent with Khandwalla (1972), who reported that the 
level of competition facing an organisation determines the impact of accounting 
controls in that organisation.
6.4.3 Financial Security
The findings indicate a correlation between the relative financial security of the 
organisation and the positioning of the MA in one of the four groups. The findings 
suggest that the more financially secure an organisation is, the greater the likelihood 
that the MA will play a more involved role in the organisation. This re-enforces some 
of the points presented at 6.4.1 above in relation to the impact of ‘industry’ on the 
role of the MA.
The Participators in this study operate within financially buoyant companies. These 
includes companies in the biomedical pharmaceuticals sector (B, C, G and O), 
mature companies in the computer software industry (D) and a company with a 
worldwide, leading, consumer brand whose managers are committed to retaining this 
brand at its peak commercial position (H) (5.4.2). While cost control and profit 
margins are important, these companies are sufficiently profitable and cash rich that 
cost control is secondary to product development, market share and customer 
satisfaction. One such manager described his company as ‘rich, fat and happy’ (G) 
and other managers in the Participator group stated that their companies are not 
subject to as stringent financial control as they have experienced in other companies 
(B, D):
We are at an investment aggressive stage of our lifecycle. The purse strings
might be tighter elsewhere and they might be watching the company as if it
might fold if something went wrong, whereas that’s not going to happen here.
That has to help the finance guy’s involvement (G).
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Citing similar findings in the literature, Otley (1978) reported that managers in 
‘tough environments’ used their information in different ways compared to managers 
in ‘liberal environments’ and Langfield Smith (1997) maintained that cost control is 
more important in firms following a defender type strategy compared with firms 
following a prospector type strategy. Defenders were concerned with efficiency and 
tight cost control while prospectors were more results orientated. This is consistent 
with the organisations in the Participator group. Cost control was not quite so 
aggressive, the financial emphasis being placed more on market share and bottom 
line profitability.
The findings indicate that the financial security of the organisation may be associated 
with greater use of Simons’ (1995) interactive control systems. The organisations in 
the Participator group achieved their objectives through cross functional team-work 
and interactive meetings, in which the MA was expected to participate (5.4.2). 
Generally, managers in these companies perceive their MAs to be actively involved 
members of the organisation, contributing to both control and DM in a constructive 
and useful way.
6.4.4 Group Structure
The findings provide evidence of an association between the extent of local control 
in the organisation and the role played by the MA.
Reporters are perceived by managers to ‘report’ structured control information only, 
while contributing little to the DM process. Both of the organisations within this 
group (A and E) are subsidiaries of foreign owned multinationals, the managers of 
which admit to having little DM autonomy locally (5.4.1). The Reporters are 
perceived by managers to devote all of their time to meeting corporate reporting 
requirements. The findings suggest that the presence of a powerful ‘parent company’ 
placing heavy reporting demands on its subsidiaries consumes most of the MA’s 
time, leaving little time for more ‘value added’ involvement. This corporate control 
influence also has repercussions on the relationship between the manager and the
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MA, which in itself, contributes to this limited role played by the MA. The 
Manager/MA relationship is discussed in detail at section 6.5.3.
In contrast, the organisations in the Interpreter and Participator groups introduced at 
section 5.4.2 were described by their managers as largely autonomous in their own 
right, being either Irish-owned and operated organisations, or Irish subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals with much more distributed control. Control in these 
organisations was imposed at a more localised level and major decisions were often 
taken locally. This meant that information prepared by the MA was used locally and 
was therefore prepared and distributed in a more involved and interactive manner. 
This has also changed the dynamic of the relationship between the manager and the 
MA as will be discussed at section 6.5.3 and 6.6.3. This is consistent with Horngren 
(1972), Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978), who asserted that organisational structure 
had an important effect on how a management accounting system functioned.
This would suggest that a strong influence from a corporate head office may be 
associated with diagnostic control systems (Simons, 1995) which encompass the 
traditional feed-back and feed-forward control mechanisms described by Otley and 
Berry (1980). The findings indicate that increased local autonomy within the 
organisation seems to push the MAs towards Simons’ (1995) belief and interactive 
control systems.
6.4.5 Section Summary
The findings provide evidence that various organisational factors influence the role 
played by the MA as perceived by managers. Specifically, the industry in which the 
organisation operates contributes to the MA’s level of understanding of the business, 
which contributes to the nature of the MA’s involvement in information provision
(6.4.1). The level of competition faced by the organisation affects the managers’ 
point of focus, which also affects the MA’s role (6.4.2). The financial security of the 
organisation influences the nature of the MA’s role as one of control and stewardship 
or one of service provision and support (6.4.3). The group structure often determines 
the key tasks required of the MA as well as the relationship between the MA and the 
manager (6.4.4). Many of these factors are referred to in section 3.6 and figure 5 as
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recognised contingent variables affecting the design of MAS. These factors also 
influence managerial focus which is examined in section 6.5.2. In addition, these 
findings suggest that these organisational factors may also be associated with the 
control culture of the organisation (6.4.1-6.4.4).
The implications of these particular findings are discussed in the conclusions section 
of the study in section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.
6.5 MANAGER
The majority of the textbook definitions of management accounting contain the word 
‘manager’. At its most basic, management accounting is about satisfying the needs of 
managers:
Management accounting involves purposely channelling relevant and timely 
information to managers (Belkaoui, 1980, pp.7).
Management accounting acts as a support tool for management (Arnold and 
Turley, 1996, pp.9).
The findings suggest that the managers’ particular circumstances and outlook, as 
well as the dynamic between the manager and their MA, will affect the way in which 
the MA carries out his/her role. In this study, manager expectation, manager focus, 
the manager/MA relationship, the extent of the managers’ independence from the 
MA, and possible manager territorialism have all been identified as key factors 
pertaining to the manager which may influence the role of the MA.
6.5.1 Manager Expectations
It is possible that the manager’s own expectations influence their perceptions of the 
role of the MA, i.e. the role played by the MA may be affected by what the manager 
sees their role as being. The evidence suggests that many managers still value the 
traditional, financially orientated MA (5.2.2, 5.3.3 and 5.6.2). There was an overall 
lack of enthusiasm for a new style MA which did appear stronger in certain groups. 
For instance, managers perceived the Reporter to be a ‘machine-like entity’ (A), 
which merely generated financial reports. They did not envisage their role expanding 
outside of the core financial remit. Similarly, managers maintained that the
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Guardians did not play any role outside of their core financial reporting role, and 
even this was limited in its scope. The managers in both of these groups did not 
recognise the ‘hybrid accountant’ and ‘business partner’ described in the literature 
(Bums et al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001) but more importantly, they did not 
appear to have any expectation in this regard, (5.4.1, 5.7.1 and 5.7.2). In this way, the 
managers own expectations appear to be influencing the MA’s role (7.3.1).
These particular findings to some extent contradict the 1994 and 1999 Practice 
Analyses carried out in the US by Siegel and Kulesza and Siegel and Sorensen 
respectively. These studies predicted the dawn of the MA as the collaborative 
business partner who was a cross between a financial advisor and a business analyst. 
Other findings were more consistent with the Practice Analysis studies. The 
Interpreters and more particularly the Participators bear a closer resemblance to the 
new type of hybrid MA described in the literature (5.4.2 and 5.7.3). For instance, one 
manager in the Participator group described his MA as a ‘support function, not a 
controlling function’ (D). Another actually referred to his MA as a ‘business partner’ 
(G). These managers expected their MA to provide something more then the core 
financial data. There are several possible reasons for this, some of which have been 
identified at the organisation discussion at 6.4. This type of MA is more consistent 
with the Practice Analysis results described above and most closely resembles the 
hybrid accountant described in the literature (7.3.4).
The managers’ expectations in terms of the SACs of their MAs differ also. For 
instance, the qualitative results at 5.3.3 suggest that managers in the Interpreter group 
expressed a strong preference for impartiality, citing it as a key aspect of their role, 
while managers in the Participator group preferred the MA to be less impartial and 
more of a team player. This represents a fundamental difference in what managers 
expect from their MA. In the first instance, managers want a MA who holds the reins 
and provides a controlling influence, in the second they want a team player offering 
financial expertise but with a shared objective with management. Bougen (1994), 
Jackson (1956) and Yamey (1982) described the MA as ‘precise’, ‘doggedly honest’ 
and ‘boring’. Bougen even maintained that this reputation benefited the MA. Some 
of the managers interviewed in this study, largely those in the Guardian and 
Interpreter groups, share Bougen’s opinion in that they appreciated characteristics
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such as precision, impartiality and conservativeness. Managers in the Participator 
group, however, have more in common with Friedman and Lyne (1997) who 
maintained that the bean-counter image created the impression of someone who 
cannot relate to the business, lacks initiative and creativity and encourages sub 
optimal decisions. These findings suggest that not al managers actually want a hybrid 
accountant. Some managers are quite satisfied with the MA retaining the traditional 
MA role (7.3.3).
In many of the cases, the line between these two alternatives is blurred. Often, the 
manager appears to want the best of both worlds. For instance, managers value 
honesty in their MA, but some resent excessive honesty (5.3.1 and 5.6.1), Similarly, 
Managers D and O, whose MAs occupy the Participator group, see their MA as a 
business partner who does not stifle creativity or inhibit progress (5.7.3), yet they 
value conservativeness in their MA as a balance against less conservative managers
(5.3.4). Manager B, who sees no role for the bean-counting MA, still does not attach 
any importance to creativity in her MA (5.3.2). Manager M expresses that he would 
like his MA to retain his traditional role, but to ‘do it better, add more value, with 
better communication, and initiating change’ (5.4.2). In some cases like this, the 
managers’ overall expectations of the MA’s role, and their specific expectations of 
the MA’s SACs are somewhat contradictory. Even those managers who expect their 
MA to play this more progressive, involved role, as typified in the Participator group 
and to some extent in the Interpreter group, often want them to retain a lot of their 
traditional characteristics and attributes. Regardless of the overall role of the MA, the 
managers generally expressed an appreciation for the traits of the traditional MA 
such as impartiality, honesty and conservativeness (7.3.3).
This review of managers expectations re-introduces the conflict issue described in 
the literature (3.7.9). Sathe (1982) asked if a single MA could play the role of 
organisational policeman while still being an active participant in the DM process. 
Granlund and Lukka (1998) posed similar questions, concluding that it was virtually 
impossible for one person to carry out both roles at the same time. When specifically 
questioned about this issue of potential conflict, managers working with Reporters 
and Guardians agreed with Sathe and Granlund and Lukka, that both roles could not 
be carried out by the same person (5.7.1). The managers in the Interpreter group
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agreed to a certain extent (5.7.2), while the managers in the Participator group
appeared to disagree entirely with Sathe and Granlund and Lukka, maintaining that
both roles could quite easily be carried out by the same person (5.7.3). It is important
to note that despite the managers in the Participator group maintaining that no
conflict exists between the two roles, both roles do exist and the MAs in this group
are still relied upon for their contribution to control. This view is typified below:
Somebody has to do it, somebody has to tell you, give you the data on the 
finances of what you can and can’t do. If you decide to go ahead with 
something and you don’t make it, you can’t not look at the fact that you 
didn’t make it and what it cost you. You have to do that and the MA is the 
guy equipped to help you do that (G).
The way the Participators carry out the control elements of their role, the attitude of 
their managers and the attitude of the Participators themselves may differ from the 
Reporters, Guardians and Interpreters. However, the Participators contribution to 
control is still an important element of their role but the distinguishing feature of this 
group, is that control is carried out in conjunction with a largely independent 
decision support role. In other words, the Participator’s involvement in control, does 
not compromise his/her contribution to the DM process.
The managers own expectations may influence the extent to which a conflict is 
perceived to exist in the MA’s role as a simultaneous provider of both control and 
DM information. The Reporters and Guardians perceive significant conflict and so 
do not encourage any greater input from them to the DM process, while the 
Interpreters and the Participators perceive less conflict and appear to support the 
MA’s increased involvement in DM (7.3.6).
6.5.2 Managerial Focus
Providing a link between the discussion on manager expectation, at 6.5.1 above, and 
the overall organisational discussion at 6.4, is the common denominator of 
managerial focus. At section 6.4, various organisational factors were suggested 
which may affect the manager’s point of focus and may in turn affect the role played 
by the MA. Mia and Chenhall (1994) suggested that managers require information 
targeted at their specific elements of the operating situation and that managers
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perceptions of the usefulness of information is affected by context. This assertion is 
supported by the current findings. Managers of organisations in more complex 
industries such as the bulk pharmaceuticals companies in the Guardian group are 
more interested in scientific and technological advancement, so naturally this is 
where their managerial focus will lie. As a result, pharmaceutical company managers 
P and Q do not find the information provided by the MA to be particularly useful
(5.5.2). This is consistent with Chenhall and Morris (1986), who asserted that the rate 
of technological change of an unpredictable nature make routinised, financial data of 
a deterministic nature less useful. Conversely, managers of organisations facing 
strong competitive pressures such as those in the Interpreter group are interested in 
costs, yields and margins. Consequently, this is where these organisations’ 
managerial focus will lie and since production of this type of information is the more 
natural domain of the MA (Nixon and Innes, 1998), he/she enjoys a significantly 
higher profile in these organisations (7.3.1). This managerial focus appears to be 
determined to a large extent by many of the organisational factors already examined 
and consequently is discussed in greater detail in section 6.4. These findings do 
suggest that managerial focus will influence the role played by the MA.
The MAs in the Participator group (6.2.4) appear to play a wider, more involved role, 
displaying more creativity and providing a broader scope of information in a more 
active and involved way. Five out of these six managers were non-production 
managers (i.e. two sales managers, a supply chain manager, a distribution manager 
and a logistics manager). These types of managers (e.g. sales managers, distribution 
managers, etc.) are exposed to greater levels of uncertainty, which affects their 
managerial focus, and so drives them to expect something more from their MA (Mia 
and Chenhall, 1994). In the Interpreter group (6.2.3), where the MA provided more 
structured, financial, routine information, only two out of six managers were non­
production managers, (i.e. a sales manager and a general Managing Director). One of 
the two managers in the Reporter (6.2.1) group and three of the four managers in the 
Interpreter group were also production managers, and all expressed little or no 
interest in broad scoped information or a broader oriented MA. Mia and Chenhall
(1994) suggest that the use of management accounting information differs depending 
on the managers’ functional orientation. Generally, it is accepted that a broader based 
MAS is appreciated more by those managers susceptible to greater amounts of
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uncertainty (Mia and Chenhall, 1994). The literature suggests that sales managers are 
exposed to greater uncertainty than production managers whose remit is more 
scheduled and routinised (Chenhall and Morris, 1986). Broad scoped information is 
associated with enhanced performance for marketing activities, but not so much for 
production (Mia and Chenhall, 1994) and generally, sales managers are less satisfied 
with traditional MAs then production managers (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). 
Functional differentiation was not a specific focus of this study. The numbers of 
managers from specific functions were too small to facilitate meaningful 
comparisons but the findings did provide support for existing literature in this regard 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1986, Mia and Chenhall, 1994, Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). This 
is presented as an opportunity for future research in section 7.6.
6.5.3 Manager/MA Relationship
Following on from suggestions by Chenhall (2003) that future contingency-based 
research should focus on the affects of interactions between groups and individuals 
on the role of the MA, these findings suggest that the relationship between the MA 
and the manager is associated with the role played by the MA.
For instance, in the Reporter group, both managers admitted to having little or no
direct contact with the MA. Reports were distributed via e-mail and manager queries,
which were rarely raised with the MA themselves, would be dealt with by telephone:
I might see the MA in the car-park in the evening, that is on the rare occasion 
where he goes home on time (E).
In contrast, the managers and the MAs in the Participator group met on a daily basis, 
both formally and informally, and in some cases, even socialised together at 
company events:
When I come in every morning, the MA is the first person I speak with (C).
The last time I spoke to my MA was last night when I played football with 
him (D).
Granlund and Lukka (1998) describe one type of MA who brings a financial 
perspective to DM and exists in an advisory and support capacity. This MA appeals 
to line staff and operations management. Alternatively, Granlund and Lukka describe
159
another type who monitors financial progress, oversees performance and exists in a 
centralised governance capacity. This MA appeals to senior and corporate 
management. The evidence from this study confirms Granlund and Lukka’s findings, 
in that the MAs playing this support role (the Participators) are those MAs who have 
a comparatively closer relationship with the manager, whereas the MAs playing a 
more governance-orientated role (the Guardians) have less involvement with the 
manager and appears to be affiliated more with corporate management (7.3.1).
A closer, interactive relationship between the manager and the MA may be 
associated with a more modem view of control within the organisation. The modem 
view of control portrayed in Otley (1999) is that control is a collaborative, supportive 
function encouraging belief systems and interactive control systems (Simons, 1995), 
not an imposing, monitoring force as presented in Otley and Berry (1980), focusing 
on boundary systems, organisational brakes and diagnostic control systems (Simons, 
1995). A more interactive relationship between the manager and the MA fits in with 
the collaborative, supportive view of control and this approach appears to be fostered 
by the organisations in the Interpreter and Participator groups (7.3.2).
The group structure in which the organisation operates, appears to have a significant 
impact on the relationship between the manager and the MA (6.4.4). Those 
organisations in the Reporter group have already been described as subsidiaries of 
foreign owned multinationals, with little local DM autonomy, who are answerable to 
their parent companies. In such companies, there is a sense that power and control is 
exerted from the corporate parent. As scorekeeper, the MA is perceived to be 
affiliated more with the corporate head office and therefore has little or no 
relationship with the manager. This ‘diagnostic’ style control, (Simons, 1995) 
exerted by the MA in conjunction with the corporate head office tends to alienate the 
MA to an almost ‘enemy’ type position.
6.5.4 M anager Independence from  M A
The findings indicate that some managers are acquiring their data from alternative 
sources and ultimately preparing their own management accounting information. 
These managers are preparing KPIs and engaging in variance analysis and yield
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analysis, all independently of the MA (5.4.1). In these particular cases, where 
managers are engaging in more management accounting activities themselves, the 
MA is not necessarily cultivating a new role as business partner. This is in contrast 
with the literature which suggests that where managers begin engaging in 
management accounting activities themselves, the MA will re-position themselves 
into more of a business partner role. For instance, Burns and Yazdifar (2001) 
predicted that the future would bring about a reduction in the number of MAs, with 
more managers carrying out management accounting activities, while the remaining 
MAs would be busy becoming supportive IT experts and business analysts. Pierce 
and O’Dea (2003) maintained that in order to survive, the MA must cultivate a 
business partner role and in doing so, must let go of their traditional power base and 
accept the decentralising of accounting information. In this study, managers in the 
Reporter and Guardian groups are preparing some management accounting 
information themselves (5.4.1). In these instances, inadequate information provided 
by the MA is driving the manager to prepare their own. This is consistent with Pierce 
and O’Dea (2003), who reported increasing incidences of managers preparing their 
own information in order to compensate for the deficiencies in the information 
provided by the MA. In contrast, managers in the Interpreter and Participator groups, 
where the MA has cultivated a more involved role, still rely exclusively on the MA 
for their management accounting information and prepare no such information 
themselves (5.4.2). Timeliness is identified in the findings as a factor. In the Reporter 
and Guardian groups, it is suggested by some managers that the MA is busy with 
corporate reporting and does not have the time to meet the needs of managers (7.3.1).
The findings suggest that the level of manager independence from the MA may be 
associated with the relationship between the manager and the MA. Those managers 
admitting to having little or no relationship with the MA (i.e. the Reporters and the 
Guardians) are those who prepare a lot of their management accounting information 
independently of the MA. Those who admit to having quite a close working 
relationship with the MA (i.e. the Interpreters and the Participators) are those who 
either rely exclusively on the MA for their information or those who perform 
additional management accounting work in conjunction with the MA. Those 
managers who had a close relationship with their MAs found them more
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approachable, more receptive to their needs and they therefore grew to rely on them 
more:
The MA is there to support me whenever I need him (G).
I wouldn’t view the MA as being the most approachable member of the
organisation (P).
The findings suggest that the more independent the manager is from the MA, the 
more traditional the control approach is. In this study, the managers in the Reporter 
and the Guardian groups perceive themselves to be very independent of the MA, yet 
they operate within quite traditional feedback and feed forward style control 
mechanisms based on diagnostic and boundary controls. The Interpreters and 
Participators operate within a modem control system, but appear to be comparatively 
more reliant on their MA. This contradicts a lot of the control literature, which 
suggests that a modem control approach encourages employee empowerment and 
distributed control (Otley, 1994). This may be due to the level of complexity in the 
control system, for example, the diagnostic and boundary control systems executed 
by the Reporters and the Guardians involve monitoring and scorekeeping only. When 
the managers in these groups want anything more, they have to prepare it themselves 
and in this way are independent from the MA. In the Interpreter and the Participator 
groups, the monitoring and scorekeeping elements of control are executed by the IT 
system or more junior members of staff. The next stage of control, i.e. interpretation 
of results, explanation of objectives and support of control decisions, encapsulates 
the belief and interactive control systems executed by the Interpreters and the 
Participators, and in this way their manager is more dependent on them (7.3.2).
6.5.5 M anager T erritorialism
While the literature has been critical of the MA for failure to re-position themselves 
into a more involved, hybrid role, these findings suggest that the managers 
themselves significantly influence the MA’s role.
The more involved role played by the MAs in the Interpreter and Participator groups 
is perceived to be assisted by the managers’ own efforts in supporting this:
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I would attribute this [sound business understanding] to the strong 
communications channels here (B).
I think they have a good understanding of the business. There is an overlay of 
communications in the culture of the organisation, which would help that 
(M).
If these guys don’t understand what’s going on, really that’s my fault (D).
These managers are actively directing the MA into a more involved role, while 
managers in the Reporter and Guardian groups appear to be doing far less to change 
the MA’s role or increase his/her profile. The managers in the Interpreter and 
Participator groups welcome the MA’s increased involvement in projects and DM 
but they do recognise certain limitations to their role:
I am ultimately accountable so the final decisions rest with me (D).
Their business partner role will always be limited because they wouldn’t be 
accountable (G).
I just want the information presented to me so that I can work with it, I 
certainly don’t see the MA solving my problems (B).
However, the managers in these groups do not appear in any way threatened by the 
MA’s expanding role. They welcome it and through there own actions appear to 
support it. The managers in the Reporter and Guardian groups, however, view their 
MA as a policing function and not a support function and so appear threatened by 
them as opposed to being interested in expanding their role (7.3.1).
Specifically in relation to control, the managers in the Reporter and Guardian groups, 
operating within traditional diagnostic and boundary control systems, appear to be 
more threatened by their MA than those managers in the other groups. The belief and 
interactive control systems appear to require much more interaction and information 
sharing between the manager and the MA. The managers in the Reporter and 
Guardian groups do not appear to engage in this level of interaction (7.3.2).
Sathe (1982) discussed ‘strong controllers’, referring to strong MAs, who achieved 
an effective balance between independence and involvement so the MA could 
effectively contribute to control and DM. Pierce and O’Dea (2003) discussed ‘strong 
managers’ who combined a detailed knowledge of their information requirements
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with an assertive, or even aggressive style of management in order to ensure that 
their needs were met. They knew what they wanted and they communicated this 
effectively and took measures to ensure that the MAs provided it. In contrast, they 
described ‘weak managers’, who tolerated information deficiencies, attributing these 
to their own lack of accounting knowledge or inflexibility, or alternatively to a lack 
of business understanding on the part of the MA. The managers in the Reporter and 
Guardian groups could be perceived as ‘weak’ because of their failure to 
communicate their requirements properly, their failure to help to generate their MA’s 
business understanding and their failure to actively communicate their dissatisfaction 
with the MA’s present role. The managers in the Interpreter and Participator groups 
could be perceived as strong because they took steps to ensure that the MA was a 
useful contributor.
This issue was not specifically addressed in this study. A thorough analysis of this 
would have required a detailed review of each MA, together with each manager and 
this was beyond the scope of the study. The importance of the strength or weakness 
of the manager in relation to the role of the MA is highlighted in section 7.6 as an 
area with strong potential for future research.
6.5.6 Section Sum m ary
Chenhall (2003) suggested that future contingency-based research into the role of the 
MA should focus on more contemporary factors, drawing from the fields of 
psychology and sociology (3.6). This section highlighted some manager related 
factors which may be associated with the role played by the MA. Firstly, the findings 
suggest that the managers’ own expectations may influence the MA’s role (6.5.1) as 
does the managers particular point of focus (6.5.2). Thirdly, the effect of the 
relationship between the manager and the MA is examined in section 6.5.3 while the 
impact of the extent of manager independence from the MA is discussed in section
6.5.4. It was found that managers in the Reporter and Guardian groups prepared a 
significant amount of their own information, in contrast with managers in the 
Interpreter and Participator groups who relied exclusively on their MA. Finally, the 
findings suggest that some managers feel territorial about their own role and they 
allow this to influence the role played by the MA. Some of the managers in the
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Reporter and Guardian groups appeared to feel threatened by the MA, either from a 
control point of view or from a job ownership perspective. As a result, these 
managers made little effort themselves to advance the position of the MAs, in 
contrast with the managers in the Interpreter and Participator groups who sought to 
advance the profile of their MA as much as possible (6.5.5). The implications of 
these findings are discussed in the conclusions section in 7.3.1 which discusses 
heterogeneous MA roles, and in 7.3.2 which discusses the organisations control 
culture.
The findings in relation to manager expectations suggest other implications for the 
role of the MA. They provide a deeper insight into the notion of the hybrid 
accountant as presented in the literature by identifying what type of MA in the 
findings most closely resemble the hybrid accountant (7.3.4). They suggest that not 
all of the managers actually want a hybrid accountant, and even those that do still 
value many of the elements of the traditional MA. The implications of these findings 
are discussed in detail in the conclusions section of the study dealing with the 
expectations of managers in section 7.3.3. The discussion on manager expectation
(6.5.1) also suggests that the managers expectations may be influencing the extent to 
which conflicts is perceived to exist in the MA’s role as a simultaneous provider of 
both control and DM information. The implications of these findings are discussed in 
the conclusions section of the study dealing with conflict in 7.3.6.
6.6 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANT
Having discussed the role of the MA as an information provider in the context of the 
organisation and the manager, it is now necessary to address the final component of 
the framework, that of MAs themselves. The findings in chapter 5 presented a picture 
of the MA across several organisations. Section 6.6 discusses how the perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of the MAs presented in this picture influence perceptions 
of the role of the MA as an information provider. Specifically, their level of business 
understanding, their interpersonal and communication skills and their attitude in 
general are discussed.
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6.6.1 Sound Business Understanding
There was complete consensus among all managers regarding the importance of a 
sound business understanding, all agreeing that it was critical to the MA’s ability to 
become more involved in the DM process and to carrying out a more involved role 
generally (section 5.3.2). The qualitative results suggest that the managers 
interviewed are generally disappointed by the level of business understanding 
displayed by their MAs:
I sometimes feel they are managed by spreadsheets (K).
Their purist style comes to the fore (J).
The findings specifically suggest that those MAs playing a more involved, 
collaborative role in information provision such as the Participators and the 
Interpreters possess a stronger business understanding than the Reporters and the 
Guardians. As detailed in section 5.6.3 and appendix H, only eight managers rated 
their MAs as ‘very good’ in terms of possessing a sound business understanding. 
Included in this eight, were all six Participators and two Interpreters. Three other 
managers in the Interpreter group rated their MA as ‘good. In contrast, the managers 
in the Reporter and Guardian groups perceived their MAs’ business understanding to 
be inadequate.
I find the MA lacks the business understanding and the commercial 
awareness which is necessary to contribute anything more than the basic 
information (A).
This is consistent with the literature which asserts that a broad-based business 
understanding is the key to a more involved, rounded MA, (Siegel and Kulesza, 
1994; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; Burns et al, 1999; Burns and Yazdifar, 2001).
Given that the Participators and the Interpreters operate within more progressive 
control systems, these findings suggest that a modern approach to control (Otley, 
1999) is more likely to be executed in an organisation where the MA has a strong 
understanding of the business. The literature suggests that this modem interpretation 
of control demands that the MA shows the ability to contextualise financial results 
within strategically expressed organisational objectives (Bums et al, 1999) while
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showing an indebt understanding of the organisations business processes (Burns and 
Yazdifar, 2001). These findings are consistent with this literature.
6.6.2 Com m unication and Interpersonal Skills
Managers were generally disappointed with the MAs’ interpersonal and 
communication skills (5.6.3). Overall, this was perceived to be one of the MA’s 
biggest weaknesses. However, the findings suggest that the Participators possess 
better communication skills than those in the other three groups, particularly the 
Reporters:
I have found over the years that people like yourself tend to be rather isolated 
from the rest of the organisation... I feel that they are not very tolerant of 
those who might not understand the numbers straight away (E).
They have to have the communications skills necessary to sit in a room and 
contribute, otherwise they wouldn’t be there (D).
This is consistent with the literature described in section 3.8, which suggested that 
communication skills are a key trait in a more involved MA.
In addition to the communication skills of the individual MA, the culture of 
communication within the organisation appeared to have a significant impact on the 
MA’s role. All of the managers in the Participator group highlighted the strong 
communication channels within the organisation as being a key contributory factor to 
the MA’s increased contribution to DM. Strong communication channels were also 
reported in the Interpreter group. This facilitated strong MA/manager relations, as 
discussed in 5.6.3 above, all of which gave the MA a better understanding of the 
business and an improved appreciation of the needs of managers. Dickson and 
Powers (1979) found that where information preparers identify strongly with users’ 
requirements, they are likely to have similar perceptions as to the effectiveness of an 
information system.
These findings suggest that a modern style of control may be associated with a 
culture of interaction and open communications. An organisational culture of 
openness and communications provides the foundation for Simons’ (1995) belief 
systems and particularly his interactive control systems.
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6.6.3 MA’s Attitude
The MA’s attitude to their own role may influence how they perform that role, and 
how useful they are to management in the performance of that role. However, this 
attitude may in itself be influenced by several different factors.
For instance, one manager, in the Reporter group, indicated that his organisation has
little local DM autonomy and is answerable to their corporate parent. He criticised
his MA for spending too much of his time meeting reporting requirements. He
admitted to having little or no working relationship with this MA and scored his MA
very poorly on his communication skills:
While we don’t meet very often, when we do, the meetings aren’t always the 
most cordial (E).
In this case, the MA appeared to have quite a dogmatic and controlling attitude to his 
role, which appeared to contribute to his limited role in the organisation. This attitude 
appeared to be as a result of several organisation and managerial specific factors as 
discussed at section 6.4 and section 6.5.
Conversely, a manager in the Participator group admitted that their company was 
largely financially buoyant. She had an extremely close working relationship with 
her MA, indicating that he had a strong business understanding, which she attributed 
to the strong communication channels within the organisation.
She confirmed that her MA would never be dogmatically controlling in his attitude:
If you can justify your reason for spending, it’s not a problem... it’s 
understood that markets can’t be built without money and it’s all discussed 
well in advance during budgeting and forecasting... everything here is open 
and communicated well in advance (B).
The MA’s attitude appears to influence the role played by that MA (7.3.1). This 
attitude in turn, appears to be influenced by many of the issues discussed throughout 
chapter 6, such as group structure, the relationship between the manager and the MA 
and manager territorialism.
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A detailed examination of the impact of MA attitude was not possible without also 
interviewing MAs. An expansion of the study to incorporate the views of MAs is 
suggested in section 7.6 as a potential area for future research.
6.6.4 Section Sum m ary
The findings suggest that the role of the MA as an information provider is influenced 
by the MA’s level of business understanding (6.6.1), the MA’s interpersonal and 
communication skills (6.6.2) and the MA’s general attitude (6.6.3). The implications 
of these findings on the role of the MA and on the control culture of the organisation 
are discussed in the conclusions section in 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 respectively.
6.7 F U R T H E R  IN S IG H T S
The framework of analysis referred to in chapter 6 has been used to organise the 
managers’ perceptions of the role of the MA in terms of providing control and DM 
information. Outside of this framework, the research provided some further 
important insights into potential obstacles which the MA must overcome in 
developing a hybrid accountant role.
6.7.1 M an agers’ C onflicting Requirem ents
Managers value the various characteristics of information (5.2.2) as well as the 
various SACs of the information provider (5.3.2) differently, depending on whether 
the information is required for control or DM.
Accuracy and consistency were the dominant characteristics favoured for control 
information, while timeliness and scope were considered more important for DM 
information. Timeliness and scope have been identified in the literature as two 
characteristics favoured in DM information. Chenhall and Morris (1986) pointed out 
that DM requires rapid turnaround of information because of its unsystematic and 
unpredictable nature. Similarly, breadth of scope has been identified as having 
particular significance in assisting managerial DM (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; 
Mia and Chenhall, 1994; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001). For DM purposes, it was
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suggested by some managers that accuracy could be traded for increased timeliness. 
This was consistent with Pierce and O’Dea (2003) who also reported concern among 
managers with the MAs delayed distribution of information because of their pursuit 
of excessive accuracy.
Sound business understanding, interpersonal and communication skills, team-skills 
and creativity were considered significantly more important for DM than for control. 
Much of the literature states that business understanding, communications and team- 
skills were critical to the MA’s success as a useful contributor to DM (Brignall et al, 
1999; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003).
There was a strong consensus among all the managers as to the importance of a
sound business understanding and there was little or no distinction among the 4
groups as to its importance:
Put it quite simply, we’re running a business, that’s what it’s about. If they 
don’t understand it, they will contribute nothing (F).
Sound business understanding is frequently cited as a key trait required in the 
contemporary MA (Brignall et al, 1999; Bums et al, 1999; Siegel and Sorensen, 
1999; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). There was also strong consensus among many of the 
managers as to the further increased importance of a strong business understanding 
in any MA involved with DM. Scapens et al (1996) suggest MAs need a sound 
commercial understanding and without it, risk having any potential business partner 
role hijacked.
6.7.2 M anagem ent A ccountants’ Perceived Strengths
Overall, the MA scored higher in relation to those characteristics which were 
perceived to be more important for control, namely, accuracy and consistency
(5.5.1). Managers were generally of the opinion that MAs were more comfortable 
providing control information. Most managers highlighted accuracy as a particular 
strength of the MA. This is consistent with Pierce and O’Dea (2003) who reported 
that MAs were perceived to be excessively concerned with accuracy.
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The MA’s performance fell short of manager expectation in relation to those SACs 
considered more important for DM: problem solving and analytical skills, team- 
skills, sound business understanding and communication and interpersonal skills
(5.6.3). These findings are consistent with the literature. Clarke, Hill and Stevens 
(1996) suggested that MAs in Ireland focus more on bookkeeping than on innovation 
and décision-support. Mendoza and Bescos (2001) suggested that the MA’s move to 
the business partner role was not straightforward due to their education, training and 
their overall development. The findings are also consistent with conflict literature 
which suggests that the MA may struggle to perform the ‘business partner’ role due 
to the conflicting attributes required in such a diverse role (Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 
1978; Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982).
6.7.3 M anagers are Preserving the T raditional M anagem ent Accountant
Bougen (1994) claimed that the single-minded, impartial, precise image of the 
traditional MA had worked in his favour by inspiring confidence and building his 
reputation. Friedman and Lyne (1997) and Brignall et al (1999) disagree, 
maintaining that the bean-counter image of the MA must be dispelled. As described 
in section 5.3.3, many of the managers interviewed in this study concurred with 
Bougen (1994):
These numbers drive important decisions (K). [Impartiality]
We all have different roles to play here. Sales people are mad cap and 
optimistic. You need someone to balance that and I believe that finance play 
a strong role in this regard (O). [Conservativeness]
The findings in relation to managers’ preferences for scope are quite revealing in this 
regard (5.2.2). Scope is perceived to be more important for DM information than for 
control information but a surprising amount of managers were clear that the financial 
information was their first priority and as long as they had that anything additional 
was a bonus.
Whatever falls under the financial scope is what I’m interested in (B).
I don’t see the value of forecasts. I care about what is happening in the 
present, not the future. I want information about what is happening now and I 
want it quickly. That’s my concern (Q).
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The findings in relation to scope were not significantly different across the four 
groups. Managers in the Participator group often considered scope just as 
unimportant as managers in the Reporter group. This is in contrast with the literature 
in this area, which suggests that managers are particularly eager to receive broad 
scoped information (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Mia and Chenhall, 1994; Mendoza 
and Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003).
Some of the managers did express an interest in scope but they expected this from 
the financial controller, or perhaps a different department, and not from the MA
(5.2.3). This is consistent with the literature. These managers have given up 
expecting to receive this information from the MA and are sourcing it elsewhere. 
Pierce and O’Dea (2003) suggested that if MAs did not provide broad scope data, 
managers would source it themselves.
6.7.4 O verall Poor Perform ance o f the M anagem ent A ccountant
A recurring feature of the findings as presented in chapter 5 is the dissatisfaction of 
managers generally with the performance of their MAs. This is particularly the case 
with regard to their contribution to DM.
The information provided by the MA is seen to be lacking in flexibility and
adaptability and excessively narrow in scope (5.5.2). The qualitative findings
indicate a large expectations gap between the MA and the manager with regard to
relevance of information:
They don’t understand a lot of the time what we are using the information for 
and they would never ask if it was relevant (P).
The managers’ perceptions of the MAs’ performance varies depending on the many 
factors discussed throughout sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. However, regardless of these 
factors, there was an overall sense of dissatisfaction with the MA’s performance on 
these specific issues. These findings are consistent with the literature. Pierce and 
O’Dea (2003) identified a user-preparer expectation gap and Bruns and McKinnon 
(1993) described the information produced by the MA as lacking a link between its 
function and objective.
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The MA also scored poorly in relation to some of the SACs, particularly those
considered significantly more important for DM. Generally, their level of business
understanding was perceived to be poor, and interpersonal and communication skills
were perceived to be a distinct weakness:
I don’t know if it goes back to a lack of training of the softer skills in college 
but finance people just don’t seem to want to get involved in things (C).
Brignall et al (1999) expressed concern as to the MA’s lack of understanding of the 
business drivers and processes, suggesting that this would limit their role in the 
organisation. Empirical literature to date has reported managers strong preference for 
interpersonal and communications skills (Siegel and Kulesza, 1994; Bums et al, 
1999), though few studies were conducted as to the MA’s performance in this regard. 
The evidence here suggests that interpersonal and communication skills are among 
the MA’s biggest weaknesses.
6.7.5 M anagem ent Accountants are too Busy
Any weaknesses in the timeliness of the MAs’ information was attributed to how 
busy they were, due largely to the pressures of corporate reporting requirements. 
Timeliness was identified by many of the managers as a key obstacle in their carving 
out of a new role:
The management report could hit my desk 2 weeks after month end and really 
that’s not providing me with any value at all. I need information much more 
quickly (Q).
This is consistent with the literature, much of which reports that managers are 
frustrated by the apparent lag between activity and reporting of the activity. 
Meaningful information is that which is actionable and for information to be 
actionable it must be timely (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Mendoza and Bescos, 
2001; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003).
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Moreover, if timeliness is not addressed, there is little doubt that the managers will
turn elsewhere to get their information:
I need my pricing models yesterday and this is the issue which causes most 
friction. I appreciate the pressure she’s under and eventually I will need to get 
more and more involved with this myself in terms of battling the issue. To be 
useful to me on pricing on contracts, she has got to be there all the time and 
while she’s excellent on the day-to-day stuff, she just isn’t there on pricing 
and this is a huge disappointment (O).
The findings suggest that the absence of timely information is driving some 
managers to source their own information (section 5.5.1). This is consistent with 
prior empirical findings (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; 
Pierce and O’Dea, 2003).
6.7.6 M anagem ent Accountants are too Honest
All managers perceived honesty to be an important attribute of their MA (5.3.1) and 
all managers perceived their MAs to be very honest (5.6.1). The managers’ responses 
on honesty, however, were sometimes inconsistent with their quantitative responses. 
As indicated in section 5.3.1, Manager N valued ‘practical honesty’ and wanted his 
MA to be honest while also using ‘some cop on’. In section 5.6.1 some managers 
criticised the MA’s excessive honesty. Manager K maintained that their levels of 
honesty counteracted their creativity and Manager O considered them to lack 
‘savyness’ in terms of displaying excessive honesty. Similar opinions were reported 
in relation to impartiality. Largely, the managers appreciated impartiality in their 
MA, and impartiality was a surprisingly popular trait for many managers, but some 
managers did express that they would like their MA to be less honest and impartial 
and more of a ‘team-player’ (5.6.2). This revisits the blurred line between the MA as 
a controller and the MA as a business partner as discussed in the context of manager 
expectations in section 6.5.1. Managers appear to want the best of both worlds. From 
one perspective, they value the MA for their honesty and impartiality, some 
managers citing it as a key advantage over alternative information providers. From 
another, they criticise the MA for being too honest and not appreciating the 
manager’s specific agenda (5.6.1). This is an illustration of the potential conflict 
between the MA as a simultaneous controller and business partner (Sathe, 1982; 
Granlund and Lukka, 1998).
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6.7.7 Management Accountants are not stakeholders in Decision-Making
Despite the evolved, supportive, collaborative roles played by the Interpreters and to 
a greater extent the Participators, some of their managers still perceive limitations to 
their potential role for the simple reason that ultimately they are not stakeholders in 
the organisation’s decisions. Manager D praises his MA for his supportive, and not 
excessively controlling influence, and always insisted that he was involved in 
decisions from the outset, yet he was clear on the fact that the MA did not own any 
of the business processes and ultimately was not accountable. Manager G refers to 
his MA on a daily basis as a ‘business partner’ but he accepts that his MA will not 
feel the sense of ownership over a decision because he will not get the same grief if 
things go wrong. Manager M, again, maintains that the MA is not accountable for the 
decision and so cannot be perceived to be an equal member of the DM team, though 
he believes that this is an advantage in that they have no agenda and can play a more 
impartial role (5.4.2). These are the perceptions of the managers working with the 
most evolved MA’s in the study, those who most closely resemble the ‘hybrid 
accountant’ and ‘business partner’ discussed in the literature (6.3.3 and 6.3.4). This 
suggests that the MA’s lack of accountability will always limit their position in the 
cross functional DM team.
6.7.8 Section Sum m ary
Many of the key discussion points arising from this study relates to the various 
organisation, managerial and MA specific factors which are associated with the role 
of the MA as an information provider. Some additional findings emerged from the 
study which fell outside the scope of the analytical framework, and these were 
discussed in this section. Generally, the managers had conflicting requirements in 
terms of their information and their information providers depending on whether they 
were seeking out control information or DM information (6.7.1). The implications of 
this particular finding is discussed in the context of managers expectations in section 
7.3.3. A variety of findings were presented which represent potential obstacles in the 
MAs pursuit of a hybrid accountant role. The MAs were perceived to be stronger at 
providing control information and most managers concurred that the MAs were more
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comfortable within the control arena (6.7.2). Managers were generally disappointed 
with their MAs on an overall level, but particularly in relation to those characteristics 
and SACs perceived more important for DM (6.7.4). MAs were perceived to be too 
busy (6.7.5) and too honest (6.7.6) and finally MAs were not perceived to be true 
stakeholders in the business (6.7.7). The implications of these findings for the MA’s 
role are discussed in section 7.3.5.
6.8 S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S IO N S
Chapter 6 presented an analysis of the findings which were described in chapter 5. 
The development of a suitable framework of analysis was necessary through which 
the findings could be interpreted and analysed. The first part of the framework of 
analysis is a MA classification system which sets out four alternative types of MA- 
the Reporter, the Guardian, the Interpreter and the Participator. The second part of 
the framework sets out the three separate components which influence the MA’s 
role- the organisation, the manager and the MAs themselves. The organisational 
factors were presented in section 6.4, addressing the industry, level of competition, 
financial security and group structure. The managerial factors were examined at 
section 6.5, examining manager expectation, managerial focus, the relationship 
between the manager and the MA, manager independence from the MA and possible 
manager territorialism. The MAs themselves were discussed in section 6.6, 
addressing their level of business understanding, their interpersonal and 
communication skills and their attitude generally. Section 6.7 presented some deeper 
insights emerging from the findings which fell outside of the scope of the framework 
but which were just as critical to the study.
This chapter highlights the diversity of MA roles in existence and discusses a variety 
of factors which may influence these roles. This contingency-based review responds 
to suggestions by Chenhall (2003) that future contingency-based research should 
focus on how relationships and interactions between groups and/or individuals are 
impacting MA roles. This chapter also discusses how these variables may be 
associated with the control culture of the organisation. This provides a deeper 
understanding of the control frameworks presented in chapters 2 and 3. The 
interpretation of the findings included in this chapter also provides a much deeper
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insight into the concept of the hybrid accountant, both from the perspective of the 
manager’s expectations, and the MA’s capacity to meet those expectations.
Chapter 7 now goes on to present a summary of the research, followed by the 
conclusions from the findings together with the strengths and limitations of the study, 
the contributions of the study to the literature, and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 7
Summary and 
Conclusions
This study examined managers’ perceptions of the role of the MA in providing 
information for control and DM, as well as the factors influencing this role. The 
study was prompted by assertions in the literature that MAs did not appreciate the 
complexities inherent in contributing to control and DM in a contemporary business 
environment (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Friedman and Lyne, 1997; Mendoz and 
Bescos, 2001; Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). The study also responded to suggestions in 
the literature of the emergence of a hybrid MA who engages effectively in both 
control and DM, combining the role of financial monitoring and stewardship with 
that of a financially astute business partner. The overall objective of the research was 
set out in section 4.2.1, followed by the specific research questions which may be 
summarised as follows:
1. What characteristics of information do managers perceive to be important for 
control and DM?
2. What SACs do managers perceive to be important in providers of control and 
DM information?
3. To what extent is the MA providing information for control and/or DM?
4. How effective is the MA perceived to be at providing useful information?
5. To what extent does the MA display the SACs associated with providers of 
useful information?
6. To what extent do managers perceive a conflict to exist in the MA’s capacity 
to provide both control and DM information?
In addressing these research questions, chapter 2 discussed the role of the MA as 
traditionally presented in the well established management accounting literature, the 
majority of which is largely theoretical in nature. Chapter 3 examined the role of the 
MA as reported in the contemporary empirical literature. The research objective was 
presented in chapter 4 together with the detailed research questions designed to 
achieve this objective. Chapter 4 also described the research approach and the data 
collection and analysis techniques. Data were collected by means of eighteen semi­
structured interviews with managers. Using a triangulation approach, both 
quantitative and qualitative data were gathered. The quantitative data were analysed 
using Microsoft Excel Analyse-It software, while the qualitative data were analysed 
manually using coding (Patton, 2001), pattern analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
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and analytical induction techniques (Bryman, 1985; Silverman, 2001; Punch, 2005). 
The results of the interviews, both quantitative and qualitative, analysed by research 
question were presented in chapter 5. Chapter 6 discussed and interpreted the 
findings in the context of a framework developed from the literature.
In this chapter, the research undertaken together with the key findings from that 
research, are summarised in section 7.2. The conclusions of the research are set out 
in section 7.3, while section 7.4 outlines the strengths and limitations of the study. 
Section 7.5 describes the contribution to the literature, while suggestions for future 
research are presented in section 7.6. Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.
7.2 S U M M A R Y  O F  T H E  R E S E A R C H
The study was framed in several different streams of literature. Firstly, the key 
control frameworks presented in the literature, which represent a progression of 
thought with regard to control, were discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Secondly, the key 
DM frameworks presented in the literature were discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
Finally, throughout this study, numerous references were made to literature 
surrounding the changing role of the MA and the factors driving these changes. The 
research objective and research questions emerging from this review were presented 
in section 4.2. The rationale behind the type of data collected to address each of the 
research questions was described in section 4.3.3. This section will present a 
summary of the main findings, analysed by research question.
7.2.1 Research Question 1
In chapter 2 the role of information was reviewed and a comprehensive list was 
derived from the literature of the characteristics most frequently referred to by 
managers when discussing their information requirements (section 2.6). This 
literature has not focused on the extent to which these characteristics may be 
considered as important for control as for DM and vice versa (section 2.6.1). This 
research question addresses this gap.
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The managers valued relevance and reliability above all else, in both control and DM 
information (section 5.2.1). Timeliness and scope were considered significantly more 
important for DM, while accuracy and consistency were favoured more for control. 
While the quantitative results revealed that scope was considered significantly more 
important in DM information, the qualitative results suggested that the managers had 
few expectations of their MA in terms of the scope of their information. The findings 
suggest that MAs were relied upon primarily for their financial input and managers 
often sourced the broader scoped information elsewhere (section 5.2.2).
The findings relating to relevance and reliability were consistent with the literature. 
Relevance has long been discussed in the management accounting literature in the 
context of the user-preparer expectation gap (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003) and reliability 
is a characteristic strongly associated with the accounting profession (Yamey, 1982; 
Bougen, 1994). The findings in relation to timeliness also concurred with the 
literature. Timeliness has traditionally been considered extremely important in the 
literature, particularly in situations where a rapid response is required, e.g. a DM or 
project situation (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993). In this study, accuracy was 
considered important, but more important again for control purposes. Some of the 
managers agreed that they would trade accuracy for increased timeliness in a DM 
scenario. This is consistent with Van der Veeken and Wouters (2002) and Pierce and 
O’Dea (2003). It was predicted in the literature that broad scoped information would 
become a key deliverable for the contemporary MA (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Mia 
and Chenhall, 1994). These findings did not support this prediction in that breadth of 
scope was not revealed as a very important characteristic in management accounting 
information.
7.2.2 R esearch Question 2
Chapter 3 discussed the changes occurring in the business environment in the past 
two decades (section 3.2), as well as the effect these changes have had on the role of 
the MA (section 3.3 -3.5), concluding with a review of the empirical research into the 
MA’s contemporary role (section 3.7). From this literature, a comprehensive list was 
derived of the key SACs which have been associated with the MA. Again, the study
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examined the extent to which these SACs may be considered as important for control 
as they are for DM, or vice versa.
The managers valued ethics above all else in providers of control and DM 
information. Honesty was also considered very or extremely important by almost all 
of the managers (section 5.3.1). Sound business understanding, communication and 
interpersonal skills, team-skills and creativity were considered significantly more 
important in providers of DM information than in providers of control information. 
In a DM scenario, some managers rated a sound business understanding as being 
even more important than honesty (section 5.3.2). The qualitative results revealed 
that the managers appreciated impartiality in their MA. Half of the managers 
interviewed perceived impartiality to be very or extremely important. The qualitative 
results also revealed that problem solving and analytical skills were considered 
important by some managers, and not favoured by others, though all concurred that 
problem solving would be more important in a DM scenario (section 5.3.3). Single- 
mindedness and conservativeness were perceived to be of low importance.
The findings in relation to ethics were consistent with contemporary research in 
which ethics have become vitally important in all organisational employees, 
particularly those within the finance department (May, 1999). The literature 
suggested that sound business understanding, communication, interpersonal and team 
skills were among the most important traits required of the modem MA (Siegel and 
Kulesza, 1994; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; Burns et al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 
2001). These findings suggested that managers value these traits more in providers of 
DM information, suggesting that an increased involvement in DM may be reflective 
of a more modem and expanded MA role. Most of the managers, while agreeing that 
increased creativity was important in a DM context, were tentative in these views 
due to apprehension at the concept of a ‘creative accountant’. This is consistent with 
similarly tentative views on creativity in the literature (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999). 
The literature suggested that accountants have traditionally been referred to as ‘bean­
counters’ who are doggedly precise and honest (Jackson, 1956; Yamey, 1982; 
Bougen, 1994; Friedman and Lyne, 1997). Bougen (1994) maintained that this 
stereotype has benefited the accountant, while Friedman and Lyne (1997) suggested 
the contrary. The findings of this study suggested that the managers still value many
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of the traits associated with the more traditional MA, i.e. impartiality, precision and 
honesty.
7.2.3 Research Question 3
Chapter 2 described how the traditional MA role may be separated into distinct roles. 
One role envisages the MA as a key component of the organisation’s ‘planning and 
control’ system. The other envisages the MA as facilitating and supporting 
managerial DM (section 2.2.4). RQ3 ascertained the extent to which this is true for 
the contemporary MA.
This research question asked respondents to describe the role played by their MA in 
the provision of information for planning and control, and although the responses 
varied significantly from manager to manager, they could be divided into two broad 
groups; (1) the MA provides information for control only, and; (2) the MA provides 
information for control and DM. In the first group, the MAs varied from periodically 
reporting routine information on performance and efficiencies to regularly engaging 
with managers to provide more frequent control information (section 5.4.1). The 
MAs in the second group varied from those who contribute information to the DM 
process, but do so strictly within the confines of a controlling role, to those who 
actively participate in both the control and DM function, bringing different 
approaches to each function (section 5.4.2).
The literature to date has presented a multitude of different management accounting 
roles, ranging from the traditional, scorekeeping MA (2.2.4) to the modern hybrid 
MA who ostensibly juggles the conflicting demands of being an effective controller 
as well as a financially astute business partner (3.7.7). These findings present MAs 
from either end of this spectrum.
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7.2.4 Research Question 4
To date, manager surveys have focused on managers’ perceptions of the importance 
of particular information characteristics or the MA’s performance in relation to 
particular information characteristics (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Bruns and 
McKinnon, 1993; Mendoza and Bescos, 2001; Van der Veeken and Wouters, 2002). 
This study did both by ascertaining how well MAs are perceived to perform relative 
to expectation in terms of providing useful information.
Overall, the managers questioned were dissatisfied with the information produced by 
their MA. The MAs’ scores fell short of expectation in almost all cases (section 5.5). 
The quantitative results revealed that the MA was perceived to be stronger at 
producing accurate, consistent, reliable and timely information. However, the 
qualitative results suggest that the managers were less satisfied with the MA’s 
timeliness than the quantitative results would suggest (section 5.5.1). The MA 
performed particularly poorly in relation to relevance, flexibility and adaptability and 
scope (section 5.5.2).
These findings were consistent with the literature, which suggested that MA’s 
particular abilities lay in producing accurate, reliable and consistent information 
(Yamey, 1982; Bougen, 1994) which often lacked relevance (Bruns and McKinnon, 
1993) and was narrow in scope (Mia and Chenhall, 1994).
7.2.5 Research Question 5
Again, empirical studies to date researching the MA’s role have focused on the 
importance of particular SACs in the MA, or the extent to which MAs exhibit 
particular SACs (Siegel and Kulesza, 1994; Siegel and Sorensen, 1999; Burns et al, 
1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). Few studies have attempted both. This study 
addresses this gap. Having examined the importance of certain SACs in RQ2, RQ5 
examines the extent to which MAs exhibit these SACs relative to the managers’ 
expectations. This will provide further insights into the reasons for the MA’s level of 
involvement in control and DM as ascertained at RQ3. In addition, many empirical 
studies of the MA’s role to date have focused on anticipating future changes and
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developments in the MAs’ SACs. This research question focuses on managers’ 
actual experiences in comparison with the predictions made in prior studies.
The results indicated that the MAs scored significantly lower in relation to problem 
solving and analytical skills, team-skills, interpersonal and communications skills 
and creativity than they did in relation to ethics, honesty, IT skills, precision and 
financial expertise (section 5.6). They exceeded the managers’ expectations in 
relation to impartiality, single mindedness and conservativeness. The qualitative 
results in relation to these particular findings were conflicting. Some managers 
valued these particular competencies, while others identified them as factors 
inhibiting the MA’s performance of a more involved role (section 5.6.2). The 
qualitative results revealed similar conflicts in relation to honesty. Some managers 
appreciated the MA’s inherently honest approach, while others felt that their 
excessive honesty was detrimental to their proposed ‘business partner’ role (section 
5.6.1).
The SACs at which the MAs scored the lowest, were among those SACs perceived to 
be significantly more important in providers of DM information, namely, sound 
business understanding, interpersonal and communications skills and creativity 
(section 5.6.3).
The contemporary empirical literature was very clear about the type of attributes 
expected of the modem MA. A strong business understanding, analytical skills and 
softer skills such as communications and team-skills were considered to be 
paramount in a modem MA (Siegel and Sorensen, 1999, Burns et al, 1999; Bums 
and Yazdifar, 2001). Overall, the MAs reviewed in this study scored particularly 
poorly in relation to these particular SACs.
7.2.6 Research Question 6
The MA’s role as a simultaneous ‘controller’ and ‘supporter’ is inherently conflicting 
(Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 1978; Hopper, 1980). These conflicts increase as the MA’s 
role develops into that of a ‘hybrid accountant’ role. This new role incorporates new 
dimensions such as consultant, advisor and change agent, alongside the traditional
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elements of the MA’s role such as monitoring and stewardship (Granlund and Lukka, 
1998). The literature questions whether or not the same person can occupy both roles 
(section 3.7.9). This conflict issue has not been pursued at length in the 
contemporary literature, particularly from the managers’ perspective. In response, 
RQ6 investigates managers’ perceptions of the conflicts in the MA’s capacity to 
contribute adequately to both control and DM.
The managers’ responses to this question fell into three main groups: (1) sufficient 
conflict exists to prevent the MA from providing both control and DM information,
(2) sufficient conflict exists to restrict the MA’s contribution of DM information, and
(3) no conflict exists and the MA may freely provide both control and DM 
information. Group l ’s MAs were considered to lack the creativity and business 
understanding required to contribute to DM. Group 2’s MAs were described as 
‘conservative’ and ‘cost conscious’ and it was suggested that they could not take off 
their ‘controlling hat’ in order to put on their ‘financial expert hat’. MAs in group 3 
were described as ‘enlightened’, ‘supportive’ and perfectly capable of exercising 
financial control, while also engaging with cross functional DM teams as the 
financial expert. The MAs described in Groups 1 and 2 were consistent with those 
described in the traditional conflict literature (Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 1978; Hopper, 
1980, Sathe, 1982, Granlund and Lukka, 1998) while the MAs described in Group 3 
appeared to be doing a better job at overcoming the conflicts inherent in their role.
7.3 CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH
This study set out to examine managers’ perceptions of the role of the MA in the 
provision of information for control and DM as well as the factors influencing this 
role. The findings highlight the diversity of management accounting roles in different 
organisations and provide a deeper understanding of the complexities influencing the 
role of the MA, identifying various factors which may be associated with that role
(7.3.1). They identify several factors which may be associated with the control 
culture of an organisation (7.3.2). They provide insights into the expectations of 
managers with regard to their MA’s role (7.3.3). In addition they facilitate the 
development of a deeper insight into the concept of the hybrid accountant as 
presented in the literature (7.3.4). They also identify some factors which may be
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associated with the MA’s lack of progression into this contemporary hybrid role
(7.3.5). Finally, the study identifies some factors which may be associated with the 
levels of conflicts which managers perceive to exist in the MA’s role as a provider of 
both control and DM information (7.3.6).
7.3.1 Heterogeneous M anagem ent A ccountant Roles
These findings suggest that there is a great diversity of MA roles in existence. The 
MAs in this study are reduced to four categories: the Reporters, the Guardians, the 
Interpreters and the Participators. These categories are not scientifically developed 
and the lines between them are blurred but they do represent four distinct groups into 
which the MAs studied may be classified (6.2). These roles may be influenced by a 
wide range of factors: The findings identified how organisational factors such as 
industry (6.4.1), level of competition (6.4.2), financial security (6.4.3) and group 
structure (6.4.4) were key forces influencing the role of the MA. The findings also 
identify some sociologically derived factors which may be associated with the role 
played by the MA within the organisation. The managers’ own expectations were 
found to be associated with the MAs’ role (6.5.1). The findings suggest that 
managerial focus, often influenced by the organisational factors outlined in section
6.4, were also strongly associated with the MA’s role, as was the relationship 
between the manager and the MA (6.5.3) and the extent to which the manager felt 
independent from the MA (6.5.4). Those managers who shared a close, interactive 
relationship with their MA, appeared to be more dependant on them for their 
informational needs and therefore welcomed the MA’s increased involvement in the 
organisation. Those managers who did not share a close, interactive relationship with 
their MA sourced a lot of their information themselves, were less dependent on them, 
and so did little to improve their MA’s profile within the organisation (6.5.4). These 
managers appeared to view their MA as a threat and were more territorial about their 
own position. Managers who did share a close relationship with the MA appeared to 
view their MA as a supportive service and they considered it their responsibility to 
assist the MA to enhance the quality of the service (6.5.5). In addition, these findings 
suggest that the MA’s level of business understanding (6.6.1) and the extent of their 
interpersonal and communication skills (6.6.2) will influence their role. The diversity 
of MA roles evident from the findings suggest that no single ‘management
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accountant’ definition may be applied uniformly to all MAs. The implications of this 
conclusion for the management accounting contingency literature is discussed in 
section 7.5.3.
7.3.2 The Organisation’s Control Culture
The findings suggest that specific circumstances may be associated with the style of 
control executed in an organisation. Industry (6.4.1), competitive pressures (6.4.2), 
increased financial security (6.4.3) and group structure (6.4.4) may be associated 
with the type of control executed in an organisation, whether it’s the traditional feed­
back style of control modelled by Otley and Berry (1980) or the modem, progressive 
style of control modelled by Otley (1999). The findings also suggest that sociological 
factors such as the relationship between the manager and the MA (6.5.3), the extent 
to which the manager is independent from the MA (6.5.4) and the level of 
territorialism displayed by the manager (6.5.5) will also impact on the control culture 
of the organisation. Finally, the findings suggest that the MAs’ own business 
understanding (6.6.1) and their interpersonal and communications skills (6.6.2) will 
influence the style of control used in the organisation. This conclusion is discussed in 
greater detail in section 7.5.1 in the context of the study’s contribution to the control 
literature.
7.3.3 The Expectations of Managers
Control and DM
The managers interviewed appeared to want different things from their MA at 
different times. They favoured accuracy, consistency, precision and impartiality in 
contributors to control, and they valued timeliness and scope, communication skills 
and creativity significantly more in contributors to DM (6.7.1). Given that twelve of 
the eighteen managers indicated that their MA contributes to both control and DM, 
this suggests that MAs are expected to approach these different aspects of their job in 
different ways.
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It has been suggested in the literature that traditional MAs, characterised by 
precision, impartiality and conservativeness are no longer required, and if MAs do 
not demonstrate more creativity and commercial awareness then they will eventually 
become extinct (Friedman and Lyne,1997; Brignall ei al, 1999). Consequently, much 
of the contemporary literature has developed the notion of the hybrid accountant who 
is a business partner as well as a controller (Bums et al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 
2001). This has created the impression in the literature that the long-standing, 
traditional aspects of the MAs role are somehow redundant and unwanted. These 
findings do not support this literature. The MAs in this study were appreciated for 
their factual, impartial and trustworthy input. Even those managers who described 
their MAs as having a very broad and multi-functional role appreciated them 
primarily for their key historical, financial input (section 6.5.1 and 6.7.3). This 
suggests that the traditional style MA is not redundant and still exists today, but in 
some organisations this traditional role is carried out alongside a wider and more 
involved role.
Not all managers want a hybrid accountant
Some of the managers interviewed were looking for a great deal more than the 
historical, financial input. Other managers sought nothing more. The findings clearly 
indicated that not all managers interviewed wanted a hybrid accountant (6.5.1). 
Referring to figure 8 in section 6.2, the Interpreters place a higher emphasis on 
routine reporting, have a controlling influence and have little involvement on cross 
functional teams. The Interpreter does not resemble the hybrid accountant as 
presented in the literature (3.7.7) and may be more closely associated with the 
traditional MA (2.2.4). However, the managers in the Interpreter group appeared to 
be quite satisfied with the Interpreters role. The traditional style MA, with a good 
understanding of the manager’s needs, is presented in these findings as a satisfactory 
alternative to the hybrid accountant. The managers in the Interpreter group, for 
various reasons outlined throughout this study, demand more extensive reporting and 
require the MA to engage predominantly in control. The Interpreters’ increased
Key financial input a priority
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involvement in projects and cross-functional teams would compromise their ability 
to satisfy these core needs of the manager.
Section 7.5.2 describes how these conclusions contribute to the MA role literature.
7.3.4 A Deeper Insight into the Hybrid Accountant
Many of the studies referring to the ‘hybrid accountant’ or the ‘business partner’ 
have centred on predicting the future role of the MA as a hybrid accountant (Bums et 
al, 1999; Bums and Yazdifar, 2001). These studies have not gathered evidence as to 
the managers’ actual experiences of these roles. Nor have they sought to establish a 
true understanding of the term hybrid accountant beyond the generic descriptions 
presented in the literature of a simultaneous controller and business partner. These 
findings have addressed both of these gaps in the literature.
In setting out to examine the MA’s involvement in the provision of information for 
control and DM, the findings of this study revealed that the ‘hybrid accountant’ did 
exist in some of the organisations reviewed. Just six of the eighteen managers 
interviewed described their MAs in terms resembling the hybrid accountant as 
presented in the literature (3.7.7). These particular MAs are described in this study as 
Participators. Figure 8 describes the distinguishing characteristics of the four 
different MA groups (6.2). Having ascertained that the Participator most closely 
resembles the hybrid accountant as presented in the literature (6.2.4), it is possible to 
define the hybrid accountant in terms of these characteristics. The findings suggest 
that the hybrid accountant places a low emphasis on routine reporting, contributes 
significantly to the DM process and has only a moderately controlling influence. A 
strong focus of the role is on the interpretation of results for managers. From an 
interpersonal point of view, these findings suggest that the hybrid accountant 
interacts regularly with managers and has a strong presence on cross-functional 
teams. Finally, the hybrid accountant has a strong voice within the organisation. 
However, a number of observations were noted in relation to the ‘hybrid accountant’ 
phenomenon in the context of these eighteen cases:
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a) The findings suggest that very particular circumstances may be associated 
with these MA’s hybrid role (discussed in the context of heterogeneous MA 
roles in 7.3.1 above).
b) The managers in the Participator group worked with the MA in cultivating 
the hybrid role (also discussed in the context of heterogeneous MA roles in
7.3.1 above).
c) The managers in the Participator group required the historical, financial 
information first. Once they had this they welcomed the MA’s wider input 
(discussed in the context of the expectations of managers in 7.3.3 above).
7.3.5 Factors Inhibiting the Development of the Hybrid Accountant
These findings suggest several factors which may be associated with the MAs lack of 
progression into a broader MA role. Overall, the MAs scored higher in relation to 
those characteristics perceived to be more important for control. Similarly, they fell 
short of expectation in relation to those SACs considered significantly more 
important for DM. This suggests that the MAs were generally more suited to the 
control element of their roles (6.7.2). Most of the managers, at some point in the 
interview, mentioned the lack of timeliness as a key weakness in the MAs’ 
information provision and most conceded that this was due to how exceptionally 
busy the MAs were. In this study, many of the MAs appeared to be too busy to 
become more involved in DM (6.7.5). The managers appreciated the MA for their 
honest, impartial input and some indicated that this is what set them apart from 
alternative information providers. However, many of the managers indicated that the 
MA was simply too honest to play a wholly collaborative role on a DM team (6.7.6). 
Most of the managers interviewed were clear that the MA was ultimately not 
responsible for the decisions being taken, and so could never be considered truly 
equal members of a DM team. These managers did not consider the MA to be a true 
stakeholder in the decision (6.7.7).
Several factors may be associated with the role of the MA (i.e. those indicated in 
section 7.3.1). Some MAs were overcoming the obstacles described above and 
appeared to be developing a hybrid role (e.g. the Participators discussed in section 
7.3.4) and some managers simply did not want their MAs to develop a hybrid role
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(e.g. the managers in the Interpreter group discussed in section 7.3.3). The factors 
described in this section merely represent the general views of managers in relation 
to the MA’s overall suitability for the hybrid accountant role.
7.3.6 Perceived Conflicts in the MA’s Role
Managers were specifically asked in this study if they perceived a conflict in the 
MA’s ability to contribute to both control and DM. The answers varied but were 
consistent within the MA groups. Managers in the Reporter and Guardian groups 
perceived significant conflict (6.2.1-6.2.2). Managers in the Interpreter group 
perceived less conflict than those in the Reporter and Guardian groups (6.2.3) and 
managers in the Participator group perceived no conflict (6.2.4).
There is a body of literature which addresses the conflicts inherent in the MA’s role 
(Perrow, 1970; Sathe, 1978; Hopper, 1980; Sathe, 1982; Granlund andLukka, 1998). 
These findings highlight factors which may influence the extent to which the MA 
may be capable of overcoming these inherent conflicts.
Conflict in the M A ’s role may be influenced by the individual MA.
On one level, the knowledge, traits and abilities of the individual MA may be 
influencing the extent to which the MA is perceived to overcome these conflicts. The 
Reporters and Guardians were described as lacking the ‘creativity’ and ‘business 
understanding’ required to contribute to DM in a satisfactory manner. The 
Interpreters were accused of being ‘cost conscious’, ‘conservative’ and ‘incapable of 
taking off their controlling hat’ while the Participators were described as 
‘enlightened’ and ‘supportive’ (7.2.6). This was not specifically addressed in the 
study but these findings suggest that the MAs’ individual traits and abilities will 
influence the extent to which they can overcome any inherent conflicts in their ability 
to contribute adequately to control and DM.
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Conflict in the MA ‘s role may be influenced by the individual manager.
On another level, the findings suggest that the managers themselves may be 
influencing the levels of conflict within the MA’s diverse role (6.5.1). The managers 
in the Reporter and Guardian groups were expressly opposed to the MAs’ increased 
involvement in DM (5.7.1). The managers in the Interpreter group had very specific 
ideas about what the MA’s role in DM was (5.7.2), while the managers in the 
Participator group described the MA’s full involvement in both control and DM as 
‘mutually supportive’ and ‘necessary’ (5.7.3). The findings have already suggested 
that managers have a responsibility to help the MA to do a better job at meeting 
managerial needs (7.3.1). In the same way, this study suggests that managers have a 
responsibility to work with MAs to overcome any inherent conflicts in their role. The 
managers in the Participator group have achieved this, the managers in the Interpreter 
group have achieved it to a lesser extent and the managers in the Reporter and 
Guardian groups have not attempted it at all.
Conflict in the MA’s role may be influenced by the control culture of the 
organisation.
The issue of conflict may be influenced at a much deeper level than the manager or 
the MA. The findings suggest a correlation between the control culture of the 
organisation and the perceived conflicts in the MA’s role. Managers in the Reporter 
and the Guardian groups perceive sufficient conflict in the MA’s role, to prevent the 
MA from contributing to DM in any way. The Reporters and Guardians operate 
within traditional control systems as portrayed by Otley and Berry (1980). The 
Reporters rely on Simons’ (1995) diagnostic control systems and the Guardians base 
their control style on Simons’ boundary control systems.
Meanwhile, the managers in the Interpreter group perceive far less conflict and 
managers in the Participator group do not perceive any conflict at all. The 
Interpreters and Participators work within a far more progressive and contemporary 
style of control as presented by Otley (1999). The Interpreters embrace Simons’ 
(1995) belief systems and the Participators function within a much more enabling 
type of control encouraged by Simons’ belief and interactive systems (6.3.2-6.3.3).
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In this way, the findings suggest that a traditional control approach contributes to 
increased conflict in the MAs ability to contribute simultaneously to control and DM. 
Alternatively, a modem control approach, may encourage the MA to play a broader 
role in the organisation and therefore lessens the conflicts inherent in the MA’s 
ability to contribute to DM as well as control.
The contribution of these findings to the conflict literature is discussed in section
7.5.4.
7.4 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
In this section, the strengths and limitations of the study are outlined so that the 
findings and conclusions can be put into context.
7.4.1 Strengths
The strengths of the study may be summarised as follows:
• The study builds on an existing body of research including the key
management accounting, control and DM frameworks as well as extensive 
literature addressing the MA’s evolving role.
• This study of the role of the MA is based on the perceptions of managers. 
According to Pierce and O’Dea (2003), MAs’ own responses may be 
susceptible to response bias and will provide little insight into the MAs’ 
capacity to satisfy the needs of managers. In addition, the study covers a 
broad range of managers, from varying functional areas and varying types of 
organisation, ensuring a broad spectrum of responses.
• A rigorous approach was adopted in conducting the interviews and analysing
the data, the details of which are presented in sections 4.3.6, 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
Several measures were taken in order to maximise the validity of the
qualitative findings including respondent validation, triangulation and 
analytical induction (4.5).
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7.4.2 Limitations
The key findings, conclusions and implications of the study must be interpreted in 
light o f the limitations of the study, which are set out below:
• The study focused on eighteen managers and while the findings may suggest 
correlations and associations between variables, these results cannot be 
extrapolated to a wider population.
• An interview approach has the limitation that the lack o f anonymity may 
result in bias arising from the interviewee’s reluctance to confess to any 
personal experiences which may reflect badly on them. This might be 
particularly pertinent in this study as the M A’s performance may well be 
affected by the manager’s own approach. However, the managers were 
guaranteed their anonymity and appeared to speak freely during the 
interviews.
• Qualitative data gathering and analysis inevitably results in the use of some 
judgement and subjectivity. Steps were taken to increase objectivity in this 
regard (4.5).
•  Given the gaps in the literature in terms of managers’ perceptions of the role 
o f the MA, at the study design phase it was decided to focus exclusively on 
the perceptions of managers. An interview with the corresponding MA in 
each organisation, in order to corroborate the responses o f the managers, was 
beyond the scope of this study.
• This study examined managers’ perceptions of the conflicts inherent in the 
M A’s role. A complete review of such conflicts would have required MAs to 
be interviewed also. This was beyond the scope o f this study.
• The development o f an in depth profile of each manager in terms of reporting 
structure, personal style, education, training, experience, strengths and 
weaknesses was beyond the scope o f the study. A similar profile of the MAs 
was also beyond the scope of the study. To this end, it was not possible to 
draw any conclusions as to the effect of any of these factors on managers’ 
perceptions of the role of the MA.
• Lastly, a detailed review of the effect o f the functional orientation of the 
managers was also beyond the scope of this study though this did emerge
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during the study as a possible area of research interest (5.3.1). The eighteen 
managers were sourced randomly and numbers o f managers from specific 
functions were too small to facilitate meaningful comparisons.
7.5 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
The contribution o f the study can be divided into contributions made to the control 
literature (7.5.1), to the body of literature surrounding the M A ’s role (7.5.2), to the 
literature relating to contingency theories of management accounting (7.5.3) and to 
the role conflict literature (7.5.4).
7.5.1 Contribution to Control Literature
The taxonomy of MAs outlined in section 6.2 is consistent with the progression of 
thought with regard to control as presented in the literature (section 6.3). The 
Interpreters and Participators represent the modern understanding of control captured 
in Otley’s (1999) framework as well as the belief and interactive levers of Simons’ 
(1995) control framework. The Reporters and Guardians represent a more traditional 
view of control reflected in Otley and Berry’s (1980) framework as well as the 
diagnostic and boundary levers o f Simons (1995) framework. The findings of this 
study broaden our understanding of these control frameworks by suggesting that 
specific styles o f control will only be successfully executed in specific organisational 
circumstances (7.3.2). Specifically there was evidence that:
• industry sector is an important factor affecting the control culture of a 
company (6.4.1).
• growing competitive pressures are associated with a greater emphasis on 
Simons’ (1995) belief systems of control (6.4.2).
• increased financial security is associated with Simons’ (1995) interactive 
systems of control (6.4.3).
• a strong influence from corporate head office appeared to encourage Simons’ 
(1995) diagnostic control systems (6.4.4).
• increased local autonomy within the organisation is associated with Simons’
(1995) belief and interactive control systems (6.4.4).
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The study further broadens our understanding o f the control frameworks by 
identifying how relationships and interactions between individuals influence the style 
of control executed in an organisation (7.3.2). Specifically there was evidence that:
• the relationship between the manager and the MA may influence the control 
culture within the organisation (6.5.3).
• More independent managers may be associated with organisations with 
traditional control approaches (6.5.4).
•  more territorial managers are more likely to operate within basic diagnostic 
and boundary control systems (6.5.5).
• a modem approach to control (Otley, 1999) is more likely to be successfully 
executed in an organisation where the MA has a strong understanding o f the 
business (6.6.1).
• a modern style o f control is more likely to be successfully executed in 
organisations with a culture o f interaction and open communications (6.6.2).
7.5.2 Contributions to Literature Relating to the Role of the MA
This study addressed a gap in the literature in which managers perceptions of the 
MA’s role had not been examined in detail (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). The 
conclusions highlighted in section 7.3.3 have resulted in a deeper understanding of 
what managers are looking for in the context of support for control and DM and 
provides an insight into levels o f satisfaction among managers with the role played 
by their MA in this regard. In particular the conclusions outlines in 7.3.4 and 7.3.5 
have facilitated the development of a deeper understanding of the concept of the 
hybrid accountant than had previously been put forward in the literature. 
Specifically, the study contributes to the MA role literature as follows:
• Previous studies have reviewed the importance o f various characteristics of 
information (2.6). This study provides a deeper level o f understanding by 
identifying that managers have different information requirements depending 
on whether the information is for control or DM (6.7.1).
• Similarly, previous studies have focused on the importance o f various SACs 
in their MA (3.8). This study provides a greater understanding of the 
importance o f these SACs by identifying that managers value different SACs
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in their MA when they are engaged in control as opposed to when they are 
engaged in DM (6.7.1).
• The study provides empirical evidence o f the needs o f managers and the 
performance of MAs relative to those needs. Prior studies in this regard have 
focused on anticipated requirements in the future and predicted changes in the 
coming years (3.7.6). This study provides an up-to-date account o f managers’ 
perceptions of the role of the MA.
• Prior studies have described the modem MA as a hybrid accountant engaging 
in effective control, in combination with a highly collaborative business 
partner role. These studies have reported the traditional, more numerically 
oriented MA to be antiquated and redundant (3.7). This study provides a 
more comprehensive insight into the modern role o f the MA. Firstly, it offers 
a detailed description o f the hybrid accountant as identified in the findings 
(7.3.4). Secondly, it found that the M A’s role (6.2) is impacted by several 
factors, relating to the organisation (6.4), the manager (6.5) and the MA (6.6), 
which suggests that while the ‘hybrid accountant’ described in the literature 
does exist, he/she can only exist in certain circumstances. Thirdly, in contrast 
with much of the literature in this area, it found that managers generally value 
and rely upon many o f the aspects o f the traditional MA and some quite 
simply do not desire a hybrid accountant (6.7.3). Finally, it uncovered three 
key factors impeding the MA’s pursuit o f the hybrid accountant role- MAs 
considered are too busy (6.7.5), too honest (6.7.6) and not considered by 
managers to be true stakeholders in DM (6.7.7).
7.5.3 Contributions to Contingency Literature
This study provides a deeper and more contemporary insight into contingency 
research surrounding the MAs role (7.3.1). It describes how various organisational 
factors may be associated with the role played by the MA in the context of control 
and DM, i.e. industry (6.4.1), level of competition (6.4.2), financial security (6.4.3) 
and group structure (6.4.4). These findings would support much of the contingency 
research which found that similar factors- technological development (Piper, 1978; 
Daft and Macintosh, 1978), level of competition (Khandwalla, 1972), financial 
security (Otley, 1978; Langfield-Smith, 1997) and group structure (Homgren, 1972;
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Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978)- were all important factors determining the 
effectiveness o f MASs.
Chenhall (2003) suggested that future contingency-based research should focus on 
interactions between individuals and groups which might impact the MAs role within 
the MAS. The study provides evidence that the relationship between the MA and the 
manager (6.5.3), the extent o f manager independence from the MA (6.5.4) and levels 
of manager territorialism (6.5.5) may be associated with the role played by the MA.
7.5.4 Contributions to the Role Conflict Literature
The literature has identified how the MA’s role as a simultaneous ‘controller’ and 
‘supporter’ is inherently conflicting (3.7.9). In order to successfully carry out both 
aspects o f the role, the MA must overcome these conflicts. This study contributed to 
this literature by identifying some factors which may be associated with increased 
conflict in the M A’s role (7.3.6).
• Firstly, the findings suggested that, in some cases, the MA does not have the
requisite knowledge, traits and abilities to overcome the inherent conflicts
meaning that the conflict issue may be attributable to the individual MA.
• Secondly, the study suggests that the managers themselves have a
responsibility to help the MA to overcome these conflicts and if  the manager
is not motivated to do so, the conflicts will remain, suggesting that the
conflict issue may also be attributable to the manager.
• Finally, the findings suggest a correlation between the control culture o f the 
organisation and the conflict in the M A’s role. Managers in organisations 
with traditional control systems- as modelled in Otley and Berry (1980) and 
Simons’ (1995) diagnostic and boundary control systems- perceived a strong 
conflict in the M A’s ability to contribute to both control and DM. 
Conversely, managers in organisations with modern and progressive control 
systems- as modelled in Otley (1999) and Simons’ (1995) belief and 
interactive control systems- perceived comparatively less conflict in the 
M A’s role.
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7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A number of directions for future research emerge from the findings, conclusions, 
and limitations o f the current study:
• Detailed case study analysis of cases within each MA group would allow a 
researcher to develop a deeper understanding of how the four types of MA 
operate and what other factors might influence how they perform their roles. 
Longitudinal studies could trace developments in the MA’s role as the key 
contingent variables develop (for example, organisation take-over, growth in 
competition, new management structures).
• This study asked managers what they expect from their MA and how they 
perceive the MA to be performing relative to expectation. Future research on 
this topic could extend this line of enquiry to incorporate the perceptions of 
MAs. Both parties could corroborate each-others responses. In addition, it 
would be useful to ascertain if  the M As’ perceptions differ from the 
managers.
• Section 7.5.4 provides the contribution of this study to the role conflict 
literature. Further analyses of the conflicts in the M A ’s role as a simultaneous 
controller and supporter should incorporate the views of MAs as well as 
managers. This would facilitate a deeper understanding of the factors 
influencing these conflicts. It would be useful to further explore the effect of 
the individual managers and MAs on the conflicts in the M As’ role.
• These findings presented the possibility o f manager territorialism as a 
contemporary contingent factor influencing the role of the MA. These 
findings were consistent with the literature regarding strong versus weak 
managers (6.5.5). This issue was not specifically addressed in this study. A 
thorough analysis would have required a detailed profile o f each manager and 
MA in each organisation which was beyond the scope of the study. This does 
represent a strong opportunity for future research.
• This study presented some initial findings in relation to the effects of 
managerial function on the role o f the MA, which were consistent with the 
literature (6.5.2). Managerial function was not a specific focus o f the study so 
further analysis was not possible but it would also be useful to extend the
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study to analyse the effect of the manager’s functional orientation on their 
requirements.
• Other variables emerged throughout the findings as potential contingent 
factors effecting the managers’ requirements as well as the M As’ ability to 
meet these requirements. A detailed analysis o f these factors was beyond the 
scope of this study, i.e. the educational background of the manager, for 
example business or engineering (suggested by Manager F), the professional 
training route o f the MA, for example audit or industry (suggested by 
Manager E), the career ambitions o f the MA (suggested by Manager J), the 
length o f service o f either the manager or the MA (suggested by Manager G). 
This would follow Chenhall’s (2003) suggestions that future contingency- 
based research should focus on more sociologically based contingent factors.
7.7 CONCLUSION
Chapter 7 presented an overview of the research undertaken, together with the key 
findings and conclusions of the study. The chapter also detailed the study’s 
contribution to the literature as well as its’ strengths and limitations and some 
possible suggestions for future research.
This study specifically addressed a gap in the empirical literature by examining 
managers’ perceptions o f the role of the MA in providing information for control and 
DM. It identified a diverse range of MA roles and highlighted several factors which 
may be associated with the particular role played by the MA. It found that not all 
managers are relentlessly seeking hybrid accountants or business partners as the 
literature would suggest, and suggests that those that do, still value many of the 
characteristics and traits of the traditional MA. In examining the M A’s role from a 
manager’s perspective, the study contributed to the literature by presenting an up-to- 
date description o f the hybrid accountant. In doing so, some obstacles were 
identified, which the MA must overcome in order to develop a hybrid role. As well 
as contributing to the MA role literature, the findings contributed significantly to the 
control literature by identifying how the style of control executed in an organisation 
may be associated with the role played by the MA. It added to the contingency 
theories of management accounting by responding to Chenhall’s (2003) suggestion
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to examine the effects of some sociologically derived contingent factors on the role 
of the MA. Finally the findings contributed to the role conflict literature by providing 
an up-to-date analysis o f the conflicts in the M A’s role from the perspective of 
managers, and identifying some factors which may be associated with the perceived 
conflicts in the MAs role.
The findings identified several opportunities for future research. Future studies could 
be expanded to include MAs which would facilitate a comparison o f the managers 
perceptions with those o f the MAs. Such an expansion would also facilitate a more 
detailed analysis o f the individual manager or MA related factors influencing the 
conflicts in the M A ’s role. A combined emphasis on the manager and the MA would 
also allow an examination of the impact o f the strength or weakness o f the manager 
on the role of the MA. Regardless of the direction o f the future research, there can be 
no doubt that detailed case study analyses and longitudinal studies could certainly 
provide a deeper understanding of the MA’s role.
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APPENDIX A
1. State brief objective of research
2. First of all, could you tell me a little about your role in the company?
3. What role does the MA play in your company, and specifically in the 
performance of your job?
4. Could you isolate some tasks, which you face on a daily, weekly, monthly, 
annual or perhaps even once-off basis for which you require information?
■ Focusing particularly on information within the financial arena. Not 
necessarily purely financial information, but information, which is 
used in quite a financial context, e.g. pricing decisions, monitoring of 
subordinate target achievement, monitoring of a sub units 
profitability, capital investment decisions, production yield analysis, 
changing suppliers, etc.
■ Aim to isolate some different examples, each for control and DM, if 
you’ve ascertained the split, suggest it back to confirm if  it appears 
reasonable.
Write these down on the pad on the desk and use them continuously to
refer back to them.
5. Where do you get this information?
Tie in with role of MA above and clear any inconsistencies
6. In an ideal world, how would you rate the importance o f these characteristics 
of such information (using list o f characteristics)?
■ How important is each to you in control information?
■ How does the relative importance o f each characteristic differ 
for DM information?
Refer to the above-mentioned page all the time, ensuring to cover both 
angles.
7. How does your MA perform in each instance relative to your expectations 
(using list of characteristics again)!
■ Consider both tasks, refer to paper.
■ Highlight deficiencies (/strengths) in the information provided by 
finance.
■ If the MA provides little information, ask what is lacking in their 
information, which caused them to abandon them.
Interview Guide
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8. Where else do you source this type of information if  the MA is not providing 
it?
■ Highlight strengths (/deficiencies) in the information provided by the 
alternative.
■ Have you any particular reason or example as to why you perceive the 
alternative to be better at providing information o f this type.
9. Moving on now from the qualities of the information itself and focusing more 
on the qualities o f the information provider. It is expected that possible 
deficiencies in the quality o f information from particular sources may be 
explained by the skills and competencies o f those who provide it, conversely, 
strengths in the quality o f information should also be explained by the skills 
and competencies o f those sources.
10. How important would you perceive these attributes, skills and competencies 
of in those who provide you with such information (use list o f a, s and c)?
■ How important are they in a provider o f control information?
■ Does this importance differ for a provider o f DM information?
Refer to pad containing examples.
11. How does your MA perform in each instance relative to your expectations?
■ Highlight deficiencies (/strengths) in the skills and competencies of 
the MA.
Ensure to draw out responses, strong potential for depth.
12. If the MA does not provide this information, query the manager about the 
alternative?
■ Highlight strengths (/deficiencies) in the skills and competencies of 
the alternative.
■ Have you any particular reason or example as to why you perceive the 
alternative department in this way.
■ What is it about your MA in this respect that caused you to abandon 
them.
Ensure to draw out responses, strong potential for depth.
13. Would you perceive any conflicts arising as a result o f one person providing 
you with information for both purposes?
■ Refer specifically to the examples provided earlier in the interview. 
Do their strengths in providing information for some purposes 
compromise their ability to provide information for other purposes
■ Have you any particular reason or examples as to why you would 
perceive this to be the case?
■ Specifically, what causes this conflict?
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APPENDIX B
How important do you perceive the following information characteristics to be in 
control information?
Interview Questionnaire
Not at all 
Important 
1
Somewhat
Important
2
Quite
Important
3
Very
Important
4
Extremely
Important
5
Accuracy
Consistency
Reliability
Timeliness
Aggregation
Relevance
Flex. & Ad
Scope
How important do you perceive the following information characteristics to be in 
decision-making information?
Not at all 
Important 
1
Somewhat
Important
2
Quite
Important
3
Very
Important
4
Extremely
Important
5
Accuracy
Consistency
Reliability
Timeliness
Aggregation
Relevance
Flex. & Ad
Scope
222
How does your management accountant perform in terms o f providing information 
with these characteristics?
Bad
1
Poor
2
Quite Good 
3
Very Good 
4
Excellent
5
Accuracy
Consistency
Reliability
Timeliness
Aggregation
Relevance
Flex. & Ad
Scope
How important do you perceive the following skills, attributes and competencies to 
be in providers o f control information?
Not at all 
Important 
1
Somewhat
Important
2
Quite
Important
3
Very
Important
4
Extremely
Important
5
Ethics
Honesty
IT Skills
Precision
Financial Exp
Impartiality
Problem solving 
& Anal, skills
Team-skills
Single-
mindedness
Sound business 
understanding
Conservativeness
Interp & Comm. 
Skills
Creativity
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How important do you perceive the following skills, attributes and competencies to 
be in providers o f decision-making information?
Not at all 
Important 
1
Somewhat
Important
2
Quite
Important
3
Very
Important
4
Extremely
Important
5
Ethics
Honesty
IT Skills
Precision
Financial Exp
Impartiality
Problem solving 
& Anal, skills
Team-skills
Single-
mindedness
Sound business 
understanding
Conservativeness
Interp & Comm. 
Skills
Creativity
How does your management accountant perform in terms o f exhibiting these skills, 
attributes and competencies?
Bad
1
Poor
2
Quite
Good
3
Very Good 
4
Excellent
5
Ethics
Honesty
IT Skills
Precision
Financial Exp
Impartiality
Problem solving 
& Anal, skills
Team-skills
Single-
mindedness
Sound business 
understanding
Conservativeness
Interp & Comm. 
Skills
Creativity
224
APPENDIX C
Orla Feeney 
40 The Street 
The Village 
Co. Dublin
Ms A Smith 2 July 2004
MA
ABC Ltd.
Main Road 
Dungarvan 
Co. Waterford
Dear Ms Smith
My name is Orla Feeney and I am currently pursuing a Masters Degree by Research 
in affiliation with Dublin City University. I am a member o f the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants o f Ireland and a practicing MA working within the 
Pharmaceutical Industry.
In fulfilment of this Masters Degree I am researching the role o f the finance function 
within the organisation, and specifically, the perception held by managers with 
regard to this role.
To complete my research I must interview a sample o f managers in industry with 
regard to their use of the management accountant. I am targeting middle managers 
who are responsible for a division, area, department or activity within the 
organisation.
To this end, I would be extremely grateful if you could provide me with a contact 
name of somebody in your company who might fit this description. The interview 
would take between forty minutes and one hour. If preferred, I could forward a brief 
outline of my proposed discussion topics in advance. This research is purely for 
academic purposes and would be entirely confidential. Under no circumstances 
would any company or individual details be disclosed.
I hope you will not mind if I take the liberty of following this letter up with a phone 
call in the next week. However, in the meantime, should you wish to contact me for 
any reason, my contact details are indicated at the bottom of this page.
Thank you for taking the time to read my letter. I am all too aware of how precious 
time is in a busy office and appreciate your patience.
For your information I obtained your contact details from the CIMA member’s 
directory.
Sample Letter Requesting Interview
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Many thanks, and, 
Yours sincerely
Orla Feeney
APPENDIX D
Manager Profiles
Mgr Function Org
Ownership
Industry Turnover* MA
Classification
A MD Irish
subsidiary of
European
multinational
Telecomms 
components and 
software dev
Eur 220m Reporter
B Sales Irish
subsidiary of
European
multinational
Pharmaceuticals
distribution
Eur 1,300m Participator
C Supply
Chain
Irish
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
Pharmaceuticals
sales,
distribution and 
marketing
Eur 90m Participator
D Distribution Irish
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
Software
manufacturer/
distributor
Eur 8,000m Participator
E Production Irish
subsidiary of
European
multinational
Consumer
products
manufacture
Eur 270m Reporter
F Plant Irish
subsidiary of
European
multinational
Global
innovation
solutions
provider
Eur 700m Interpreter
G Production Irish
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
Biomedical
manufacture
Eur 270m Participator
H Logistics Irish owned 
multinational
Drinks 
production, 
sales and 
distribution
Eur 1,000m Participator
I Production Indigenous
Irish
Beverages/snack 
foods sales and 
distribution
Eur 900m Guardian
J MD Indigenous
Irish
Services
subcontracting
Eur 40m Interpreter
K Production Irish
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
Computer sales 
and services
Eur 500m Interpreter
L Director Local county 
council
Housing dept Not
Applicable
Guardian
M Production Irish Retail Eur 80m Interpreter
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Mgr Function Org
Ownership
Industry Turnover* MA
Classification
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
pharmaceuticals
products
manufacture
N Sales Irish branch 
o f UK co
Transport and 
freight services
Eur 50m Interpreter
0 Sales Indigenous
Irish
Biotechnology Not
available
Participator
P Production Irish
subsidiary of
Japanese
multinational
Second stage
pharmaceuticals
manufacture
Eur 85m Guardian
Q Production Irish
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
Bulk
pharmaceuticals
manufacture
Eur 100m Guardian
R Facilities Irish
subsidiary of 
US
multinational
Computer
manufacture
Eur 6,000m Interpreter
* approximate figure for most recently published 12 month financial period
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APPENDIX E(RQ1)
Breakdown of managers’ responses in relation to the perceived importance of
characteristics of information
5 4 3 2 1 Mean
Importance
Relevance Control 15 2 1 0 0 4.78
Decision Making 16 2 0 0 0 4.89
Reliability Control 11 6 0 1 0 4.50
Decision Making 12 5 0 1 0 4.56
Accuracy Control 13 1 3 1 0 4.44
Decision Making 11 2 0 5 0 4.06
Consistency Control 4 10 4 0 0 4.00
Decision Making 5 6 3 2 2 3.56
Flexibility & 
Adaptability
Control 2 13 2 1 0 3.89
Decision Making 3 11 3 1 0 3.89
Timeliness Control 3 7 5 3 0 3.56
Decision Making 9 6 2 1 0 4.28
Aggregation Control 1 9 5 3 0 3.44
Decision Making 1 10 5 2 0 3.56
Scope Control 2 5 7 1 3 3.11
Decision Making 7 5 3 1 2 3.78
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APPENDIX F (RQ2)
Breakdown of managers’ responses in relation to the perceived importance of
SACs of information providers
5 4 3 2 1 Mean
Ethics Control 15 3 0 0 0 4.83
Decision Making 14 3 1 0 0 4.72
Honesty Control 10 6 2 0 0 4.44
Decision Making 10 6 2 0 0 4.44
Precision Control 8 9 0 1 0 4.33
Decision Making 7 8 0 3 0 4.33
Sound Business 
Understanding
Control 7 10 1 0 0 4.33
Decision Making 11 7 0 0 0 4.61
IT Skills Control 5 10 3 0 0 4.11
Decision Making 7 8 3 0 0 4.22
Financial Expertise Control 6 9 1 2 0 4.06
Decision Making 5 9 2 2 0 3.94
Interpersonal and 
Communications Skills
Control 3 12 3 0 0 4.00
Decision Making 8 9 1 0 0 4.39
Problem Solving and 
Analytical Skills
Control 5 7 4 2 0 3.83
Decision Making 7 6 3 2 0 4.00
Team-skills Control 4 9 3 1 1 3.78
Decision Making 10 4 3 0 1 4.22
Impartiality Control 6 4 5 2 1 3.67
Decision Making 5 4 5 3 1 3.50
Creativity Control 2 6 6 2 2 3.22
Decision Making 8 3 3 2 2 3.72
Conservativeness Control 0 1 9 3 5 2.33
Decision Making 0 1 6 4 7 2.06
Single-Mindedness Control 0 1 5 4 8 1.94
Decision Making 1 0 5 4 8 2.00
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APPENDIX G (RQ4)
Breakdown of managers’ responses regarding MAs’ performance in relation to
information characteristics
5 4 3 2 1 Mean
Accuracy 2 11 4 1 0 3.78
Consistency 2 11 4 1 0 3.78
Reliability 3 11 0 4 0 3.72
Timeliness 3 10 2 3 0 3.72
Aggregation 2 8 2 6 0 3.33
Relevance 3 7 2 3 3 3.22
Flexibility and 
Adaptability
0 9 2 5 2 3.00
Scope 0 4 6 6 2 2.67
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Breakdown of managers’ responses regarding MAs’ performance in relation to
the SACs
APPENDIX H (RQ5)
5 4 3 2 1 Mean
Ethics 13 4 1 0 0 4.67
Honesty 11 6 1 0 0 4.56
IT Skills 7 10 1 0 0 4.33
Precision 8 8 0 2 0 4.22
Financial Expertise 5 11 2 0 0 4.17
Impartiality 5 9 2 2 0 3.94
Problem Solving and Analytical 
Skills
2 7 6 3 0 3.44
Sound Business Understanding 0 8 5 4 1 3.11
Single Mindedness 0 6 9 2 1 3.11
Team-skills 1 6 6 4 1 3.11
Conservativeness 0 5 7 3 3 2.78
Interpersonal and 
Communications Skills
0 5 3 10 0 2.71
Creativity 0 2 7 6 3 2.44
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APPENDIX I (RQ1)
Wilcoxon signed rank testing of significance of difference between perceived
importance of characteristics in control information
Characteristic 1 Mean Characteristic 2 Mean Z
Score
P Score
Relevance 4.78 Reliability 4.50 21 0.2969
Relevance 4.78 Accuracy 4.44 17 0.2188
Relevance 4.78 Consistency 4.00 73.5 0.0049 **
Note 1
Reliability 4.50 Accuracy 4.44 12 0.8438
Reliability 4.50 Consistency 4.00 46 0.6450
Reliability 4.50 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.89 86.5 0.0353 *
Note 2
Accuracy 4.44 Consistency 4.00 83 0.2078
Accuracy 4.44 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.89 43 0.0443 *
Note 3
Consistency 4.00 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.89 22 0.6406
Consistency 4.00 Timeliness 3.56 74 0.1937
Consistency 4.00 Aggregation 3.56 67 0.0269*
Note 3
Flexibility and 
Adapt.
3.89 Scope 3.11 92 0.1122 
Note 4
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
Note 1: In control information, relevance is perceived to be significantly more 
important than consistency and all lower ranked characteristics as indicated at table 1 
at section 5.1
Note 2: In control information, accuracy is perceived to be significantly more 
important than flexibility and adaptability and all lower ranked characteristics as 
indicated at table 1 at section 5.1
Note 3: Same rational as explained at notes 1 and 2.
Note 4: In control information, there is no significant difference between lowest 4 
ranked characteristics as indicated at table 1 at section 5.1.
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APPENDIX J (RQ1)
Wilcoxon signed rank testing of significance of difference between perceived
importance of characteristics in DM information
Characteristic 1 Mean Characteristic 2 Mean Z
Score
P Score
Relevance 4.89 Reliability 4.56 18 0.1563
Relevance 4.89 Timeliness 4.28 41.5 0.0273 * Note 1
Reliability 4.56 Timeliness 4.28 31.5 0.3594
Reliability 4.56 Accuracy 4.06 41 0.1934
Reliability 4.56 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.89 75.5 0.0298 * Note 2
Timeliness 4.28 Accuracy 4.06 53 0.6355
Timeliness 4.28 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.89 45 0.0840
Timeliness 4.28 Scope 3.78 56 0.2036
Timeliness 4.28 Aggregation 3.56 92 0.0107* Note 2
Accuracy 4.06 Consistency 3.56 64 0.2163 Note 3
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
Note 1: In DM information, relevance is perceived to be significantly more important 
than timeliness and all lower ranked characteristics as indicated at table 1 at section
5.1
Note 2: Same rational as explained at note 1.
Note 3: In DM information, there is no significant difference between lowest 5 
ranked characteristics as indicated at table 1 at section 5.1.
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APPENDIX K (RQ2)
Wilcoxon signed rank testing of significance of difference between perceived
importance of SACs in providers of control information
SAC 1 Mean SAC 2 Mean Z
Score
P Score
Ethics 4.83 Honesty 4.44 15 0.0625
Ethics 4.83 Precision 4.33 28* 0.0156 *
Note 1
Honesty 4.44 Precision 4.33 9 0.8125
Honesty 4.44 SBU 4.33 38.5 0.7002
Honesty 4.44 IT Skills 4.11 52.5 0.3394
Honesty 4.44 Financial Expertise 4.06 27.5 0.2500
Honesty 4.44 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 52.5 0.1016
Honesty 4.44 Problem solving 3.83 45 0.0840
Honesty 4.44 Team-skills 3.78 54 0.0674
Honesty 4.44 Impartiality 3.67 34 0.0234 *
Note 2
Precision 4.33 SBU 4.33 30 0.8457
Precision 4.33 IT Skills 4.11 45 0.3203
Precision 4.33 Financial Expertise 4.06 22 0.2188
Precision 4.33 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 33.5 0.2500
Precision 4.33 Problem solving 3.83 34.5 0.2031
Precision 4.33 Team-skills 3.78 38 0.0742
Precision 4.33 Impartiality 3.67 28 0.0156 *
Note 2
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33. IT Skills 4.11 27 0.2500
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33 Financial Expertise 4.06 58.5 0.4143
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33 Interpersonal and 
communication, skills
4.00 36 0.1289
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33 Prob Solving 3.83 43 0.1309
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33 Teamskills 3.78 47 0.0488
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33 Impartiality 3.67 92.5 0.0730
Sound Bus 
Understanding
4.33 Creativity 3.22 99.5 0.0017**
Note 2
IT Skills 4.11 Financial Expertise 4.06 23 1.0000
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SAC 1 Mean SAC 2 Mean Z
Score
P Score
IT Skills 4.11 Interpersonal and 
communication, skills
4.00 22.5 0.6406
IT Skills 4.11 Prob Solving 3.83 59.5 0.3737
IT Skills 4.11 Teamskills 3.78 46 0.2783
IT Skills 4.11 Impartiality 3.67 92.5 0.2312
IT Skills 4.11 Creativity 3.22 70 0.0122 *
Note 2
Financial Expertise 4.06 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 28 1.0000
Financial Expertise 4.06 Prob Solving 3.83 61.5 0.6257
Financial Expertise 4.06 Teamskills 3.78 41.5 0.5195
Financial Expertise 4.06 Impartiality 3.67 44 0.3652
Financial Expertise 4.06 Creativity 3.22 72 0.0681
Financial Expertise 4.06 Conservativeness 2.33 149.5 0.0001
* *  Note 2
Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 Prob Solving 3.83 44.5 0.7334
Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 Teamskills 3.78 19 0.4688
Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 Impartiality 3.67 54 0.2661
Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.00 Creativity 3.22 56 0.0420 *
Note 2
Prob Solving 3.83 Teamskills 3.78 43 0.7910
Prob Solving 3.83 Impartiality 3.67 36 0.8311
Prob Solving 3.83 Creativity 3.22 42 0.0195 *
Note 2
Teamskills 3.78 Impartiality 3.67 62.5 0.5840
Teamskills 3.78 Creativity 3.22 66 0.1677
Teamskills 3.78 Conservativeness 2.33 142 0.0008
* *  Note 2
Impartiality 3.67 Creativity 3.22 59 0.3757
Impartiality 3.67 Conservativeness 2.33 94.5 0.0067
* *  Note 2
Creativity 3.22 Conservativeness 2.33 72 0.0081
* *  Note 2
Conservativeness 2.33 Single mindedness 1.94 32 0.0912
Note 3
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
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Note 1: In providers o f control information, ethics is perceived to be significantly 
more important than precision and all lower ranked characteristics as indicated at 
table 2 at section 5.2
Note 2: Same rational as explained at note 1.
Note 3: In providers o f control information, there is no significant difference 
between 2 lowest ranked characteristics as indicated at table 2 at section 5.2.
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APPENDIX L (RQ2)
Wilcoxon signed rank testing of significance of difference between perceived
importance of SACs in providers of DM information
SAC 1 Mean SAC 2 Mean Z
Score
P Score
Ethics 4.72 Sound business 
understanding
4.61 7.5 0.6250
Ethics 4.72 Honesty 4.44 10 0.1250
Ethics 4.72 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.39 28.5 0.1953
Ethics 4.72 Precision 4.33 33 0.0391 *
Note 1
Sound business 
understanding
4.61 Honesty 4.44 15 0.4375
Sound business 
understanding
4.61 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.39 27 0.2500
Sound business 
understanding
4.61 Precision 4.33 30 0.1094
Sound business 
understanding
4.61 IT Skills 4.22 45 0.0840
Sound business 
understanding
4.61 Teamskills 4.22 39 0.2754
Sound business 
understanding
4.61 Problem solving 4.00 33 0.0391 *
Note 2
Honesty 4.44 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
4.39 35.5 0.8984
Honesty 4.44 Precision 4.33 17 0.2188
Honesty 4.44 IT Skills 4.22 48 0.5186
Honesty 4.44 Teamskills 4.22 46 0.6221
Honesty 4.44 Problem solving 4.00 22.5 0.2188
Honesty 4.44 Financial Expertise 3.94 25.5 0.0781
Honesty 4.44 Creativity 3.72 67 0.1465
Honesty 4.44 Impartiality 3.50 52.5 0.0098
* *  Note 2
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 Precision 4.33 32 0.5311
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 IT Skills 4.22 24 0.4609
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 Teamskills 4.22 17.5 0.6875
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SAC 1 Mean SAC 2 Mean Z
Score
P Score
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 Problem solving 4.00 63 0.2439
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 Financial Expertise 3.94 41.5 0.1934
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 Creativity 3.72 44.5 0.1055
Interpersonal and
communication
skills
4.39 Impartiality 3.50 88.5 0.0245 *
Note 2
Precision 4.33 IT Skills 4.22 35 0.7910
Precision 4.33 Teamskills 4.22 35 0.4973
Precision 4.33 Problem solving 4.00 29 0.9219
Precision 4.33 Financial Expertise 3.94 26 0.7344
Precision 4.33 Creativity 3.72 63.5 0.5416
Precision 4.33 Impartiality 3.50 33.5 0.0391 *
Note 2
IT Skills 4.22 Teamskills 4.22 26.5 1.0000
IT Skills 4.22 Problem solving 4.00 55.5 0.5417
IT Skills 4.22 Financial Expertise 3.94 42 0.4648
IT Skills 4.22 Creativity 3.72 54 0.2661
IT Skills 4.22 Impartiality 3.50 93.5 0.0637
IT Skills 4.22 Conservativeness 2.06 136 0.0001
* *  Note 2
Teamskills 4.22 Problem solving 4.00 51 0.7354
Teamskills 4.22 Financial Expertise 3.94 55.5 0.5417
Teamskills 4.22 Creativity 3.72 34 0.2031
Teamskills 4.22 Impartiality 3.50 91 0.0833
Teamskills 4.22 Conservativeness 2.06 167 0.0001
* *  Note 2
Problem solving 4.00 Financial Expertise 3.94 34.5 0.9658
Problem solving 4.00 Creativity 3.72 31 0.3594
Problem solving 4.00 Impartiality 3.50 43 0.4131
Problem solving 4.00 Conservativeness 2.06 102 0.0006
* *  Note 2
Financial Expertise 3.94 Creativity 3.72 68 0.6788
Financial Expertise 3.94 Impartiality 3.50 45.5 0.3203
Financial Expertise 3.94 Conservativeness 2.06 149.5 0.0001
* *  Note 2
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SAC 1 M ean SAC 2 M ean Z
Score
P Score
Creativity 3.72 Impartiality 3.50 50.5 0.7869
Creativity 3.72 Conservativeness 2.06 95 0.0052
* *  Note 2
Impartiality 3.50 Conservativeness 2.06 127 0.001 **
N ote 2
Conservativeness 2.06 Single Mindedness 2.00 36 0.8311
Note 3
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
Note 1: In providers o f DM  information, ethics is perceived to be significantly more 
important than precision and all lower ranked characteristics as indicated at table 2 at 
section 5.2
Note 2: Same rational as explained at note 1.
Note 3: In providers o f DM  information, there is no significant difference between 2 
lowest ranked characteristics as indicated at table 2 at section 5.2.
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APPENDIX M (RQ 4)
W ilcoxon signed rank testing o f perceived perform ance o f M A with regard to
information characteristics
Characteristic 1 M ean Characteristic 2 M ean Z
Score
P Score
Accuracy 3.78 Consistency 3.78 18 1.0000
Accuracy 3.78 Reliability 3.72 30 0.8457
Accuracy 3.78 Timeliness 3.72 20 0.8438
Accuracy 3.78 Aggregation 3.33 41.5 0.1934
Accuracy 3.78 Relevance 3.22 48 0.2061
Accuracy 3.78 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.00 43 0.0117 * Note 1
Consistency 3.78 Reliability 3.72 30 0.8457
Consistency 3.78 Timeliness 3.72 16 0.8125
Consistency 3.78 Aggregation 3.33 33.5 0.2500
Consistency 3.78 Relevance 3.22 48 0.2061
Consistency 3.78 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.00 52 0.0098 * * N o te 2
Reliability 3.72 Timeliness 3.72 27.5 0.9212
Reliability 3.72 Aggregation 3.33 38.5 0.3233
Reliability 3.72 Relevance 3.22 46 0.2783
Reliability 3.72 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.00 55 0.0020* Note 2
Timeliness 3.72 Aggregation 3.33 45 0.3203
Timeliness 3.72 Relevance 3.22 55.5 0.2334
Timeliness 3.72 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.00 42.5 0.0195 * * Note 2
Aggregation 3.33 Relevance 3.22 54 0.9515
Aggregation 3.33 Flexibility and Adapt. 3.00 44 0.3652
Aggregation 3.33 Scope 2.67 68 0.0210* Note 2
Relevance 3.22 Scope 2.67 66 0.1677 Note 3
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
Note 1: M A’s are perceived to perform significantly better with regard to reliability 
than with regard to flexibility and adaptability and all those lower ranked 
characteristics as indicated at table 3 at section 5.4
Note 2: Same rational as explained at note 1.
Note 3: There is no significant difference between lowest 3 ranked characteristics as 
indicated at table 3 at section 5.4.
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APPENDIX N (RQ5)
W ilcoxon signed rank testing o f perceived perform ance o f M As with regard to
SACs
SAC 1 M ean SAC 2 M ean Z
Score
P Score
Ethics 4.67 Honesty 4.56 10 0.6250
Ethics 4.67 IT Skills 4.33 24.5 0.1094
Ethics 4.67 Precision 4.22 29 0.1484
Ethics 4.67 Financial Expertise 4.17 46 0.0645
Ethics 4.67 Impartiality 3.94 51 0.0137 *
N ote 1
Honesty 4.56 IT Skills 4.33 21 0.2969
Honesty 4.56 Precision 4.22 18 0.1563
Honesty 4.56 Financial Expertise 4.17 48 0.0840
Honesty 4.56 Impartiality 3.94 60.5 0.0137 *
Note 2
IT Skills 4.33 Precision 4.22 25 0.8203
IT Skills 4.33 Financial Expertise 4.17 12 0.3125
IT Skills 4.33 Impartiality 3.94 29 0.1484
IT Skills 4.33 Problem solving 3.44 45 0.0039 *
Note 2
Precision 4.22 Financial Expertise 4.17 30 0.8457
Precision 4.22 Impartiality 3.94 15 0.0625
Precision 4.22 Problem solving 3.44 58 0.0244 *
Note 2
Financial expertise 4.17 Impartiality 3.94 25.5 0.3238
Financial expertise 4.17 Problem solving 3.44 45 0.0039
* * N o te 2
Impartiality 3.94 Problem solving 3.44 59 0.1294
Impartiality 3.94 Teamskills 3.11 89.5 0.0203 *
N ote 2
Problem solving 3.44 Teamskills 3.11 31 0.3594
Problem solving 3.44 Single mindedness 3.11 67 0.3910
Problem solving 3.44 Sound business 
understanding
3.11 33 0.2500
Problem solving 3.44 Conservativeness 2.78 89 0.1070
Problem solving 3.44 Interpersonal and 
communication skills
2.72 41 0.0273 *
Note 2
Teamskills 3.11 Single mindedness 3.11 36.5 0.9097
Teamskills 3.11 Sound business 
understanding
3.11 33.5 1.0000
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SAC 1 Mean SAC 2 M ean Z
Score
P Score
Teamskills 3.11 Conservativeness 2.78 48 0.5186
Teamskills 3.11 Interpersonal and 
communication Skills
2.72 36 0.1289
Teamskills 3.11 Creativity 2.44 49 0.0273 *
Note 2
Single mindedness 3.11 Sound business 
understanding.
3.11 55 0.9032
Single mindedness 3.11 Conservativeness 2.78 15 0.0625
Single mindedness 3.11 Interp. and
communication Skills
2.72 64.5 0.2163
Single mindedness 3.11 Creativity 2.44 95 0.0479 *
Note 2
Sound business 
understanding
3.11 Creativity 2.44 64.4 0.0522
Note 3
Significance levels *0.05 **0.01
Note 1: M A’s are perceived to perform significantly better with regard to ethics than 
with regard to impartiality and all those lower ranked SACs as indicated at table 4 at 
section 5.5
Note 2: Same rational as explained at note 1.
Note 3: There is no significant difference between lowest 4 ranked SACs as 
indicated at table 3 at section 5.4.
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APPENDIX O (RQ3)
Breakdown of m anager responses regarding their MAs overall role
Group
Mgr
Function REPORTER 
(Note 1)
GUARDIAN 
(Note 2)
INTERPRETER 
(Note 3)
PARTICIPATOR 
(Note 4)
A MD X
B Sales X
C Supply Chain X
D Distribution X
E Production X
F Plant X
G Production X
H Logistics X
I Production X
J MD X
K Production X
L Director X
M Production X
N Sales X
O Sales X
P Production X
Q Production X
R Facilities X
Note 1: The MA ‘reports’ routine monthly control information only. The MA does 
not provide any DM information.
Note 2: The MA engages with managers to provide routine monthly control 
information as a control measure. The MA does not provide DM information.
Note 3: The MA actively provides and interprets control information for both control 
and DM purposes. The M A’s profile in this case is one of a controller.
Note 4: The MA is actively involved in both control and DM.
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